In re Estate of Woodfield v. Woodfield
| Docket Number: | 2004-CA-00238-COA Linked Case(s): 2004-CA-00238-COA ; 2004-CT-00238-SCT ; 2004-CT-00238-SCT ; 2004-CA-00238-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-21-2006 Opinion Author: Southwick, J. Holding: The motion for rehearing is granted. The earlier opinion is withdrawn. The judgment of the Chancery Court of Harrison County is affirmed except as to the award of attorneys' fees of $22,155.78 and of $15,220.78, plus interest. The portion of the judgment awarding those fees is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wills & estates - Void will - Lost will - Attorney’s fees - M.R.C.P. 11(b) - Tour of property - M.R.A.P. 10(c) - Recusal of chancellor Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Griffis, Ishee and Roberts, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Irving and Chandler, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Lee, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Myers, P.J. and Barnes, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-17-2003 Appealed from: Harrison County Chancery Court Judge: William Griffin, Jr. Disposition: CHANCELLOR DECLINED TO ADMIT SUBSEQUENT WILL TO PROBATE Case Number: C2401-01-2528 |
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| Note: | This judgment was later reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court on 11/1/2007. See the SCT opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO44397.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | In the Matter of the Estate of Clyde V. Woodfield, Deceased, and In the Matter of the Conservatorship of Michael A. Woodfield: John V. Woodfield |
JOHN VERNON WOODFIELD |
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| Appellee: | Sharon McCoy Woodfield, Administratrix of the Estate of Clyde V. Woodfield, Deceased, and Alfred R. Koenenn, Guardian Ad Litem and Temporary Conservator of Michael A. Woodfield | TIMOTHY LEE MURR, ALFRED R. KOENENN |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Wills & estates - Void will - Lost will - Attorney’s fees - M.R.C.P. 11(b) - Tour of property - M.R.A.P. 10(c) - Recusal of chancellor |
| Summary of the Facts: | The motion for rehearing is granted, and the prior opinion is withdrawn. Clyde Woodfield died in 2001. He was survived by his wife, Sharon Woodfield, and two adult sons, John and Michael. John served as the conservator for his half-brother Michael who was a quadriplegic until 2002 when the court substituted Alfred Koenenn as a temporary conservator and as guardian ad litem. Three days before his death, Clyde Woodfield executed a will. Two weeks after the will was written, his widow petitioned for probate of the 2001 will. Her initial attorney was her stepson, John Woodfield, The will was probated and Mrs. Woodfield was appointed as the executrix of the estate. Michael Woodfield’s new guardian filed a petition contesting the will. The executrix, Sharon Woodfield, filed for probate of a last will and testament that was dated January 11, 1973, even though she had already been appointed under the 2001 will. She stated that it was the 1973 will that she delivered to John Woodfield and only later found out that it was a different will that had been probated. In ruling on motions before trial, the chancellor found that no one objected to withdrawal of the 2001 will from probate. He therefore granted the motion to withdraw the will. In the same pretrial order, the chancellor appointed Sharon Woodfield as Administratrix C.T.A. under the 1973 will. The chancellor awarded fees to Sharon Woodfield’s attorney in the amount of $22,155.78 as a penalty for frivolous litigation by John Woodfield in offering the 2001 will for probate. Michael Woodfield’s guardian and conservator was awarded $15,220.78 in fees and expenses. After a trial, the chancellor awarded the estate$261,558.15 against John Woodfield for various debts owed his father. John Woodfield was also ordered to pay $7,710 in attorneys’ fees owed by Michael Woodfield’s guardian ad litem, and $7,500 in attorneys’ fees owed by Sharon Woodfield. Woodfield appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Void will John argues that the chancellor erred in failing to hold that the 2001 will irreversibly revoked the 1973 will and that Clyde Woodfield in effect died intestate. John’s motion to withdraw the 2001 will from probate noted that the will had been contested on various grounds. In the motion, John denied wrongdoing but said “it is in his best interests as well as the best interests of the Estate itself” that the 2001 will be withdrawn. The motion also stated John Woodfield did not concede the validity of the 1973 will that his stepmother had offered for probate. Once a will is renounced by all interested parties, the effect of the renunciation relates back to the time the will became effective so as to make it void where, as in this case, the property in the renounced will is devised unconditionally and absolutely to the beneficiaries. If the agreement to renounce be entirely free from fraud, and is made by all the parties in