Hendon v. Lang


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Docket Number: 2008-CA-00997-COA
Linked Case(s): 2008-CA-00997-COA ; 2008-CT-00997-COA
Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 08-10-2010
Opinion Author: Griffis, J.
Holding: Affirmed and remanded.
Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Mistrial - Mention of settlement - M.R.E. 103(a)(1) - URCCC 3.12 - Requests for admission - M.R.C.P. 36 - Attorney’s fees
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ.
Concurs in Result Only: Carlton, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-07-2008
Appealed from: Copiah County Circuit Court
Judge: Isadore Patrick
Disposition: JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES
Case Number: 2003-0442
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Michael T. Hendon, Sherry Hendon and Charles Hendon




 MICHAEL JAMES BROWN



  
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief
    		•
    Appellee: Beverly Lang and Robert C. Lang EDUARDO ALBERTO FLECHAS  
    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Contract - Mistrial - Mention of settlement - M.R.E. 103(a)(1) - URCCC 3.12 - Requests for admission - M.R.C.P. 36 - Attorney’s fees
    Summary of the Facts: Michael T. Hendon, Sherry Hendon, and Charles Hendon brought a claim for breach of contract against Robert C. Lang and Beverly Lang. The contract was a lease agreement with an option to purchase a parcel of commercial property. The jury found that there was no contract between the parties, and a judgment was entered in favor of the Langs. The Hendons appeal.
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Mistrial The Hendons argue that the circuit court committed reversible error when it denied the Hendons’ motion for a mistrial. The motion for mistrial was based on a series of questions that were asked, in the presence of the jury, by the Langs’ attorney about a settlement with former co-defendants. The judge is provided considerable discretion to determine whether the remark is so prejudicial that a mistrial should be declared. Where serious and irreparable damage has not resulted, the judge should admonish the jury then and there to disregard the impropriety. Here, the Hendons’ attorney promptly objected to the question by the Langs’ attorney, as required by M.R.E. 103(a)(1). The court then sustained the objection. For evidentiary purposes, the question was never answered. Later, when the Hendons’ attorney moved for a mistrial, the circuit court reviewed the motion for a mistrial under the standard set forth in URCCC 3.12 and determined that the question did not constitute substantial and irreparable prejudice to the Hendons’ case. The circuit court’s evidentiary ruling was within its discretion. The circuit court also instructed the jury to disregard all evidence excluded by the court from consideration. There is no evidence the jury did not follow this instruction. Issue 2: Requests for admission The Hendons argue that the circuit court erred when it set aside a previous order confirming the admission of certain requests for admissions. M.R.C.P. 36 expressly gives the judge the authority, using his or her discretion, to vacate any prior orders deeming certain requests that were unanswered as admitted. Here, the circuit judge, having found there was good cause and that there would be little or no detriment to the Hendons, vacated his previous order deeming all unanswered requests as admitted and allowed the defendants additional time to answer. The circuit court did order sanctions against the Langs. Thus, the circuit judge did not abuse his discretion. Issue 3: Attorney’s fees The circuit court issued an order that sanctioned the Langs for the five-month delay in answering all of the requests for admissions. The Langs were ordered to pay the Hendons’ attorney’s fees incurred during that delay. Before the circuit court approved the attorney’s fees submitted by the Hendons, the Hendons appealed. The circuit judge then refused to issue an order for the Langs to pay the attorney’s fees because the case had been appealed. The circuit judge determined that he had lost jurisdiction once the case was appealed. The Hendons argue this was error. When a trial court's order broadens, amends, modifies, vacates, clarifies, or rehears a decree, it must be vacated as null and void because it exceeds the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower court. The circuit court correctly determined that it had lost jurisdiction when this case was appealed. An order establishing the amount of attorney’s fees that were awarded as a result of a prior sanction order would certainly broaden the court’s judgment. An order establishing the amount of attorney’s fees that were awarded as a result of a prior sanction order would certainly broaden the court’s judgment. However, in the interest of justice, the case is remanded to the circuit court to grant the relief awarded in the court’s previous order.


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