Estate of Johnson v. Graceland Care Ctr. Of Oxford, LLC
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-00688-SCT Linked Case(s): 2008-CA-00688-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-03-2010 Opinion Author: Pierce, J. Holding: Reversed and remanded; Affirmed and remanded; As to 2008-CA-00688-SCT - Estate of Johnson v. Graceland Care Center of Oxford, LLC; Reversed and Remanded. As to 2008-IA-01762-SCT- Desoto Healthcare, Inc. v. Conley; Affirmed and Remanded. As to 2008-CA-00688-SCT - Appellees taxed with costs of appeal. As to 2008-IA-01762-SCT - Appellant taxed with costs of appeal. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wrongful death - Medical malpractice - Statute of limitations - Section 15-1-36(5) & (6) - Section 15-1-55 - Disability of unsoundness of mind - M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Graves, P.JJ., Dickinson, Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens and Chandler, JJ. Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-28-2008 Appealed from: Lafayette County Circuit Court Judge: Henry L. Lackey Disposition: The trial court ruled that all of the plaintiff’s claims arose from alleged medical malpractice by Graceland. The trial court further held that the medicalmalpractice statute of limitations began to run the last day Johnson received treatment from Graceland, and therefore, the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred. The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice. Case Number: L06-347 |
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| Consolidated: CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2008-IA-01762-SCT; DeSoto Healthcare, Inc. d/b/a DeSoto Healthcare Center v. Timothy Conley; DeSoto Circuit Court; LC Case #: CV2008-0175CD; Ruling Date: 10/02/2008; Ruling Judge: Robert Chamberlin | ||
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | The Estate of Ardelua Johnson, By and Through Allie Shaw, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Ardelua Johnson, and for the use and Benefit of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Ardelua Johnson |
SUSAN NICHOLS ESTES, CAMERON CHRISTOPHER JEHL |
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| Appellee: | Graceland Care Center of Oxford, LLC, Graceland Management Company, Inc., Graceland Holdings, L. P., Graceland Inc., Lafayette LTC, Inc., Katie M. Overstreet Qtip Trust, Katie M. Overstreet Trust, Larry Overstreet and John B. ("Ley") Falkner, Mary Wilson | THOMAS L. KIRKLAND, JR., ANDY LOWRY | ||
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| Topic: | Wrongful death - Medical malpractice - Statute of limitations - Section 15-1-36(5) & (6) - Section 15-1-55 - Disability of unsoundness of mind - M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) |
| Summary of the Facts: | This appeal arises from two different cases. In the first, Ardelua Johnson was a resident of Graceland Care Center of Oxford, LLC, from September 1, 2001 until June 8, 2004. Johnson subsequently died on July 16, 2004. Allie Shaw, the executrix of the estate of Ardelua Johnson, served notice of intent to sue Graceland on July 7, 2006, and subsequently filed suit against Graceland on September 11, 2006. The complaint alleged multiple counts of negligence, medical-malpractice, gross negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, statutory survival claims, and statutory wrongful death. Graceland filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Johnson’s medical-malpractice claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that Johnson had mischaracterized the other claims against it in order to plead around the medical malpractice statute of limitations. The trial court ruled that all of the plaintiff’s claims arose from alleged medical malpractice by Graceland. The trial court further held that the medical malpractice statute of limitations began to run the last day Johnson received treatment from Graceland, and therefore, the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred. Johnson appeals. In the second case, Ester B. Conley was treated at DeSoto Healthcare Center from August 2005 until February 23, 2006, and subsequently died on March 19, 2006. Thomas Conley, the survivor and heir of Ester B. Conley, served notice of intent to sue DeSoto Healthcare on January 10, 2008. Conley then filed the complaint in this matter on May 19, 2008. The complaint alleged negligence, gross negligence, medical malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Mississippi Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. DeSoto Healthcare filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that all of the plaintiff’s claims arose out of an alleged medical-malpractice action, and the complaint was time-barred by the medical-malpractice statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and DeSoto Healthcare appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Both plaintiffs argue that the decedents were under the disability of unsoundness of mind while residents at the nursing homes and until the times of their deaths. Section 15-1-36(5) is the statute of limitations regarding plaintiffs with medical-malpractice claims who are under the disability of unsoundness of mind. However, both defendant nursing homes claim that subsection (5) of the medical-malpractice statute is limited by subsection (6), which references the limitations period established in section 15-1-55. This section is applicable only where the death of the person occurs within the last year of the time for the completion of the bar. This is because only when the decedent dies within a year of the applicable statute of limitations can there be a time period that is both after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, and within one year after the death of such person, as required by section 15-1-55. Regardless of whether section 15-1-36(6) incorporates section 15-1-55 in its entirety, or only the time period prescribed therein, as contended by the defendants, the result is the same. Because it is alleged that both Ardelua Johnson and Ester B. Conley remained under the disability of unsoundness of mind at the time of their death, section 15-1-36(6) points to section 15-1-55 as the limitations period only if there would be a period in time which was after the expiration of the medical-malpractice statute of limitations and within one year of the decedent’s death. In this matter, there is no such time period, because section 15-1-36(5) allows for an action to be commenced at any time within two years of the decedents’ deaths, since the plaintiffs claim their deaths occurred prior to the decedents’ ceasing to be under the disability of unsoundness of mind. If subsection (6) is applied, there may be some circumstances in which a forfeiture would be imposed on a plaintiff’s right to bring suit because the time would be limited to one year after death – rather than two years as provided by subsection (5). Consequently, the limitations period found in section 15-1-36(5) should be applied so as to prevent such a forfeiture. Assuming the allegations in the two complaints in this appeal are true, the respective statutes of limitations began running at the time of the decedents’ deaths. At this stage in the proceedings, neither complaint can be dismissed as untimely under M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). |
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