Booker v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-KA-02054-COA Linked Case(s): 2008-KA-02054-COA ; 2008-CT-02054-SCT ; 2008-CT-02054-SCT ; 2008-CT-02054-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-22-2010 Opinion Author: Roberts, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Manslaughter - Weathersby rule - Jury instructions - Lay opinion testimony - M.R.E. 701 - Discovery violation - Exclusion of evidence - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 402 - Admission of testimony Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Griffis and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Barnes and Carlton, JJ. Dissenting Author : Ishee, J., dissents with separate written opinion Dissent Joined By : King, C.J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Irving, J., concurs in part and in the result without separate written opinion. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-03-2008 Appealed from: TIPPAH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Henry L. Lackey Disposition: CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH TEN YEARS SUSPENDED AND FIVE YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION AND TO PAY $25,000 IN RESTITUTION District Attorney: Benjamin F. Creekmore Case Number: TK2007-043 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Chad Booker |
ANTHONY L. FARESE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Manslaughter - Weathersby rule - Jury instructions - Lay opinion testimony - M.R.E. 701 - Discovery violation - Exclusion of evidence - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 402 - Admission of testimony |
| Summary of the Facts: | Chad Booker was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years, with ten years suspended and five years of post-release supervision. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Weathersby rule Booker argues that the Weathersby rule applies in this case. The Weathersby rule provides that where the defendant or the defendant's witnesses are the only eyewitnesses to the homicide, their version, if reasonable, must be accepted as true, unless substantially contradicted in material particulars by a credible witness or witnesses for the state, or by the physical facts or by the facts of common knowledge. However, if the defendant or the defendant's eyewitnesses' testimonies satisfy all the elements of murder or manslaughter, the defendant would not be entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal, as their testimonies would be the basis for a valid conviction. Booker’s version of the incident satisfies the elements of manslaughter; therefore, the circuit court was within its discretion to determine that the Weathersby rule did not apply. Issue 2: Jury instructions Booker argues the circuit court erred when it instructed the jury pursuant to the prosecution’s manslaughter instruction and that the circuit court erred when it denied three of his proffered jury instructions. At best, the evidence indicates that Booker landed three punches to the left side of the victim’s head while the victim was attempting to punch him. At worst, Booker punched the victim in the head while the victim remained seated in the Rhino. Either of these scenarios is sufficient to constitute a “cruel or unusual manner.” Therefore, the prosecution’s instruction properly instructed the jury that it had to find that Booker struck the victim in the head with deadly force in order to find him guilty of manslaughter. With regard to Booker’s proferred instructions, the core substance of all three proffered instructions centers on Booker’s self-defense theory. The circuit court acted well within its discretion in declining to instruct the jury pursuant to the three instructions. Issue 3: Lay opinion testimony Booker argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it allowed a witness to testify regarding whether the victim would have been able to sustain the injuries that Booker caused and then be mobile enough to walk back to the Rhino ATV. The witness testified that she had been a registered nurse since 1981. Since that time, she had been an emergency-room nurse and a nurse in an intensive care unit. She was the first person to arrive at the scene of the homicide. Booker claimed that the victim was the initial aggressor. The witness’s testimony was harmful to Booker’s defense theory because if the victim never left the Rhino ATV, or if he was sitting in it when Booker hit him, then Booker’s version of events was not very credible. The prosecution did not attempt to qualify Morgan as an expert in the traditional sense. Accordingly, she could only provide her opinion as a lay witness. Pursuant to M.R.E. 701, a lay witness may testify as to his or her non-expert opinion evidence if the opinion is rationally based on the perception of the witness and is helpful to the clear understanding of the determination of a fact in issue. Where a lay witness testifies to matters that require qualification as an expert witness, any error in admitting the lay witness’s testimony is harmless if the lay witness’s testimony was cumulative because a properly qualified expert witness testified to the same effect. It is important to consider that, even if the evidence was undisputed that the victim in this case was the initial aggressor, the jury could have still found Booker guilty of manslaughter. Thus, Booker was not prejudiced by the witness’s testimony. Issue 4: Discovery violation Booker argues the circuit court erred when it allowed the victim’s grandson to testify when the prosecution did not list him as a witness and his statement to the police was never produced as discovery by the State. For a discovery violation to require reversal there must be a showing of prejudice and the non-disclosed material must be more than simply cumulative. Here, the testimony was cumulative. Issue 5: Exclusion of evidence Booker argues the circuit court erred when it refused to allow him to introduce testimony from a number of witnesses. One of the witnesses had a verbal confrontation with the victim three-and-one half years earlier. There was no indication that the witness would have testified that the victim was physically aggressive during their confrontation – much less that the victim was the initial physical aggressor. Consequently, his testimony would not have made it more likely that the victim was the initial aggressor and was therefore irrelevant under M.R.E. 401 and 402. In addition, it would have been confusing and misleading to the jury. With regard to the second witness, Booker’s attorney sought to introduce his hearsay testimony to demonstrate that the victim “had a bad temper and he was overbearing.” Assuming for the sake of argument that the witness’s testimony was admissible as an exception to M.R.E. 801, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the testimony. The hearsay testimony is not only too remote in time to be admissible – it is also irrelevant, and its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. With regard to the circuit court’s exclusion of an opinion from a witness that, in his experience, Booker was generally respectful and calm and that it was uncharacteristic of him to be involved in such an altercation, the court did not err in excluding the statement considering the totality of the cumulative evidence. Issue 6: Admission of testimony Booker argues that the circuit court erred when it allowed a witness to testify regarding the location of the victim’s baseball cap. There was no abuse of discretion. This testimony was not the only evidence that contradicted Booker’s version of events. The location of the victim’s glasses contradicted Booker’s version of events. |
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