Delk v. Delk
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-00384-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-20-2010 Opinion Author: Lee, P.J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Division of marital property - Ferguson factors Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Myers, P.J., Irving, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Griffis, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-05-2009 Appealed from: Harrison County Chancery Court Judge: Carter Bise Disposition: DIVIDED MARITAL PROPERTY Case Number: C2402-05-00418(4) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Scott Delk |
HAROLD O. GRISSOM JR. |
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| Appellee: | Karen Delk | JOSEPH R. MEADOWS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Division of marital property - Ferguson factors |
| Summary of the Facts: | Scott and Karen Delk were granted a divorce on irreconcilable differences. The only issue relevant to this appeal is the chancellor’s division of a condominium owned by Karen prior to the marriage. The condominium was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. The chancellor found that Scott was entitled to 26.2% of the equity, insurance proceeds, and grant money. Scott appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The chancellor determined that the condominium was commingled and became marital property. Once property has been qualified as marital or separate, the chancellor must then apply the Ferguson factors in dividing the property. The chancellor focused on the first factor, substantial contribution to the accumulation of property, which can be by direct or indirect economic contribution. Scott argues that the chancellor failed to apply the Ferguson factors correctly because he only took into account the direct financial contribution of the parties. The chancellor mainly used factor one of the Ferguson factors to determine each party’s share in the condominium. However, the chancellor examined the other factors and either found them to be inapplicable, or the other factors were applied in the division of other assets. The chancellor noted that it would be inequitable to award Scott any more than 26.2% of the interest in the condominium when Karen had owned and paid all the expenses for the condominium for eight years before it became marital property. The chancellor did not apply an incorrect legal standard in reaching this conclusion. Scott argues, in the alternative, that the chancellor’s application of the Ferguson factors was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Scott first argues that he is entitled to half of the proceeds of the condominium because it was jointly titled in his and Karen’s names. However, jointly titling the property does not on its own convert separate property to marital property. It was not until the couple began using the condominium as their marital home in 2003 that it became marital property. Therefore, the chancellor was correct in basing the valuation of the condominium at the time the couple began using the condominium as a marital residence. Scott argues that although he did not make a direct payment on the condominium before moving into it, he shared expenses with Karen and provided her a place to live, which allowed her to earn rental income on the condominium. The chancellor considered Scott’s contributions and noted that Scott benefitted from the use and sale of these properties, as the proceeds were deposited into the marital account. Scott next argues that the chancellor erred in requiring him to pay a portion of the penalties and interest for late payments on the condominium. Scott argues that the chancellor failed to consider that the reason he had stopped making payments was because Karen was taking his paychecks. However, the chancellor ordered that Karen reimburse Scott for the funds she took for his appraisal work. The chancellor thoroughly analyzed the Ferguson factors, and his findings were not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. |
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