Harris v. State


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Docket Number: 2008-KA-01731-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 06-22-2010
Opinion Author: Myers, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Sale of cocaine - Discovery violation - URCCC 9.04 - Closing argument - Ineffective assistance of counsel
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Roberts, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Maxwell, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-15-2008
Appealed from: SHARKEY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: Isadore Patrick
Disposition: CONVICTED OF SALE OF COCAINE AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH FIFTEEN YEARS TO SERVE AND FIVE YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION, AND TO PAY A $5,000 FINE, $1,000 TO THE CRIME VICTIMS’ COMPENSATION FUND, AND $166.50 IN STATE ASSESSMENTS
District Attorney: Richard Earl Smith, Jr.
Case Number: 3182

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: William Harris, Sr.




MICHAEL R. BONNER, TRAVIS T. VANCE, JR.



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LISA LYNN BLOUNT  

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    Topic: Sale of cocaine - Discovery violation - URCCC 9.04 - Closing argument - Ineffective assistance of counsel

    Summary of the Facts: William Harris Sr. was convicted of the sale of cocaine and sentenced to twenty years, with fifteen years to serve and five years of post release supervision. He appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Discovery Harris argues that the State’s failure to timely provide the audiotapes and the name of its chief witness denied him a meaningful opportunity to prepare for trial. URCCC 9.04(B) provides that an informant’s identity must be disclosed if a failure to disclose would infringe upon the constitutional rights of the accused or the informant was or depicts himself or herself as an eyewitness to the event or events constituting the charge against the defendant. An exception to the rule exists in situations where the trial court finds there is a substantial risk of physical harm or intimidation resulting from such disclosure. Here, the CI was the State’s chief witness, and he was the only eyewitness to the alleged drug buy; thus, in accordance with Rule 9.04(A)(1) and 9.04(B)(2), the State was required to disclose his name and address to Harris in discovery. Likewise, the State was required to provide Harris a copy of the audiotapes, which contained statements made by both the CI and Harris. But the State made an argument in this case that it withheld furnishing the CI’s name and address, as well as the audiotapes, to Harris earlier in discovery based on a justified concern for the CI’s safety. The trial judge acknowledged the State’s reason for withholding certain discovery in this instance, and there was no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s implicit decision. The trial judge afforded defense counsel an opportunity to interview the CI before testimony began the next day. Defense counsel made no request for a continuance following the interview. As to the audiotapes, the trial judge did not err in finding that there was no information contained on the audiotapes that caused Harris any prejudicial, unfair surprise. Issue 2: Closing argument Harris argues that the prosecutors made “link-in-the-chain” and “send-a-message” comments during the State’s closing argument at trial. Attorneys are given wide latitude in presenting their cases to the jury during closing arguments, but they are not allowed to employ tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury. When reviewing whether an argument at trial constitutes reversible error, the Court considers whether defense counsel properly objected and whether it appears, under the circumstances, defense counsel invited the prosecutor’s comments. Harris did not object to any of the comments made by the prosecutors during the State’s closing argument at trial and is, therefore, barred from appealing this issue. While the comments stated by both prosecutors were improper, they did not interfere with the fairness of Harris’s trial so as to warrant reversal under the plain-error doctrine nor are the remarks so inflammatory that the trial court should have objected on its own motion. Issue 3: Ineffective assistance of counsel Harris argues that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the improper comments made by the prosecutors during closing argument constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Assuming for the sake of argument that Harris’s counsel’s conduct fell outside the range of reasonable professional assistance, Harris has failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of prejudice that resulted therefrom.


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