interest, then the agreement is valid. The Woodfields consented to settle a dispute by withdrawing the 2001 will. The fact that the parties did not agree as to what happened next does not invalidate the consent. Issue 2: Lost will John argues that the 1973 instrument was a “lost will,” and the requirements of proving the effectiveness of such a will were not met. The original of the will could not be located at the time of trial. In probating a will that has been lost, the court should consider the proof of the existence of the will; evidence of its loss or destruction; proof of its contents; and that the testator did not destroy the will with the intent to revoke it. The only contested lost-will issue in this litigation is whether the testator irretrievably revoked his earlier will. The widow Sharon Woodfield testified she gave the original will to John Woodfield to probate, but it was not produced at trial. Since there was evidence that the original still existed after the testator’s death, any presumption that the testator destroyed it was rebutted. Though there is little evidence to support that Clyde Woodfield destroyed the 1973 will, there certainly is evidence that in 2001 he wished to revoke previous wills and adopt a new one. By executing a will in 2001, Woodfield was rejecting intestacy with at least as much clarity as he was rejecting his 1973 will. The 2001 language revoking all prior wills never came into effect, because the last will was withdrawn by all beneficiaries. The 1973 will devised Clyde Woodfield’s “homestead and all of the furniture, fixtures and appliances located therein to my wife, Sharon Jeanne McCoy Woodfield.” The remainder of the testator’s real property was left in equal shares to his two sons, John and Michael. The chancellor determined that the entire 324 acres of the “Woodfield Farm” was devised by this provision. John argued that the provision referred to a three-acre parcel that Clyde and Sharon Woodfield owned as tenants by the entireties with right of survivorship. Among the several items of evidence relied upon in the chancellor’s finding was that all the Woodfield Farm tracts were contiguous and fenced. The family home was within this tract. The land had been used by Clyde and Sharon Woodfield regularly for family activities and was treated during the testator’s lifetime as a unit. In the ambiguity of this provision, there was substantial flexibility for the chancellor’s fact-findings, and the chancellor did not err in finding that the entire Woodfield Farm was intended to be left to Sharon Woodfield. The chancellor ordered John Woodfield to pay substantial sums to the estate for debts that had been incurred through the years prior to the father’s death. Substantial evidence supported that these debts were outstanding and they were properly found to be John Woodfield’s continuing obligation after his father’s death. Issue 3: Attorney’s fees John argues that it was error to award over $40,000 of attorneys’ fees as sanctions. There is evidence that John Woodfield admitted that the 2001 will prepared by his former paralegal, removing his half-brother Michael from any distribution, was suspicious no matter what the justification might have been. Under M.R.C.P. 11(b), the court may award reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees against a party or his attorney, or both, whose pleading or motion is frivolous or filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. A pleading is frivolous within the meaning of Rule 11 only when, objectively speaking, the pleader or movant has no hope of success. It was within the chancellor’s discretion based on the facts before him to determine that some of John Woodfield’s actions were frivolous or for the purpose of delay. But not all of what John Woodfield did prior to the trial can be categorized that way. Offering for probate a will drafted for the deceased not long before his death and for which little involvement by John Woodfield has been shown does not appear totally frivolous. There is insufficient evidence to support that all these fees should be awarded as a penalty. The award is reversed and remanded so that another review of the fees will be made, and a decision reached concerning what fees, if any, should be considered a valid sanction. Issue 4: Tour of property John argues that the chancellor improperly toured Woodfield Farms without a court reporter. John concedes that the tour was without objection, but he argues that the chancellor should not have engaged in conversations. If there was a desire to create a record of the event, there was a means to do so under M.R.A.P. 10(c). This option was not utilized. Issue 5: Recusal of chancellor John argues that the chancellor should have recused himself. The 2002 campaign contribution made by the conservator to the chancellor was found by the Supreme Court in an interlocutory appeal to be an insufficient basis for recusal. The other issues of friendships between chancellor and certain lawyers are not sufficient grounds for mandatory recusal. |
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