Angle v. Koppers, Inc.
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-02045-SCT Linked Case(s): 2008-CA-02045-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-27-2010 Opinion Author: Lamar, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Statute of limitations - Section 15-1-35 - Intentional torts - Section 15-1-49(2) - Federal preemption - 42 U.S.C. 9658 Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Dickinson, Randolph, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J., With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Graves, P.J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-28-2008 Appealed from: Grenada County Circuit Court Judge: Joseph H. Loper Disposition: In this toxic-tort case, Rebekah Angle asserts various state-law claims for injuries she suffered from 1984 to 2001. Finding these claims time-barred, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. Case Number: 2006-194-CVL |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Rebekah Angle |
ELIZABETH UNGER CARLYLE, HUNTER W. LUNDY, ANDRE F. DUCOTE, J.P. HUGHES, JR., CARTER C. HITT |
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| Appellee: | Koppers, Inc. f/k/a Koppers Industries, Inc., and Illinois Central Railroad Company, Beazer East, Inc., and Three Rivers Management, Inc. | CHRISTOPHER A. SHAPELY, ROBERT L. GIBBS, WILLIAM ‘TREY’ JONES, III, JOSEPH ANTHONY SCLAFANI, JAY GORE, III, REUBEN V. ANDERSON, GLENN F. BECKHAM | ||
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Statute of limitations - Section 15-1-35 - Intentional torts - Section 15-1-49(2) - Federal preemption - 42 U.S.C. 9658 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Rebekah Angle filed a complaint against Koppers Inc., Beazer East, Inc., Three Rivers Management, Inc., and Illinois Central Railroad Company, claiming that she was exposed to harmful levels of toxic chemicals, including creosote and pentachlorophenol, that were released into the environment from railroad tank cars and trucks and from a wood-treatment facility. She sought damages under theories of negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se, intentional tort, conspiracy, private conspiracy under 42 U.S. Code Section 1985(3), strict liability, trespass, private nuisance, and failure to warn. Pursuant to a court order requiring Angle to provide a more definite statement, Angle submitted additional information concerning her alleged exposure and injuries. Upon receipt of this information, the defendants moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Defendants argued that all of Angle’s illnesses were diagnosed no later than 2001, approximately five years before Angle filed her complaint. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Angle appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Statute of limitations Angle argues that the statute of limitations for all her asserted claims began to run when she discovered that her medical problems were the result of exposure to toxic chemicals. The plain language of section 15-1-35 does not cover an intentional tort for failing to investigate and remediate contamination of property. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding section 15-1-35 to be inapplicable. The parties do not dispute that section 15-1-49(2) applies to all claims in the event that section 15-1-35 does not govern the intentional tort-claim. The plain language of section 15-1-49(2) supports the defendants’ argument that the cause of action accrued upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause. Angle’s cause of action accrued at the latest in 2001, the date she was last diagnosed with an injury or disease. No provision of Section 15-1-49 provides that a plaintiff must have knowledge of the cause of the injury before the cause of action accrues, initiating the running of the statute of limitations. Therefore, Angle’s claims are time-barred, as she filed her complaint in 2006, approximately five years after her discovery of the last injury. Issue 2: Preemption Alternatively, Angle argues that if her claims are time-barred under section 15-1-49, 42 U.S. Code Section 9658 preempts the state statute of limitations. Preemption occurs in three circumstances: where Congress explicitly preempts state law; where preemption is implied because Congress has occupied the entire field; or where preemption is implied because there is an actual conflict between federal and state law. Angle must persuade the Court that Section 9658 preempts state law by showing, at a minimum, that her claims meet the six elements of that federal statute, namely: (1) property damage and/or personal injury (2) caused or contributed to by (3) a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant (4) released (5) into the environment (6) from a facility. The record is void of any evidence before the trial court that CERCLA preempts state law. Absent any evidence in the record to the contrary, the trial court properly found that Angle failed to carry her burden of showing that 42 U.S. Code Section 9648 preempts Mississippi Code section 15-1-49. |
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