Carlisle v. Allen
| Docket Number: | 2007-CT-02047-SCT Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-02047-SCT ; 2007-CA-02047-COA ; 2007-CA-02047-COA ; 2007-CT-02047-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-29-2010 Opinion Author: Pierce, J. Holding: Court of Appeals reversed and rendered; Chancery court reinstated and affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Revocation of divorce - Jurisdiction - Section 93-5-31 - Abatement of application - Timeliness of motion for reconsideration - M.R.C.P. 59 - M.R.C.P. 60(b) Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson, P.J., Dickinson, Kitchens and Chandler, JJ. Dissenting Author : Randolph, J., Dissents With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Waller, C.J., and Lamar, J. Dissenting Author : Lamar, J., Dissents With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Waller, C.J., Graves, P.J., and Randolph, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS Writ of Certiorari: yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-19-2007 Appealed from: PEARL RIVER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: James H.C. Thomas, Jr. Disposition: A divorced couple, Charles Allen and Janet Allen, filed a petition to revoke their divorce. While the petition was pending, Charles died. The chancellor initially quashed the motion. On rehearing, the chancellor found that Janet had produced sufficient evidence of reconciliation and entered an order revoking the divorce. Arthur Carlisle, the administrator of Charles’s estate, appealed on his behalf. The Court of Appeals – finding cases in which a party to a pending divorce died prior to a final entry of divorce to be analogous – held that the chancery court did not have jurisdiction to hold an evidentiary hearing, and reversed and rendered the matter. Case Number: 02-0328-GN-TH |
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| Note: | This opinion reverses and renders a former judgment made by the Court of Appeals. See the original COA opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO55553.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Arthur D. Carlisle, Administrator of The Estate of Charles E. Allen, III, Deceased |
MICHAEL J. VALLETTE |
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| Appellee: | Janet Ellen Davis Allen | JOSEPH EDGAR FILLINGANE, CAROL ANN ESTES BUSTIN | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Revocation of divorce - Jurisdiction - Section 93-5-31 - Abatement of application - Timeliness of motion for reconsideration - M.R.C.P. 59 - M.R.C.P. 60(b) |
| Summary of the Facts: | A divorced couple, Charles Allen and Janet Allen, filed a petition to revoke their divorce. While the petition was pending, Charles died. The chancellor initially quashed the motion. On rehearing, the chancellor found that Janet had produced sufficient evidence of reconciliation and entered an order revoking the divorce. Arthur Carlisle, the administrator of Charles’s estate, appealed on his behalf. The Court of Appeals held that the chancery court did not have jurisdiction to hold an evidentiary hearing, and reversed and rendered the matter. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The Court of Appeals held that the chancellor should not have conducted a hearing on the matter, because it lacked jurisdiction. This is an issue of first impression in Mississippi. The requirements of section 93-5-31, which regulates revocation of divorce, have been met in this case. Therefore, the chancellor did not err in holding a hearing on the matter and revoking the judgment of divorce. The Court of Appeals erroneously ruled that petitions to revoke a divorce should be governed by the rules which govern petitions to dissolve a marriage. It is well-established that when a right is given solely by statute it is subject to the terms named in the statute. The standards which must be met in order to have a divorce revoked are separate requirements from those governing the grant of a divorce decree. Carlisle argues that the application to revoke the divorce abated upon Charles’s death. While Carlisle cites many historical precedents for the proposition that the court’s jurisdiction ceases upon the death of one of the parties, he overlooks a central element required for a jurisdictional argument. While alimony, child support, and visitation are personal matters, actions touching on the marriage relationship itself, including divorce, are not personal — they are in rem actions and are subject to statutory control. Here, the Legislature drafted and passed legislation which allows chancellors to revoke divorces upon fulfillment of all the statutory requirements, even after the death of one of the parties. Because the matter is one touching upon the marital status of the parties and is an in rem action, the trial court maintained jurisdiction in order to make that determination. Since the Legislature, in writing section 93-5-31, did not limit the time frame in which a couple may pursue a revocation of divorce, Janet is within the applicable time frame to have her divorce revoked. Furthermore, the petition was filed in and granted by the Chancery Court of Pearl River County, the court which granted Charles and Janet’s divorce. The chancery court imposed no regulations and restrictions on the revocation, and the application to revoke the divorce and testimony presented at the hearing clearly showed that the application for revocation of divorce was a joint application. The chancellor was not manifestly wrong in finding that there was sufficient evidence of reconciliation and revoking the divorce of Charles and Janet Allen. Thus, the requirements of section 93-5-31 have been met in their entirety. Carlisle argues that Janet’s motion for reconsideration in the trial court was untimely filed under M.R.C.P. 59, because it was filed eleven days after the entry of the judgment, rather than ten. Janet argues that the motion is a motion for relief from judgment under M.R.C.P. 60, which must have been made only within a reasonable time. It is reasonable to consider a party’s motion for reconsideration as one under Rule 60(b) when the motion does not state that it was brought under Rule 59 and was filed more than ten days after the entry of final judgment in the case. Here, the motion did not specify that it was brought pursuant to Rule 59, and it was filed more than ten days after the entry of the order to quash. Therefore, it should be considered a motion for relief under Rule 60. |
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