Means v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-CT-01117-SCT Linked Case(s): 2008-CP-01117-COA ; 2008-CP-01117-COA ; 2008-CT-01117-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-26-2010 Opinion Author: Waller, C.J. Holding: Reversed and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Successive writ - Section 99-39-23(6) - Waiver bar - Section 99-39-21(1) - Order of banishment Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson, P.J., Dickinson, Lamar, Kitchens and Chandler, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Graves, P.J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Carlson, P.J., Dickinson, Lamar, Kitchens and Chandler, JJ. Procedural History: PCR; Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF; Dismissal Writ of Certiorari: yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-03-2008 Appealed from: Forrest County Circuit Court Judge: Robert Helfrich Disposition: Charles Means brought a post-conviction-relief petition to vacate his banishment order and the revocation of the suspension of his sentence for violating it. The trial court summarily dismissed Means’s petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. District Attorney: Anthony J. Buckley Case Number: CI08-0042 |
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| Note: | This opinion reverses and remands a previous judgment by the Court of Appeals. See the original COA opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO56836.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Charles Means |
PRO SE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: DEIRDRE McCRORY |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Successive writ - Section 99-39-23(6) - Waiver bar - Section 99-39-21(1) - Order of banishment |
| Summary of the Facts: | Charles Means brought a post-conviction-relief petition to vacate his banishment order and the revocation of the suspension of his sentence for violating it. The trial court summarily dismissed Means’s petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The Court of Appeals found that Means’s motion was barred by the waiver bar in section 99-39-21(1) and by the successive-writ bar in section 99-39-23(6). Although Means did not object to his banishment at the sentencing hearing and he did not raise this issue in his first PCR motion, a PCR motion is excepted from the successive-writ bar if the petitioner claims that his probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked. In his PCR motion, Means argued that the trial court was not authorized to order the banishment without placing him on probation, that the court was limited to imposing a five-year term of probation, and that his twenty-five year banishment, without probation, was thus unenforceable. Because of this, Means claimed that the court was without judicial authority to revoke his suspended sentence for violating the banishment. Means’s sentence was suspended, and he was released, upon several conditions, including the banishment. So Means’s suspended sentence was a conditional release, in the parlance of section 99-39-23(6), and his suspended sentence was revoked for violating the banishment condition. If the banishment condition was illegal, unauthorized, or otherwise improper, then the revocation of the suspension for violating the banishment was unlawful, and Means’s PCR motion should be excepted from the successive-writ bar in section 99-39-23(6). In addition, if the trial court violated Means’s fundamental due-process rights by imposing the banishment, his PCR motion should be excepted from the waiver bar in section 99-39-21(1). A trial judge’s reasons for ordering banishment must be articulated and supported in the record by a factual basis. The trial court may not banish a person convicted of a crime without first explaining, on the record, the reasons for and benefits of the banishment as they relate to the defendant. In this case, the sentencing order did not set forth any specific facts or circumstances regarding Means’s situation, character, or offense, or any reasons why the banishment may help to achieve his intended rehabilitation, serve the ends of justice, or protect the rights and interests of Means and the public. Further, although Means designated all pertinent transcripts in his “Designation of Record on Appeal,” the record does not include the transcript of the plea and/or sentencing hearing, during which the specific facts and circumstances supporting Means’s banishment, if any, would have been addressed. Means’s PCR motion should have been excepted from the procedural bars, and the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the motion. Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court to review the record as it existed at the time of Means’s sentencing to determine if it contains the requisite reasons for and benefits of Means’s banishment. |
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