Sullivan v. Sullivan
| Docket Number: | 2009-CP-01657-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-14-2010 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Adultery - Continuance - Property division - Attorney's fees Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Carlton, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-15-2009 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: Denise Owens Disposition: GRANTED DIVORCE, DIVIDED THE MARITAL ESTATE, AND AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES Case Number: G2009-605 O/3 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Gerard Van Sullivan |
PRO SE |
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| Appellee: | Natasha Donielle Sullivan | BRADLEY ALAN OBERHOUSEN | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Adultery - Continuance - Property division - Attorney's fees |
| Summary of the Facts: | Natasha Sullivan was granted a divorce from Gerard Sullivan based on his uncondoned adultery. Almost three weeks before trial, the chancellor allowed Gerard’s attorney to withdraw from the case, and Gerard represented himself. On the morning of trial, Gerard requested – for the first time – a continuance, which the chancellor denied based on “inconvenience to witnesses” and Natasha’s expense in securing a witness from Texas. Gerard appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Continuance Gerard argues that the chancellor erred in denying his motion to continue the trial. The denial of a continuance will not be reversed unless prejudice resulted. The record shows that Gerard was neither prejudiced in representing himself nor by the denial of the requested continuance. Even though Gerard represented himself, he questioned Natasha’s witnesses extensively. The chancellor also aided Gerard in preventing the admission of hearsay. Issue 2: Property division Gerard argues that the chancellor erred in the division of property. The chancellor valued the marital home and household property at $170,000. Natasha purchased the house for $103,000 before she married Gerard. She refinanced several times and owed approximately $150,000. Because of current market conditions, the chancellor found it unlikely that any equity would be realized from a sale of the house. Thus, she awarded Natasha possession of the home and its furnishings for the purpose of accepting a then-pending offer of $150,000. There is no evidence in the record to show whether Natasha sold the house. Gerard claims the chancellor erred by denying him equity in the home if it does sell in the future. But in her bench ruling, the chancellor held that if Natasha chose to remain in the home, any equity realized from a future sale must be divided between the parties, which is not error under these circumstances. It appears the chancellor divided the property and debts as equally as possible. The chancellor addressed the value of the home and equally divided the vehicles between Gerard and Natasha. The chancellor awarded both parties three vehicles, with each receiving one vehicle that is currently not working. The chancellor also considered the expenses caused by Gerard’s previous criminal activities, which Natasha paid by refinancing the house. Though the chancellor did not specifically list and address each Ferguson factor, she indirectly addressed many of the relevant Ferguson factors when she recited her findings of fact and distributed the property. Issue 3: Attorney’s fees The chancellor awarded Natasha $2,500 toward her attorney’s fees. Gerard argues that Natasha presented no evidence of her inability to pay her attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees may only be awarded to a party who is financially unable to pay. Here, there is no evidence of Natasha’s inability to pay her attorney’s fees. The record indicates Natasha is employed by Baptist Medical Center, and Gerard is currently unemployed. There is no mention of Natasha’s current income. Thus, the award of attorney’s fees to Natasha is reversed and remanded. |
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