Golden v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-KA-00767-SCT Linked Case(s): 2006-KA-00767-SCT ; 2006-CT-00767-SCT ; 2006-KA-00767-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-20-2007 Opinion Author: DICKINSON, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Rape - Motion to sever - Swearing in the jury - Instruction on duty to fix penalty - Section 97-3-71 - Section 97-3-65 - Ineffective assistance of counsel Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Diaz, P.JJ., Easley, Carlson, Graves, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-12-2006 Appealed from: Clay County Circuit Court Judge: James T. Kitchens, Jr. Disposition: Count I: Conviction of forcible rape and sentence of forty (40) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Count II: Conviction of forcible rape and sentence of forty (40) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Sentence in Count II shall run consecutively with the sentence in Count I for a total of eighty (80) years. District Attorney: Forrest Allgood Case Number: 8741 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | WILLIAM GOLDEN, JR. a/k/a WILLIAM HOWARD GOLDEN, JR. |
W. DANIEL HINCHCLIFF |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL |
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| Topic: | Rape - Motion to sever - Swearing in the jury - Instruction on duty to fix penalty - Section 97-3-71 - Section 97-3-65 - Ineffective assistance of counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | William Golden, Jr. was convicted of two counts of rape and sentenced to forty years for each count. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion to sever Golden argues that the court erred in overruling his motion to sever the two counts of rape, because his conviction of the first rape was supported by DNA evidence while the second one was not. When the defendant raises the issue of severance, the trial court should pay particular attention to whether the time period between the occurrences is insignificant, whether the evidence proving each count would be admissible to prove each of the other counts, and whether the crimes are interwoven. Here, the two rapes occurred only three hours apart. While some of the evidence introduced to prove the rape of the first victim would also have been admissible to prove the rape of the second victim, the first victim immediately went to the hospital, where a rape kit was performed. As such, the State was able to introduce DNA evidence. The trial judge correctly recognized that, in trying the two counts together, there would be some evidence in common and some not. Both of Golden’s victims knew him personally, and he showed up at both victims’ homes unannounced. He told both victims that he just needed a place to sit down for a minute because his parents would not allow him into their home. Golden asked both victims for a glass of water before he “jumped” on them and raped them. Both victims testified that Golden held a gun to their heads. Considering these similarities, the judge did not abuse his discretion in finding the two crimes were so closely interwoven that they were part of a common plan or scheme. Taking these factors together as a whole, the judge did not abuse his discretion by overruling Golden’s motion to sever. Issue 2: Swearing in the jury Golden argues that the trial court failed to administer the oath required in a capital case until after the evidence had been presented, and that he was therefore deprived of a fair trial. The record shows that counsel for Golden failed to make any objection when the judge administered the oath for capital cases midway through the trial. As such, Golden’s plea on appeal for reversal on this issue is barred. Although the record does not indicate that the trial judge administered any oath at the beginning of trial, the trial judge indicated on the record during voir dire that an oath had been given. The oath given in the middle of trial, together with the petit oath given at the beginning of trial, were sufficient to instruct the jury of their duty. Issue 3: Jury instruction Golden argues that he is entitled to a new trial because no instruction was given to the jury on its sole duty to fix the penalty in the case of forcible rape under section 97-3-71. A review of the indictment evidences that although section 97-3-71 is referenced in the heading, the substance of the indictment clearly charges Golden with two counts of forcible sexual intercourse. Any reference to section 97-3-71 in Golden’s indictment is of no moment. The substance of the indictment clearly charged Golden with forcible rape under section 97-3-65. Issue 4: Ineffective assistance of counsel Golden argues that his trial counsel was ineffective, and sets forth twenty-one alleged deficiencies he argues constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. A thorough consideration of each of Golden’s claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel shows that Golden’s defense counsel provided reasonably effective assistance. |
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