Wells v. Wells
| Docket Number: | 2007-CA-01813-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-01-2010 Opinion Author: Lee, P.J. Holding: The judgment of the Jackson County Chancery Court is affirmed on direct appeal and cross-appeal. All costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to the appellant/cross-appellee and one-half to the appellee/cross-appellant. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Child custody - Marital residence - Child support - Section 43-19-101(1) - Division of marital assets - Alimony - Attorney's fees Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Myers, P.J., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-14-2007 Appealed from: Jackson County Chancery Court Judge: Jaye A. Bradley, Sr. Disposition: GRANTED DIVORCE, AWARDED PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF CHILDREN TO HUSBAND, AND DIVIDED MARITAL ASSETS EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES Case Number: 2004-0830JB |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Reyna Corridori Wells |
CALVIN D. TAYLOR |
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| Appellee: | Forrest Simpson Wells | GARY L. ROBERTS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Child custody - Marital residence - Child support - Section 43-19-101(1) - Division of marital assets - Alimony - Attorney's fees |
| Summary of the Facts: | Reyna and Forrest Wells were granted a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Forrest and Reyna were awarded joint legal custody of two twin boys born during the marriage. Forrest was awarded physical custody of the twins, and Reyna was awarded visitation rights. Forrest was adjudicated not to be the father of Reyna’s third son and has no legal rights or responsibilities for this child. Reyna was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $336 a month to Forrest for the support of the twins. Forrest was ordered to provide health and hospitalization insurance for the twins, and Reyna and Forrest were ordered to split equally any medical, dental, ocular, or psychological expenses not covered by the insurance. The chancellor also split the marital estate. Reyna’s request for alimony and attorney’s fees was denied. Reyna appeals, and Forrest cross-appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Child custody Reyna argues that the children’s best interests would be served by keeping all three children together in her custody and that Forrest should have been adjudicated to be Reyna’s third son’s father. The third son was born when, without Forrest’s knowledge or consent, Reyna artificially inseminated herself with donor sperm and, after multiple attempts, became pregnant. Reyna initially led Forrest to believe that the child was conceived naturally. Under the circumstances of this case, Forrest was not adjudicated to be the father of the third son. Forrest has no rights or legal interest in this child. Therefore, the chancellor was presented with the option of either keeping the children together and awarding custody of all three children to Reyna or separating the children by awarding the twins to Forrest. As the chancellor found it would be in the best interests of the children to award custody to Forrest, it would be unfair to deny him custody because it would separate the twins from their half-brother. The chancellor found three of the Albright factors in Forrest’s favor, and she found the rest to be either neutral or inapplicable. We find that the chancellor thoroughly considered each of the Albright factors in awarding custody to Forrest. When considering the factors together as a whole, the award of child custody was not clearly erroneous. Issue 2: Marital residence Reyna argues that because she should have been granted primary physical custody of the children, she also should have been granted the exclusive use and possession of the marital residence. Since the award of child custody was not made in error, this issue is without merit. Issue 3: Child support Reyna argues that the amount of child support awarded by the chancellor was not supported by the evidence. No elaboration is made as to why the award was erroneous. No legal authority is cited for her argument. Failure to cite any authority is a procedural bar. In his cross-appeal, Forrest argues that the amount of child support set by the chancellor is too low. The chancellor used the child-support guidelines set out in section 43-19-101(1). This section states that for two children, child support should be set at twenty percent of the non-custodial spouse’s adjusted gross income. Reyna’s monthly income working part time as a nurse is $1,680. Twenty percent of this amount is $336. Forrest argues that income should be imputed to Reyna because she is working at less than full capacity. Income will be imputed to a child-support payor who, in bad faith, voluntarily worsens his financial position. There is no evidence that Reyna reduced her work hours in bad faith to reduce her child-support obligation. Thus, the chancellor was not manifestly wrong by not imputing income to Reyna. Issue 4: Division of assets Reyna argues that the chancellor erred in dividing the marital property. The chancellor determined that the marital estate should be split equally. After dividing the property, the chancellor made Forrest responsible for the marital debt. In order to maintain an equitable result, the chancellor awarded Forrest the marital checking account, the interest in the 401(k), and his interest in his life-insurance policy. The chancellor’s division was not clearly erroneous. The Ferguson factors were thoroughly considered, and the division was made in such a way as to eliminate alimony. Issue 5: Alimony Reyna argues that she should have received lump-sum alimony because Forrest’s non-marital assets are significantly greater than her non-marital assets. However, Reyna was awarded assets in excess of $100,000 and none of the debt. Therefore, the chancellor did not err in denying alimony. Issue 6: Attorney’s fees Reyna argues that she should have been awarded attorney’s fees. Generally, an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate in a divorce case where the requesting party establishes an inability to pay. However, if a party is financially able to pay her attorney, an award of attorney’s fees is not appropriate. Reyna has failed to show that she is incapable of paying her own attorney’s fees. |
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