Doyle v. Doyle
| Docket Number: | 2007-CP-01925-COA Linked Case(s): 2007-CP-01925-COA ; 2007-CT-01925-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-17-2010 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Equitable distribution - Contempt - Frivolous appeal - M.R.A.P. 38 Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Myers, P.J., Griffis, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Lee, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Irving, J. Concurs in Result Only: Carlton, J., concurs in result only without separate written opinion. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-22-2007 Appealed from: DeSoto County Chancery Court Judge: Vicki Cobb Disposition: WIFE GRANTED DIVORCE; MARITAL ESTATE DIVIDED AND DISTRIBUTED Case Number: 06-01-0105 |
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| Consolidated: Consolidated with 2008-CP-01927-COA David Hardin Doyle v. Karen Phyliss Doyle; DeSoto Chancery Court; LC Case #: 06-01-0105; Ruling Date: 08/27/2008; Ruling Judge: Vicki Cobb | ||
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | David Hardin Doyle |
PRO SE |
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| Appellee: | Karen Phyliss Doyle | JAMES D. MINOR | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Equitable distribution - Contempt - Frivolous appeal - M.R.A.P. 38 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Karen Doyle was granted a divorce from David Doyle on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. When David failed to perform the actions ordered by the divorce decree, the chancery court granted Karen’s motion for citation of contempt. David appeals both the judgment regarding the property division and the final order of contempt. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Property distribution David argues that the chancery court erred by failing to apply the Ferguson factors properly and in making several determinations regarding the distribution of the marital property. The first step in equitable distribution of marital property is for the chancellor to determine whether the parties’ assets are marital or non-marital. Assets accumulated during the marriage are considered marital assets and are subject to equitable distribution by the chancellor. The second step is for the chancellor to divide equitably the marital assets according to the Ferguson factors. David first argues that the chancellor erred in awarding Karen $2,500 for equity in the 2002 Infiniti automobile, which was classified as marital property. The automobile was purchased during the marriage and registered in both parties’ names. In making her ruling, the chancellor did not ignore David’s testimony that the 8.05 statement was incorrect, but she explained that the information the parties provided was all she had to refer to, even if it was inaccurate. While there was obviously some error on the face of David’s 8.05 statement concerning the automobile, the error could have been in the automobile’s estimated value at $23,000 rather than the amount of equity. Karen testified that half the equity in the vehicle totaled $2,500. The chancellor did not err in accepting Karen’s testimony on this disputed issue of fact. David contests the chancellor’s award of $7,300 to Karen for her share of the marital furniture. There is no error in the chancellor’s determination that David purposefully destroyed marital assets and, thus, Karen should be awarded $7,000 in order to replace the marital furniture and $300 for her grandchild’s furniture. David argues that the chancellor erred in awarding Karen $1,000 in equity for the lawn mower. Substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the lawn mower was marital property. David argues that the chancellor erred in ordering him to pay Karen $15,000 for credit-card debt. At the divorce hearing, David admitted that while he did not know where Karen’s credit-card debt came from, it did arise during the course of the marriage. There was substantial evidence introduced that the charges on Karen’s credit cards were for marital expenses, such as bills, and David did not present any evidence to refute it. Karen testified that the debt was for payment of household bills, at the direction of David. Thus, there was no error. David argues the chancellor erred in requiring him to pay fifty percent of the 2005 federal income-tax refund. The chancellor did not err in finding that the refund was a marital asset; thus, Karen should be entitled to half of it. David argues that the chancellor erred in ruling that he should have to provide Karen with health insurance for one year. Because of the disparity in the parties’ income and Karen’s health issues, the chancellor ruled that while she normally did not make an alimony award at the end of such a short marriage, here she would require David to provide Karen with health insurance for one year either through the same marital policy, COBRA, or a substantially similar policy. There is no error in the chancellor’s ruling regarding Karen’s health insurance. David argues that the chancellor erred in ordering him to sell the marital residence and pay one-half of the equity to Karen. The chancellor stated that because of the various figures given about the value of the marital residence and its equity, the parties would place the residence on the market immediately and split any proceeds equally. The chancellor also found that Karen’s residence in Memphis was not marital property as it had been acquired before the marriage, and even though David lived there briefly while they were married, Karen alone continued to pay the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the home with her social-security benefits. There is substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s ruling regarding the marital home. David argues the chancellor erred in awarding Karen $7,500 in equity in his Southwest Tennessee Community College retirement account. It is well established that retirement funds accumulated during the marriage are personal property subject to division at divorce. The chancellor found that David’s and Karen’s contributions to the marriage were equal, even though Karen was a homemaker and David made substantially more income than Karen. While their marriage was short, the chancellor only awarded Karen a portion of David’s retirement accounts that had accumulated during the marriage. The chancellor did not abuse her discretion. Issue 2: Contempt David argues that he attempted to comply with the court’s divorce decree as best he could, but he did not have the funds to pay the judgment; and it was impossible for him to provide Karen with health insurance because she was no longer his wife. A payor’s failure to comply with a court order is prima facie evidence of contempt. The burden then shifts to the defendant who may rebut the prima facie case by proving inability to pay, lack of willfullness regarding the contempt, ambiguity in the order’s provisions, or impossibility of performance. When David was asked why he did not pay the various judgments, he merely stated repeatedly that he “didn’t have the money” to each query. He offered no particular proof of why he did not have the funds. David testified that it was impossible for him to pay the amounts set by the court, but he offered to pay $200 per month, increased to $1,000 per month once he sold the marital home or reached sixty years old and had access to an annuity. The chancellor noted that at the divorce hearing, David had testified and provided documentation that he had $37,000 in a savings account; so he should have been able to pay the items she ordered within thirty days. The fact that David now reported only $235 in his savings account showed that he chose to spend these funds on something other than the judgment. There is no merit to David’s argument that he could not satisfy the judgment due to circumstances beyond his control. David did not appeal the divorce decree with a supersedes bond; he merely took it upon himself to stay the action by not performing. The decree specifically stated that most of its actions were to occur within thirty days of its entry. Further, not all of the matters of contempt involved payment of funds, but David did not comply with these orders either. David argues that the chancellor erred in ordering him to pay $4,559.40 to cover Karen’s health-insurance premium for one year. David was ordered to provide health insurance for Karen for twelve months, and he did not comply with the order; instead he attempted to shift the blame to Karen’s inaction in failing to obtain coverage through Tenn-Care. David cannot successfully argue he is no longer responsible for providing insurance when he never complied with the chancellor’s order. Issue 3: Frivolous appeal Karen asks that the Court apply M.R.A.P. 38, which allows the Court to award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee when the appeal is frivolous. The contempt appeal is not frivolous, and damages against David are, thus, not appropriate. |
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