Moore v. McDonald


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-01451-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-07-2010
Opinion Author: Carlton, J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Real estate - Judgment on the pleadings - M.R.C.P. 15(a) - M.R.C.P. 12(c) - Filing of deeds
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ.
Procedural History: Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 07-13-2009
Appealed from: PEARL RIVER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Judge: Sebe Dale, Jr.
Disposition: GRANTED APPELLEES’ MOTION FOR AJUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Case Number: 08-0318-GN-D

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Kenneth Moore, Jr. and Carolyn M. Moore




WILLIAM L. DUCKER



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Roy D. McDonald, Donna R. McDonald, Harold Belton and Ruth Belton NATHAN S. FARMER  

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    Topic: Real estate - Judgment on the pleadings - M.R.C.P. 15(a) - M.R.C.P. 12(c) - Filing of deeds

    Summary of the Facts: In 1995, William Garrett sold a 20.6-acre tract of land to Lamar Moore and his brother, Kenneth, on a lease-purchase agreement until the purchase price was paid in full. Kenneth married and built a home on his side of the property, but he did not finish out the contract for sale and purchase until 2008. He received a special warranty deed from Garrett’s estate on August 28, 2008. However, Kenneth failed to record the contract for sale and purchase, executed by himself and Garrett, in the chancery clerk’s office. In 1998, Lamar and Garrett executed a warranty deed conveying Lamar’s 10.34 acres to Roy McDonald and his wife, Donna McDonald. The conveyance reserved a twenty-five foot easement along the north boundary of the property. In 2007, the McDonalds transferred title to a portion of the property to their son-in-law, Harold Belton, pursuant to a warranty deed. When Harold’s deed was recorded, Roy and Harold moved their driveway over. In 2008, the McDonalds and Beltons filed a complaint to quiet and confirm title and to remove the cloud on the title and for other relief. Kenneth filed his answer with affirmative defenses, and he sought intervention for Carolyn Moore in this action pursuant to her motion to intervene as a party defendant. The Moores filed a cross-complaint. The McDonalds’ and Beltons’ attorney moved for a judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the motion. The chancellor advised the Moores that they could seek a remedy against Garrett’s estate to resolve the issue. As to the McDonalds and Beltons, the chancellor found that they were entitled to have title to their tract of property quieted and confirmed against any claims of the Moores. The Moores appeal.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Judgment on the pleadings The Moores argue that by granting the McDonalds’ and Beltons’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings without allowing the Moores to amend their complaint under M.R.C.P. 15(a), the chancellor improperly applied M.R.C.P. 12(c). The Moores specifically argue that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the description of the land referred to in the deed, and the Moores submit that they had subpoenaed witnesses to testify as to such differences. The Moores failed to object as to the form and timing of the McDonalds’ and Beltons’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings. Therefore, they have waived any objections they may have with regard to the form and timing of the motion. The record shows that Kenneth’s purchase contract was not recorded, and the language in the contract stated that the land needed to be surveyed and that adjustments might need to be made to the contract. The chancellor determined that if an error existed in the description of the land, the error existed in the dealings between Garrett and Kenneth. The chancellor stated that the remedy for such error was not to invalidate a deed which is correct on its face. In addition, the Moores admit in their brief that no matters outside the pleadings were considered before the chancellor granted McDonalds’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings. Thus, the chancellor did not err in granting the motion for a judgment on the pleadings. Issue 2: Filing of deeds The Moores argue that the chancellor erred by invoking the theory of “first in time, first in right,” concerning the filing of the deeds to the land. A plaintiff's deraignment must show title in himself from the government down, or he must show title by adverse possession or he must show title from the defendant, or that both derive their claim from a common source, and that his is the better title from that source. The record shows that the common source of title for the parties is Garrett. It is also uncontested that the first deed recorded was the deed from Garrett to the McDonalds, dated September 15, 1998, and this deed was recorded on September 16, 1998, in the office of the Pearl River County Chancery Clerk. In addition, as previously stated, the chancellor found that the September 15, 1998, warranty deed to the McDonalds was properly executed, unambiguous, and conveyed title to the real property described therein. However, as to the contract for the sale and purchase executed between Kenneth and Garrett on December 23, 1997, the chancellor found that the contract was not recorded, and it did not impart notice to the McDonalds. Thus, the warranty deed gave the McDonalds title superior to that of Moores, who did not acquire title to their real property until August 2008.


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