In re Estate of Woodfield v. Woodfield


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Docket Number: 2004-CT-00238-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2004-CA-00238-COA ; 2004-CA-00238-COA ; 2004-CT-00238-SCT ; 2004-CA-00238-COA

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 11-01-2007
Opinion Author: Carlson, J.
Holding: THE JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE CHANCERY COURT ARE REVERSED AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED TO THE CHANCERY COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wills & estates - Validity of will - Withdrawal of will from probate
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Diaz, P.JJ., Easley, Dickinson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ.
Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
Writ of Certiorari: Yes
Appealed from Court of Appeals

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-17-2003
Appealed from: Harrison County Chancery Court
Judge: William Griffin, Jr.
Disposition: The Chancellor declined to admit a subsequent will to probate. The Court of Appeals found that the withdrawal from probate of a 2001 will, which contained a provision “hereby revoking all previous wills and codicils,” revived a 1973 will.
Case Number: C2401-01-2528

Note: This opinion reverses and remands a previous judgment by the Court of Appeals. See the original COA opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO38093.pdf Motion to Strike Response of Appellee to Grant of Petition for Writ of Certiorari is dismissed as moot. See Opinion of this Court at footnote 6 handed down this date.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: In the Matter of the Estate of Clyde V. Woodfield, Deceased, and In the Matter of the Conservatorship of Michael A. Woodfield: John V. Woodfield




PRO SE



 

Appellee: Sharon McCoy Woodfield, Administratrix of the Estate of Clyde V. Woodfield, Deceased, and Alfred R. Koenenn, Guardian Ad Litem and Temporary Conservator of Michael A. Woodfield TIMOTHY LEE MURR, ALFRED R. KOENENN  

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Topic: Wills & estates - Validity of will - Withdrawal of will from probate

Summary of the Facts: At the time of their marriage, Clyde Woodfield and Sharon Woodfield each had children by previous marriages – Clyde had John Woodfield, and Sharon had David Lane and Kelly Sevier. All three children are now adults. The only child born to the marriage between Clyde and Sharon is Michael Woodfield. In 1973, Clyde executed his last will and testament, which in essence devised and bequeathed all of Clyde’s real and personal property to his wife, Sharon, and his two children, John and Michael. In 1997, Michael was in a serious accident which rendered him totally incapacitated, thus requiring around-the-clock care. A court-supervised conservatorship was thereafter established for Michael, and John was appointed as the conservator of Michael’s person and estate. In 2001, Clyde appeared at the law office of his son, John, and sought assistance from a paralegal in revising his will. John was evidently not present in his law office when Clyde appeared. According to Nick Thornton, John’s paralegal, and Danny Leggett, Clyde’s friend, Clyde wanted to remove all references to Michael in his will in order to keep the government from seizing farm assets which otherwise would be given to Michael under the 1973 will. The will which was prepared pursuant to this office visit was basically the same as the 1973 will, except that the 2001 will acknowledged Michael’s serious injuries and the establishment of a conservatorship; removed any references to Michael as a devisee or legatee under the will; and, appointed Sharon, or alternatively, John, as the executrix or executor. Of significant import is the fact that this will provided in the first paragraph, inter alia, that Clyde did “declare this to be my Last Will and Testament, hereby revoking all previous wills and codicles (sic) as follows, to-wit.” Three days later, Clyde died, survived by Sharon, John and Michael. Sharon, through John, as the attorney, filed a petition to have the 2001 will admitted to probate. The will was admitted to probate, and Sharon was appointed as the executrix of the estate. In 2002, John was removed and Alfred Koenenn was substituted as temporary conservator and guardian ad litem for Michael. Michael’s new guardian filed a petition contesting the 2001 will. Sharon then filed a petition to have the 1973 will admitted to probate, notwithstanding the fact that she had already filed a petition to have the 2001 will admitted to probate. The special chancellor ruled that because of the guardian ad litem’s filing of a petition contesting the 2001 will, John’s filing of a motion to withdraw the 2001 will, and no objection being lodged by “any party in interest or any heir at law of the decedent,” the petition to probate the 2001 will was “dismissed with prejudice.” Since the 1973 will did not name a successor executor in the event Clyde’s father was unable to serve, the special chancellor appointed Sharon as Temporary Administrator C.T.A. of the 1973 will. As a penalty for frivolous litigation by John Woodfield in offering the 2001 will for probate, the chancellor awarded fees to Sharon Woodfield’s attorney in the amount of $22,155.78. Michael Woodfield’s guardian and conservator was awarded $15,220.78 in fees and expenses. The chancellor ruled that the term “homestead” in the will encompassed a 324-acre farm. The estate was awarded $261,558.15 against John Woodfield for various debts owed his father. John Woodfield was also ordered to pay $7,710 in attorneys’ fees owed by Michael Woodfield’s guardian ad litem, and $7,500 in attorneys’ fees owed by Sharon Woodfield. John appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the special chancellor in all respects except on the issue of attorney’s fees, which issue was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of what effect the withdrawal from probate of a will executed in 2001 had on a will executed in 1973.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: The Court of Appeals discussed Parker v. Broadus, 128 Miss. 699, 91 So. 394 (1922), to determine whether the 1973 will was revived. The key difference between the present case and Broadus is that in Broadus the beneficiaries to the will renounced their bequest under the will and then entered a private agreement detailing how the property should be divided. In today’s case, the beneficiaries are attempting to withdraw a will which may or may not have been validly made and executed. Beneficiaries are not entitled to completely disregard the testator’s intent and have a validly-made-and-executed will withdrawn completely from probate. It is true that a beneficiary may choose to renounce his or her bequest under the will, but renunciation and withdrawal do not equate to the same outcome. When a beneficiary renounces a bequest under a will, that beneficiary formally gives up a right to property under the will. When a beneficiary attempts to withdraw a will, that beneficiary does not seek formally to give up a right under the will, but to have the testator’s estate distributed contrary to the testator’s intent. Such action is impermissible under Mississippi law. On remand, if the chancellor determines that the 2001 will was validly made and executed, Mississippi case law is clear in regard to revocation clauses. A prior will may be effectively revoked by a revocation clause in a later will, and an express revocation clause in a will revoking all former wills when duly executed and attested according to law is unequivocal and conclusive of the intent of the testator. On the other hand, if the chancellor determines that the 2001 will was not validly made and executed, Clyde Woodfield’s 1973 will should be probated.


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