Tatum v. Tatum
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-01858-COA Linked Case(s): 2008-CA-01858-COA ; 2008-CT-01858-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-20-2010 Opinion Author: King, C.J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Adultery - Equitable distribution - Rehabilitative alimony - Child support - Section 43-19-101 - Savings accounts - Attorneys' fees Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-01-2008 Appealed from: Lamar County Chancery Court Judge: Johnny Lee Williams Disposition: GRANTED DIVORCE, DIVIDED MARITAL ASSETS, AWARDED CHILD SUPPORT, ALIMONY, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES Case Number: 2007-0394-GN-W |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Joseph F. Tatum, III |
DAVID ALAN PUMFORD |
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| Appellee: | Lauren D. Tatum | MICHAEL V. RATLIFF | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Adultery - Equitable distribution - Rehabilitative alimony - Child support - Section 43-19-101 - Savings accounts - Attorneys' fees |
| Summary of the Facts: | Lauren Tatum was granted a divorce from Joseph Tatum III on the ground of adultery. The chancellor divided the marital assets valued at approximately $978,000, awarded Lauren alimony, and ordered Joseph to pay child support. Joseph appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Equitable distribution Joseph argues that the chancellor erred as a matter of law because he failed to properly consider the Ferguson factors when distributing the marital assets. An equitable distribution does not mean that the chancellor is required to divide the property equally. In his bench opinion, the chancellor first addressed what property was considered marital and non-marital property. Thereafter, the chancellor weighed the evidence against the Ferguson factors to make a determination as to the appropriate distribution of Joseph and Lauren’s marital assets. The chancellor ruled that although Joseph was the primary breadwinner, Lauren had contributed significantly to the parties’ accumulation of property by caring for the parties’ two minor children and making their house a home. The chancellor found that because Joseph and Lauren had worked together to accumulate assets, the marital assets should be divided equally. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion. Issue 2: Alimony Joseph argues that the chancellor failed to properly consider the Armstrong factors and applicable law governing alimony. The chancellor awarded Lauren rehabilitative alimony of $48,000, payable at $2,000 per month. Rehabilitative alimony provides for a party who is trying to become self-supporting and prevents that party from becoming destitute while searching for a means of income. Lauren and Joseph were married for more than six years. The parties agreed early in the marriage that Lauren would be a stay-at-home mom caring for their two minor children and their home and that Joseph would work outside the home. Although Lauren was not employed throughout the marriage, Lauren testified that she did have a degree in psychology and had operated a printing center from 1995-2002. When questioned as to possible employment in the field of psychology, Lauren responded that she would need additional education to obtain employment in that field. The chancellor found that Lauren was capable of gainful employment, but she needed some time and assistance to make the transition from being a stay-at-home wife and mother. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion by awarding Lauren rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month for twenty-four months to assist in her transition back to the workforce. Issue 3: Child support Joseph argues that the chancellor’s directing him to pay private-school tuition and three-quarters of medical expenses in addition to child support, exceeds the statutory child support guidelines. According to section 43-19-101, child support payment is based on the individual’s adjusted gross income. Once the individual’s gross income is obtained, the court is required to subtract the legally mandated deductions from the total income according to section 43-19-101(3)(b). The chancellor is allowed to deviate from the statutory guidelines when certain criteria are met. The chancellor ordered Joseph to pay $750 per child in monthly child support; provide health and hospitalization insurance for the children; pay three-quarters of the costs of the children’s medical costs not covered by insurance; maintain a life-insurance policy with each child named as the beneficiary of $250,000; timely pay the children’s private-school tuition, registration, and fees; and pay for the extracurricular activities for the children in which he enrolled them. The chancellor may deviate from child-support guidelines if the parent’s adjusted gross income is greater than $50,000 and if the chancellor finds the application of the guidelines inappropriate. Here, the chancellor was not in error in deviating from the child-support guidelines. Tax returns for 2005 through 2007 indicated that Joseph’s adjusted gross income was $161,877, $146,143, and $131,787, respectively. Issue 4: Savings accounts Joseph argues that the chancellor erred in placing the children’s savings in Lauren’s name rather than in both parties’ names or the children’s names only. The record does not indicate that the chancellor abused his discretion by placing Lauren’s name on the savings accounts for the children. Issue 5: Attorneys’ fees At the time of the proceedings in June 2008, Joseph had already paid $4,500 in attorney’s fees. The chancellor awarded Lauren an additional $15,500 in attorney’s fees. Joseph argues that the chancellor failed to properly consider the McKee factors and applicable law governing the award of attorney’s fees and to enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law based on each factor. The appropriate amount of attorney’s fees is determined by a sum sufficient to secure one competent attorney, the relative financial ability of the parties, the skill and standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the case and novelty and difficulty of the questions at issue, the degree of responsibility involved in the management of the cause, the time and labor required, the usual and customary charge in the community, and the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case. Review of the record indicates that the only factors that the chancellor addressed in his ruling to award attorney’s fees to Lauren was the fact that this case was complex and that the attorneys involved labored extensively to determine the assets and etc., regarding this case. Without more, the chancellor’s decision to award attorney’s fees should be reversed and remanded for proper determination of the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded using the appropriate factors. |
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