Wheat v. Wheat
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-00476-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-24-2010 Opinion Author: Carlson, P.J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Adultery - Marital property - Amount of mortgage - Child support - Section 43-19-101(1) Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Graves, P.J., Randolph, Lamar and Chandler, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Kitchens, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Carlson, P.J., and Lamar, J.; Waller, C.J., Graves, P.J., and Dickinson, J., Join This Opinion in Part. Non Participating Judge(s): Pierce, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Dickinson, J., Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part With Separate Written Opinion Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Joined In Part by Kitchens, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-19-2008 Appealed from: Jackson County Chancery Court Judge: Jaye A. Bradley, Sr. Disposition: Judith R. Wheat and James M. Wheat were divorced on October 10, 2007, on the ground of uncondoned adultery, in the Chancery Court of Jackson County. Chancellor Jaye A. Bradley entered the Final Judgment of Divorce; the October 2, 2007, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and the February 14, 2008, Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Case Number: 2005-0763-JB |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Judith R. Wheat |
DEAN HOLLEMAN |
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| Appellee: | James M. Wheat | GARY L. ROBERTS | ||
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| Topic: | Divorce: Adultery - Marital property - Amount of mortgage - Child support - Section 43-19-101(1) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Judith Wheat and James Wheat were divorced on the ground of uncondoned adultery. James filed a Motion for Reconsideration, New Trial, Alteration or Amendment of Judgment or Relief from Judgment on the basis that the judgment incorrectly classified James’s nonmarital property and failed to divide the marital assets and liabilities equitably. The court ordered Judy to prepare and execute a qualified domestic-relations order that would award James $91,458 from a savings plan. Judy appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Marital property Judy argues that her Employment Severance Agreement in the amount of $267,707 (after withholding) and her “bridge” IRA account in the amount of $52,448, were erroneously classified as marital property, because those funds were distributed to her after the separation. Generally, for the purposes of classifying marital property, the marriage runs from the date of marriage until the final judgment of divorce. However, assets acquired after an order for separate maintenance should be considered the separate property of the parties, absent a showing of either contribution to the acquisition of the asset by the other spouse or acquisition of the asset through the use of marital property. Judy argues that her severance and IRA were compensation she would have earned had she remained employed with the shipyard; therefore, they were payment for future earnings and benefit, not consideration for the years of past service that overlapped with the years she was married. Notwithstanding Judy’s argument that the severance package and IRA were distributed for the purposes of providing her with future earnings, not for the purpose of compensating her for past service, Judy and James were married when the severance payout began in 2005, and they remained married until October 2007, after the severance pay was exhausted. Accordingly, the chancellor did not err in finding that both the severance and the IRA benefits received by Judy could be considered marital property, given that they were distributed to Judy two years before the divorce. Judy also argues that a portion of the appreciation in value of James’s Merchants and Marines Bank pension plan was a marital asset, because it was a direct result of years of service and employment during the marriage. A valuation expert showed the value of James’s pension plan to be $7,298.25 at the time of marriage. As of April 1, 2007, the value was $180,484.44. Thus, Judy asserts that the chancellor erred in finding that the more-than-$170,000 increase was not a marital asset. Assets acquired or accumulated during the course of a marriage are subject to equitable division unless it can be shown by proof that such assets are attributable to one of the parties' separate estates prior to the marriage or outside the marriage. Given that James showed proof that his pension was fully funded prior to the marriage, and given that Judy’s counsel, both in a letter to James’s counsel and during oral arguments at the hearing, conceded that the pension was nonmarital property, the chancellor did not commit manifest error in reclassifying the pension as James’s nonmarital property. The chancellor made a finding that the Merchants & Marine stock, valued at $34,720, was acquired prior to the marriage; thus, it was not subject to equitable distribution. Judy argues that, because the stock was jointly titled during the marriage, it became commingled; thus, the stock became a marital asset. Judy never asserted before the court that the Merchants & Marine Bank shares were marital property. Accordingly, Judy is procedurally barred from raising this issue. Judy argues that James’s testimony that the Morgan Keegan Individual Retirement Account had been obtained prior to the marriage, and that no contributions had been made to the IRA during the marriage, was insufficient to establish that the asset was nonmarital property. Judy did not raise this issue at trial and is now procedurally barred from doing so. Issue 2: Amount of mortgage Judy argues that the chancellor erroneously found the first mortgage to be in the amount of $116,658. She asserts that the first mortgage is actually in the amount of $75,872, a difference of $40,786 in James’s favor. Ample evidence supports Judy’s claim that the first mortgage is $75,872. James’s financial declaration lists the mortgage balance as $116,658; however, in his own testimony, James established that this was a combined total of the first and second mortgages. He further testified that the first mortgage was $75,872. The record shows that, with all marital and separate property, James received $435,761 in total assets. Judy received $481,603 in total assets, after all marital and separate property had been classified and assigned to her by the chancellor. The chancellor should revisit this issue on remand. Issue 3: Child support Judy argues that the chancellor erred in awarding James, the custodial parent, $750 per month in child support, because this amount is in excess of the statutory child-support guidelines in section 43-19-101(1). According to Judy, the trial court erred in finding her “current adjusted gross income” to be in excess of $50,000 per year. Section 43-19-101(1) establishes a rebuttable presumption that one child should receive support in an amount equal to fourteen percent of the adjusted gross income of the noncustodial parent. This presumption exists unless the chancellor makes a written, specific finding that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate pursuant to section 43-19-103. Furthermore, in cases where the annual adjusted gross income is more than $50,000 or less than $5,000, the chancellor shall make a written finding as to whether the application of the guidelines is reasonable. While $750 conceivably could be seen as a reasonable amount of monthly child support in light of Judy’s significant assets, the statute plainly states gross income is determined from all “expected” and “available” sources of income. The Northrop Grumman severance package was no longer an available source of income after May 2007. The monthly income from Judy’s retirement accounts, her “expected” income, was unknown at the date of divorce, as noted by the chancellor. It is unclear what source of revenue serves as the basis of the trial court’s award of child support. While the chancellor could have based the child support on Judy’s earning capacity rather than her actual earnings, no on-the-record findings were made that Judy’s earning capacity was the basis for the $750 award of monthly child support. Thus, this issue is reversed and remanded. A determination of child support must be made based on Judy’s circumstances from the time of divorce until remand. Moreover, given that much time has passed since the divorce on October 10, 2007, a determination should be made as to the amount of child support that is appropriate based on Judy’s current circumstances. |
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