Blakeney v. State
| Docket Number: | 2007-KA-02300-COA Linked Case(s): 2007-KA-02300-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-20-2010 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder - Jurisdiction - Timeliness of appeal - M.R.A.P. 2(a)(1) & (c) - M.R.A.P. 4(a) - Sufficiency of evidence - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(c) - M.R.E. 402 - M.R.E. 404(b) - Videotape interview Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Ishee and Carlton, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-20-2007 Appealed from: Jones County Circuit Court Judge: Billy Joe Landrum Disposition: CONVICTED OF TWO COUNTS OF MURDER AND SENTENCED TO TWO CONSECUTIVE LIFE TERMS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Anthony J. Buckley Case Number: 2006-261-KR2B |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Wanda Leona Blakeney |
DANIEL DEWAYNE WARE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Murder - Jurisdiction - Timeliness of appeal - M.R.A.P. 2(a)(1) & (c) - M.R.A.P. 4(a) - Sufficiency of evidence - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(c) - M.R.E. 402 - M.R.E. 404(b) - Videotape interview |
| Summary of the Facts: | The motion for rehearing is denied, and this opinion is substituted for the original opinion. Wanda Blakeney was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to serve two consecutive life sentences. She appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jurisdiction M.R.A.P. 2(a)(1) states that the dismissal of an appeal is mandatory if the notice of appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Rules 4 or 5. Under M.R.A.P. 4(a), Blakeney is required to file her notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of her sentencing order. The thirty-day period ended on January 19, 2008, which was a Saturday. The following Monday, January 21, 2008, was a legal holiday. Consequently, Blakeney’s appeal should have been filed by Tuesday, January 22, 2008. As she failed to file her notice of appeal until the following day, January 23, 2008, her notice of appeal was untimely. However, Rules 2 and 4 may be suspended when justice demands to allow an out-of-time appeal in criminal cases. As the dismissal of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction would likely result in Blakeney’s filing a motion for post-conviction relief citing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on the failure to file a timely notice of appeal, the Court will suspend the rules pursuant to Rule 2(c). Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence Blakeney argues that the State failed to prove that the murders were a result of suffocation as stated in the indictment, because Dr. Hayne testified at trial that the deaths were a result of “manual strangulation.” The State argues that the terms “strangulation” and “suffocation” are “synonymous.” However, these medical terms are not necessarily synonymous. The State argued at trial that there was proof of suffocation when the indictment was drafted, and that the language pertaining to suffocation in the indictment was not required. The purpose of an indictment is to give a defendant notice and a reasonable description of the charges against him or her in order to assist the defendant in preparing a defense. Therefore, an indictment is only required to have a clear and concise statement of the elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged. There was no requirement that Blakeney’s indictment contain the manner or means of the victims’ deaths. Blakeney was indicted under section 97-3-19(1), which put the burden on the State to prove that Blakeney killed the victims with the deliberate design to effect their deaths. The indictment sufficiently notified Blakeney of the charges against her in order that she might prepare her defense. The mere addition of this manner of death did not change the nature of the crime for which Blakeney was being charged. Blakeney also argues that there was neither any direct evidence presented that she had assisted in the murders nor was there evidence that she had entered into an agreement with another person to murder the victims. Blakeney confessed to the police that she and the other person had discussed the murders prior to their occurrence. She also admitted that she had assisted the other person in attempting to cover up the murders. A confession by a defendant constitutes direct evidence. Issue 3: Hearsay Blakeney argues that the statements made by law enforcement regarding the co-defendant’s statements are hearsay under M.R.E. 801(c) and that any probative value of such statements was outweighed by their prejudicial nature. Therefore, she claims that it was error to submit this evidence to the jury. Evidence is relevant under M.R.E. 402 if it has any tendency to prove a consequential fact. The threshold question when addressing a hearsay issue is whether the statement is actually hearsay under M.R.E. 801(c). If the statement is not admitted for the truth of the matter but, rather, to impeach a witness’s testimony, then it is admissible hearsay. Here, the trial court properly admitted the videotaped statements into evidence as they were not being admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that Blakeney planned and committed the murder of her parents. Rather, the statements were admitted to demonstrate that Blakeney’s statements were inconsistent as to the events of that morning. They were also an attempt to illicit more information from Blakeney about the events of that morning. Additionally, Blakeney argues that it was error not to give a limiting instruction to the jury prior to the jury’s viewing of the videotape. Although defense counsel objected to the admission of the statements at trial, counsel did not request a limiting instruction. The trial court is not required to issue a sua sponte M.R.E. 404(b) limiting instruction; rather, this burden lies solely with trial counsel. Issue 4: Videotape interview Blakeney argues that her first videotaped interview, which was conducted on the day of the murders, should not have been admitted into evidence as she had not been informed of her Miranda rights. The officer testified that, at the time of the first interview, Blakeney was not considered a suspect; rather, she was questioned in order to determine the events of that morning and to ascertain the whereabouts of another person. The threshold question in a Miranda rights analysis is whether the defendant was in custody and being interrogated when the statement in question was made. A subject is in custody when his right to leave freely has been restricted. In the first interview, Blakeney was admittedly at the sheriff’s office in an interrogation room. However, Blakeney was not in handcuffs during the interview. She voluntarily provided facts to law enforcement regarding her accusations that a person had taken her parents and assisted the police in determining the person’s whereabouts. It was only after the first interview concluded, and more information was obtained in a subsequent interview, that she became a suspect in the murders and was taken into custody. Therefore, the statement was admissible. |
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