Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Byrd
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-00065-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-00065-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-26-2010 Opinion Author: Graves, P.J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Motion to enforce settlement - Discovery - Statute of frauds - Section15-3-1(d) Judge(s) Concurring: Kitchens and Chandler, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Randolph, J. Dissenting Author : Dickinson, J., Dissents With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Carlson, P.J., and Lamar, J. Dissenting Author : Lamar, J., Dissents With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., and Dickinson, J. Concurs in Result Only: Pierce, J., Concurs in Result Only With Separate Written Opinion. Procedural History: Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-10-2008 Appealed from: Holmes County Circuit Court Judge: Robert Goza, Jr. Disposition: After a large number of its former employees sued Illinois Central Railroad Company (“ICRR”), alleging occupational exposure to asbestos, plaintiffs’ counsel and ICRR’s counsel met to discuss the possibility of a settlement. Although the parties dispute exactly what transpired at the meeting, they agree that ICRR later sent settlement checks to a substantial majority of the 216 plaintiffs after receiving signed releases and other pertinent information from them. However, ICRR refused to send settlement checks to several remaining plaintiffs. Of these remaining plaintiffs, twenty-five sought enforcement of the alleged settlement agreement. Ultimately, the trial court granted the remaining plaintiffs’ motion to enforce settlement. Case Number: 2002-495 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Illinois Central Railroad Company |
DANIEL J. MULHOLLAND, THOMAS R. PETERS, TANYA D. ELLIS, HEATHER JULIA WILKINS |
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| Appellee: | Gary R. Byrd, Robert Bowden, William L. Cook, John Curlin, Lyle N. Ernest, George A. Fouse, Gary E. Frederickson, Franklin D. Gossum, Q.B. Gray, John Ed Howell, Willie Johnston, Gary Jolly, E.J. Ledbetter, Jr., Bobby L. Lessel, Thomas G. Mudd, Jerry C. McKissack, Lyle McMannis, Ronald E. Miller, Ted E. Morrison, Charles Payne, Robert D. Payne, Kenneth W. Pounders, Fred L. Rogers, Billy Wayne Sims and William L. Taylor | ELIZABETH A. CHIAPPETTA, ROBERT N. PEIRCE, JR., LOUIS H. WATSON, JR. | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Motion to enforce settlement - Discovery - Statute of frauds - Section15-3-1(d) |
| Summary of the Facts: | After a large number of its former employees sued Illinois Central Railroad Company, alleging occupational exposure to asbestos, plaintiffs’ counsel and ICRR’s counsel met to discuss the possibility of a settlement. Although the parties dispute exactly what transpired at the meeting, they agree that ICRR later sent settlement checks to a substantial majority of the 216 plaintiffs after receiving signed releases and other pertinent information from them. However, ICRR refused to send settlement checks to several remaining plaintiffs. Of these remaining plaintiffs, twenty-five sought enforcement of the alleged settlement agreement. Ultimately, the trial court granted the remaining plaintiffs’ motion to enforce settlement, and ICRR appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion to enforce settlement ICRR argues that the trial judge committed plain error when he chose to proceed with the merits of the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce settlement before addressing its motion to sever and dismiss. However, the trial judge’s reasoning in doing so is sound and his decision was correct. On a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, what may well be viable defenses to a claim are simply not relevant unless they are a part of the settlement agreement. In this case, the judge found that they were not. In addition, it was proper for the trial judge to make findings of fact in ruling on plaintiffs’ motion to enforce settle agreement. The trial judge reviewed all of the parties’ pleadings, considered all of the other affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs’ attorney and ICRR’s attorney, describing their understanding of the settlement negotiations, and conducted two quite lengthy hearings on the disputed issues of fact. Moreover, multiple attorneys representing ICRR appeared before the trial judge and had ample opportunity to present evidence and argument. With regard to enforcement of the settlement agreement, a meeting of the minds must exist between the parties in order to have a settlement. Further, in order for a settlement agreement to be enforced, the party claiming the benefit of enforcement must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a meeting of the minds. Here, the trial court has thoroughly considered the arguments and evidence that each party presented in support of their conflicting accounts of what the attorneys agreed to at the Pittsburgh meeting. This evidence included the fact that ICRR already had paid approximately 180 of the approximately 216 plaintiffs, and many of the plaintiffs who already had been paid had signed prior releases (when they had settled claims for other occupational injuries). Furthermore, the approximately thirty-six remaining, unpaid plaintiffs had provided the same documentation to ICRR as those plaintiffs who had been paid. Thus, it was not clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to find that the attorneys did have a meeting of the minds regarding settlement of the claims of all plaintiffs, including those who had signed prior releases. Issue 2: Discovery ICRR argues that it was erroneously denied discovery regarding the plaintiffs’ second B-reads that were submitted in support of the plaintiffs’ claims for settlement and discovery related to the effect of the prior occupational releases on plaintiffs’ current claims. However, there is no indication that ICRR ever requested a hearing regarding discovery related to the second B-reads. Moreover, the trial judge clearly found that the second B-reads were sufficient to meet the conditions of the settlement agreement. Issue 3: Statute of frauds ICRR argues that plaintiffs’ settlements are barred by Mississippi’s Statute of Frauds, section15-3-1(d), because the alleged agreement could not be performed within fifteen months. Where a contract is for an indefinite period of time with the possibility of performance within fifteen months, it is not within the statute of frauds. The record shows that a settlement was reached at the Pittsburgh meeting on January 23, 2004. Since the Pittsburgh meeting, the claims of approximately 180 of the approximately 216 plaintiffs were paid by ICRR well within the fifteen-month time limit designated by Mississippi’s Statute of Frauds. Because ICRR could pay and did pay a majority of the plaintiffs’ claims in settlement, ICRR could have paid the remaining plaintiffs’ claims within the statutory time period. |
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