In re C.K.B., a Minor v. Harrison County Youth Ct.
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01004-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-17-2010 Opinion Author: Graves, P.J. Holding: Reversed and rendered |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Juvenile justice - Sanctions - M.R.C.P. 11(b) - Section 43-21-651(1) & (2) - M.R.A.P. 3(a) - M.R.A.P. 8(b)(1) - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-17-23 - Confession - Section 43-21-559 Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Randolph, J. Concurs in Result Only: Dickinson, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - JUVENILE JUSTICE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-23-2009 Appealed from: Harrison County Youth Court Judge: Michael Ward Disposition: The Harrison County Youth Court’s adjudicated C.K.B. (C.B.) as a delinquent for the act of burglary and fimposed sanctions against C.B., his mother, and counsel for C.B. Case Number: 24-YC-2009-D-6 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | In The Interest of C.K.B., a Minor |
OLIVER E. DIAZ, JR., VANESSA JUDITH CARROLL, SHEILA ANNE BEDI |
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| Appellee: | Harrison County Youth Court | HERBERT WAYNE WILSON |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Juvenile justice - Sanctions - M.R.C.P. 11(b) - Section 43-21-651(1) & (2) - M.R.A.P. 3(a) - M.R.A.P. 8(b)(1) - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-17-23 - Confession - Section 43-21-559 |
| Summary of the Facts: | The Harrison County Youth Court adjudicated C.B. as a delinquent for the act of burglary and imposed sanctions against C.B., his mother, and counsel for C.B. C.B. appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sanctions C.B. argues that the youth court erred in declaring that C.B.’s motion for release and stay of detention pending appeal was duplicative of a prior motion and in imposing sanctions as punishment for filing the motion. C.B. argues that the youth-court order for sanctions is in the nature of a finding of criminal contempt and that the Rules of Appellate Procedure required that the request for relief be presented to the youth court before seeking a stay in the Supreme Court, and asserts that the motion was not duplicative. Also, C.B. argues that, even if there was a basis for imposing sanctions on counsel, there was no basis to impose sanctions on C.B. and his mother. Harrison County argues that the sanctions were issued pursuant to M.R.C.P. 11(b) and that C.B. had no right to appeal with supersedeas and, thus, no right to seek a stay from the Supreme Court, making the Rules of Appellate Procedure inapplicable. Harrison County also argues that, since C.B. and his mother were present for the detention hearing, and since both signed the duplicative motions, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to sanction them. However, there were declarations of C.B. and his mother attached as exhibits to the second motion, but neither signed either pleading. Further, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court clearly was not imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Harrison County fails to provide a single citation of authority for imposing sanctions on a child. The youth court made no specific finding that any motion was frivolous or is filed for the purpose of harassment or delay as required by Rule 11. The transcript and the order indicate that the judge was imposing sanctions for what he believed to be violations of his prior order regarding duplicative filings. The imposition of sanctions was in the nature of a finding of direct criminal contempt. C.B.’s counsel filed two motions. First, counsel filed a Motion to Set Case for Adjudication and Disposition and Release the Minor from Detention on May 15, 2009. This motion asserted that C.B. had been detained thirty-seven days in violation of section 43-21-551(2) and sought his release pending final adjudication. Further, this motion asked the Court to immediately set C.B.’s case for adjudication, as he had filed a petition to admit. After a hearing, the youth court entered an order on May 26, 2009, setting the adjudicatory hearing for June 22, 2009, and summarily denying the request for release. On May 29, 2009, counsel for C.B. filed a notice of appeal of the May 26 order pursuant to section 43-21-651(1) and M.R.A.P. 3(a). Also on May 29, 2009, counsel for C.B. filed a Motion for Release and Stay of Detention Order Pending Appeal, seeking to appeal with supersedeas. C.B.’s first motion sought to enforce the statutorily-imposed requirement found in section 43-21-551(2) that his adjudicatory hearing be scheduled within twenty-one days. In the second motion, C.B. indicated his intent to appeal with supersedeas pursuant to section 43-21-651(2) and M.R.A.P. 8(b)(1). Harrison County argues that C.B. had no right to appeal because no final judgment had been entered. However, Harrison County offers no authority which establishes that the Supreme Court lacks authority to review any decision of a youth court until a final adjudication and disposition. Moreover, despite the erroneous assertion that the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply because there had not been a final disposition, Harrison County acknowledges the existence of a rule pertaining to interlocutory appeals. The record indicates that C.B. denied the burglary, but then filed a petition to admit based upon an indication from the youth court counselor that she would recommend probation if he admitted the burglary charge. However, during C.B.’s hearing, the youth court judge informed C.B. that he would not get probation and, thus, C.B. reasserted his denial. The judge characterizes C.B.’s decisions as “playing games.” However, that is not supported by the record. The record in this matter does not indicate any basis for a finding of direct criminal contempt. The youth court sanctioned a child, his mother and his counsel for an alleged violation of the court’s directive in other, unrelated cases. The alleged violation in this case was the filing of two motions pursuant to statutory authority seeking to prevent a child from being detained for some seventy-six days pending his final adjudication. C.B. was required under both the applicable statute and rule to first seek relief in the youth court. Reasonable diligence in the zealous representation of a juvenile is not a viable basis for either contempt or Rule 11 sanctions. Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence C.B. argues that the youth court erred in failing to direct a verdict in his favor. The standard of proof to support a determination that a youth is a delinquent child is the same as for the criminal conviction of an adult, i.e., proof of all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. C.B. was adjudicated a delinquent for burglary of a dwelling under section 97-17-23. The evidence in this case consisted of a low-resolution, home-surveillance video approximately four or five minutes in length and optimally viewed at approximately the size of a three-by-five-inch photograph. People appear on this video for only a few minutes. The only evidence of C.B.’s presence in the vicinity of the home was police testimony that C.B. was one of the individuals merely walking down the street. However, on cross-examination, the witness admitted that he could not identify the faces of any of the four individuals walking down the street in the first portion of the video. The witness was merely asked what the person he believed to be C.B. on the video appeared to be wearing. The witness neither identified the clothing C.B. was wearing that day when arrested nor did he confiscate any clothing from C.B. There is no evidence in the record of C.B. breaking and entering the dwelling house or inner door of a dwelling house. There is also no evidence in the record that C.B. had any intent to commit any crime therein. Therefore, neither element of burglary was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was insufficient evidence to adjudicate C.B. a delinquent child. Issue 3: Confession The police officer testified that he obtained a written waiver of rights from four other individuals. Those waivers included notations regarding the parental consent to question those individuals. He testified that he failed to obtain a written waiver of rights from C.B. He also testified that he spoke with C.B.’s mother, although he neither remembered her name nor made any written note that she consented to his questioning of C.B. Further, he testified that C.B. gave a statement admitting culpability that the officer knew was contradictory to the only evidence, i.e., the video. Even if C.B.’s statement were admissible, section 43-21-559 clearly provides that it shall be insufficient to support an adjudication. Pursuant to subsection (2), any admission by C.B. must be corroborated in whole or in part by other competent evidence. That corroboration is missing here. The only other evidence presented, i.e., the video, directly contradicts the “admission” by C.B. Surveillance video showing that two other individuals kicked open a door can hardly be construed as corroborative of an alleged admission by a third individual that he did it by himself. Further, testimony of witnesses who merely had watched the surveillance video likewise does not corroborate such an “admission.” |
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