In re Estate of Williams v. Estate of Williams
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-00668-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-22-2010 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wrongful death - Attorney's fees - Jurisdiction - Breach of contract claims - M.R.C.P. 2 - M.R.C.P. 3 Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-13-2007 Appealed from: Harrison County Chancery Court Judge: Jim Persons Disposition: MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND AMEND ORDER DISBURSING FUNDS DENIED Case Number: 06-00346-1 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | In the Matter of the Estate of Jessie Lee Williams, Jr., Deceased, By and Through His Brother and Next Friend, Terry Williams, Wrongful Death Representative: Contessa Gray, Guardian of Jyshawn Michael Gray |
BRUCE B. SMITH |
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| Appellee: | The Estate of Jessie Lee Williams, Jr. | MICHAEL W. CROSBY | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Wrongful death - Attorney's fees - Jurisdiction - Breach of contract claims - M.R.C.P. 2 - M.R.C.P. 3 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jessie Lee Williams, Jr. died while in the custody of the Harrison County Sheriff’s Department. Four days later, Terry Williams, the wrongful death representative for the Estate of Williams, contracted with attorney Michael W. Crosby to represent any wrongful-death beneficiaries in the wrongful death action. The contract was also signed by Sandra Hall and Stacey Ratcliff, mothers to six of Williams’s illegitimate children. On March 14, 2006, Crosby and attorney John Whitfield filed a wrongful death action in the federal district court of the Southern District of Mississippi seeking to recover damages for the wrongful death of Williams. On March 21, 2006, attorney Bruce B. Smith advised Crosby that he was representing Contessa Gray, who was pregnant with Williams’s unborn child. A motion was filed by Gray to establish paternity and for a DNA test. However, since Williams’s death was highly publicized, Crosby expressed concern to Smith about the adverse publicity that might be created by the discovery of another out-of-wedlock child fathered by Williams. Due to this concern about bad publicity and its possible effect on the potential settlement value of the case, the attorneys agreed that the best course of action for Gray would be to stay quiet and not actively participate in the suit. Therefore, Crosby handled all of the legal filings and publicity matters. After the wrongful death action was settled, a hearing was held to determine the wrongful death beneficiaries of Williams. Smith attended the hearing on Gray’s behalf. Following the hearing, the chancery court entered an order to determine the wrongful death beneficiaries and to conduct DNA tests. The chancery court later conducted a hearing to discuss the terms of the settlement and to review the results of the DNA tests. At the hearing, the chancellor approved the payment of the attorneys’ fees as provided in Crosby’s contract, along with expenses. The chancellor then entered an order establishing the wrongful death beneficiaries and an order approving the partial settlement of the wrongful death action. While reviewing the proposed petitions and orders, Smith learned that Crosby and Whitfield were claiming all of the court-approved attorneys’ fees. According to Smith, until that point, he had been under the belief that he would receive one-seventh of the attorneys’ fees. Consequently, Gray filed a motion to allocate and distribute attorneys’ fees which sought an award of attorney’s fees for Smith. The court denied the motion, finding that it was without jurisdiction to consider the motion as the matter constituted “a contractual dispute.” Smith, purportedly on Gray’s behalf, subsequently filed a motion to approve the contingency-fee contract she had entered into with Smith. She also filed a motion to set aside or amend the order disbursing funds. The court denied the motions, and Gray appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Smith argues that he was entitled to a prorate portion of the attorneys’ fees awarded by the chancery court, and this was not a contract dispute between the attorneys. It is more appropriate for a circuit court to hear equity claims than it is for a chancery court to hear actions at law since circuit courts have general jurisdiction but chancery courts enjoy only limited jurisdiction. While a wrongful death suit may be brought in circuit court, chancery jurisdiction should be invoked in certain instances, such as wrongful death suits that are brought on behalf of the deceased’s estate, involve a minor either as an heir, a wrongful death beneficiary or both, or involve the determination of wrongful death beneficiaries. Here, the case was brought in chancery court, and the chancellor approved Crosby’s contract to represent the estate in the wrongful death suit. However, although chancery approval is required for the appointment of the personal representative of the estate, there is no general requirement under law that the personal representative obtain chancery approval to pursue the claims of the estate in litigation. Nor does counsel representing the estate in the litigation have to obtain chancery approval for such representation. As the recovery of any funds by an estate in litigation must be administered and distributed through the chancery court in the same manner as other assets of the estate, and counsel for the estate must be paid from estate proceeds or assets, it is a wise practice to obtain such approval. As to the issue of the allocation of attorneys’ fees, the personal representative or any beneficiary may petition the court for a review of the proposed payment of costs and distribution of attorneys’ fees, and the trial court may equitably adjust and allocate fees among the attorneys based on the quantitative and qualitative contribution of each to the case, provided however, that so long as an attorney is reasonably involved, and makes a reasonable contribution to all aspects of the litigation, no deduction should be made from his or her fees. Although no express agreement existed between Smith and Crosby regarding attorneys’ fees, Smith accepted and used Crosby’s services as an attorney to obtain a settlement for his client. Moreover, Smith was present at the hearing to establish the wrongful death beneficiaries; yet, he never asserted any right to the attorneys’ fees even though the chancellor plainly discussed the issue of attorneys’ fees with Crosby at that hearing. Any conduct of one party from which the other party may draw the inference of a promise is effective as such and the conduct of the parties is viewed as a reasonable man would to determine the existence or not of the contract implied in fact. Smith’s acquiescence strongly suggests an expectation by Smith that his portion of the attorneys’ fees would be obtained from Crosby through an implied contract, not through the settlement of the estate. Thus, there is no merit to Smith’s contention that the chancery court should have jurisdiction as the claim involved a minor’s business. The chancellor found that Smith’s claim was “one of law against Mr. Crosby,” making the claim more appropriate for consideration by the circuit court. Breach of contract issues are best heard in circuit court. M.R.C.P. 2 and 3 state that only one form of action is recognized, a civil action, which is commenced by the filing of a complaint. Here, the matter on appeal was not brought by complaint, but merely by a motion contested among the attorneys of the minor parties in the underlying action. Consequently, due to the manner in which this matter was presented to the chancery court, it would have been inappropriate procedurally for the chancellor to transfer the issue of attorneys’ fees to the circuit court. The chancellor correctly denied the motion based upon lack of jurisdiction. |
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