Thomas v. Bd. of Supervisors of Panola County
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-00347-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-00347-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-05-2010 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Rezoning - Substantial change in character of neighborhood - Public need - Spot zoning - Special exception - Constitutionality of ordinance Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson and Graves, P.JJ., Kitchens and Pierce, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Lamar, J. Dissenting Author : Dickinson, J., Dissents With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Waller, C.J. Concurs in Result Only: Randolph, J., Concurs in Result Only Without Separate Written Opinion. Procedural History: Admin or Agency Judgment; Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-10-2009 Appealed from: PANOLA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Andrew C. Baker Disposition: The Panola County Board of Supervisors (the Board) rezoned a five-acre parcel owned by Chris Aldridge from an agricultural to an industrial classification at its January 14, 2008, meeting. The Board also granted a special exception to Aldridge to operate a recycling facility/junkyard on the property. Lent E. Thomas, Jr., filed an appeal from the Board’s decision in the Circuit Court of Panola County, Second Judicial District, Mississippi. He also filed a bill of exceptions. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision to rezone the five acres from an agricultural to an industrial classification and affirmed the special exception to operate a recycling facility/junkyard. Case Number: CV2008-25BP2 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Lent E. Thomas, Jr. |
MICHAEL KEVIN GRAVES |
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| Appellee: | Board of Supervisors of Panola County, Mississippi | DARRIN JAY WESTFAUL | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Rezoning - Substantial change in character of neighborhood - Public need - Spot zoning - Special exception - Constitutionality of ordinance |
| Summary of the Facts: | The Panola County Board of Supervisors rezoned a five-acre parcel owned by Chris Aldridge from an agricultural to an industrial classification. The Board also granted a special exception to Aldridge to operate a recycling facility/junkyard on the property. Lent E. Thomas, Jr., filed an appeal in circuit court. He also filed a bill of exceptions. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision to rezone the five acres from an agricultural to an industrial classification and affirmed the special exception to operate a recycling facility/junkyard. Thomas appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | In order to reclassify property, an applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence that a mistake in the original zoning occurred; or a change in the character of the neighborhood occurred that justified rezoning, and a public need existed for the rezoning. Thomas argues that the trial court erred by affirming the Board’s rezoning of Aldridge’s five-acre property from agricultural to industrial because no substantial evidence supported the Board’s actions and Aldridge failed to show either a mistake or a change in the character of the neighborhood and a public need for rezoning. Panola County did not raise the issue of mistake at the hearing or in any of its filings. Thus, this issue is not properly before the Court. Furthermore, the Board, neither at the hearing nor in its order, referenced any mistake, and the circuit court likewise did not base its decision on mistake. While there is no test to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood and public need, without comparable evidence, such as maps showing a change or recent rezoning in the area, statistics or other evidence of growth in the neighborhood, and charts showing the quantity of construction, the record lacks comparable evidence to show a material change in the neighborhood or a public need. Here, the Board’s order provides little insight into its reasoning for granting rezoning. However, the order adopted the Commission’s recommendation to rezone and grant a special exception with limitations. The order also recited who made presentations and who provided testimony for and against rezoning. Aldridge provided various maps to the Board. The aerial map showed the location of his property in relation to other landowners. Aldridge discussed the location of current commercial and industrial businesses in relation to his facility. It is evident that the area has a mixture of agricultural, commercial, and industrial uses, despite its agricultural zoning. The Board already had granted a special exception in the area to operate a used car lot since the adoption of the ordinance. Indeed, the Board was made aware that Aldridge’s property had been used for a number of years as an industrial business, a concrete plant, prior to its use as a junkyard. The numerous photographs depicting Aldridge’s facility and the surrounding area and other businesses provided a reference for determining how the facility was used and what area businesses were nearby. The photographs also showed that many parcels of land were used for purposes other than agriculture. Also, a board may draw from its own common knowledge and its own familiarity with the area when making zoning decisions. The Board also heard arguments and testimony concerning public need. Aldridge contended that the public would have a convenient place to dispose of its materials, such as batteries, and the Board and taxpayers would not have to dispose of the materials in landfills or other locations. Further, the issue of economic development and growth was discussed in relation to the zoning ordinance. Thus, the Board had substantial evidence before it to support its decision to rezone, and the decision was fairly debatable and cannot be disturbed on appeal. Thomas also argues that the trial court erred by affirming the board’s rezoning because it constituted spot-zoning. The term ‘spot zoning’ is ordinarily used where a zoning ordinance is amended reclassifying one or more tracts or lots for a use prohibited by the original zoning ordinance and out of harmony therewith. The specific facts of each case dictate whether an amendment to the ordinance is considered void. The mere fact that an area is small and is zoned at the request of a single owner and is of greater benefit to him than to others does not make out a case of spot zoning if there is a public need for it or a compelling reason for it. Here, the Board found a public need for rezoning and, on that basis, the decision cannot be considered spot-zoning. Thomas argues that no substantial evidence supported the Board’s approval of the special exception. The applicant for the special exception has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they have met the elements/factors essential to obtaining the exception. Here, the Board did not err by granting the special exception. The ordinance provided a two-step process. The ordinance provided for industrial zones and contemplated and provided for the specific special exception of a junkyard within the industrial zone. A special exception may be permitted where, if controlled, it would promote the public health, safety, welfare, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosperity, or general welfare. The record showed that the junkyard would provide a public benefit by its convenience for residents. The community had a place to dispose of its used property, and the Board and taxpayers did not have to pay for its disposal in landfills. Thomas argues that his due-process rights were violated because the special-exception provision contained in the ordinance was impermissibly vague and provided no parameters to guide the Board in its decision. An ordinance is vague where it fails to provide persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. Thomas’s argument that the ordinance is vague and provides no guidance is without merit. The special exception was restricted by the Board in number, area, location, or relation to the neighborhood, and proof was provided as to the promotion of the public health, safety, welfare, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosperity, or general welfare. The ordinance provided a method to grant a special exception, and the record supports the method by restricting the junkyard and providing testimony on the promotion of public health and the like. |
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