Curry v. McDaniel


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-00577-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 05-25-2010
Opinion Author: Myers, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Modification of custody - Standard - Physical disability - Albright analysis
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Irving, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ.
Concurs in Result Only: Griffis, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CUSTODY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-11-2009
Appealed from: RANKIN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Judge: John Grant
Disposition: CHILD CUSTODY AWARDED TO FATHER WITH MOTHER RECEIVING VISITATION
Case Number: 50686

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Teressa C. Curry




RANDY A. CLARK



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: Joseph R. McDaniel MICHAEL P. YOUNGER  

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    Topic: Modification of custody - Standard - Physical disability - Albright analysis

    Summary of the Facts: Legal and physical custody of C.H. was awarded to her father, Joseph McDaniel, based on a finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred since its previous judgments that warranted changing C.H.’s custody from her mother, Teressa Curry. Curry appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Standard Curry argues that chancellor erroneously treated this case as an initial-custody matter, rather than as one for custody modification. She argues that the chancellor acknowledged that Curry has had de facto custody of C.H. for most of C.H.’s life, and despite the chancellor’s decision to award McDaniel custody of C.H. based on a material change of circumstances, the chancellor did not seriously consider this case to be a modification case. The chancellor found in this instance that there had been no custody determination decided or approved by the court prior to McDaniel’s petition for custody modification. Because there had not been a first-time finding by the court regarding custody of C.H, the chancellor viewed this matter as a “straight custody case.” The chancellor explained that when there has been no previous custody determination, a material-changes test is not required; rather, Mississippi law instructs chancellors to apply an Albright analysis in order to determine in whose custody does the best interest of the child lie. He stated, however, that even if there had been a prior custodial award by the court, a material change in circumstances adversely affecting the welfare of C.H. was sufficiently demonstrated to the court. The material-changes standard used in modification proceedings is dependent on there being a prior determination of custody. But, in cases where no prior determination of custody has been considered, the proper standard of law to be applied is that found in divorce proceedings, which is the best interest of the minor child. The chancellor’s statement that he viewed this matter as a “straight custody case” was not an incorrect statement of law. Nevertheless, the matter was pleaded and tried as a case for custody modification, and the chancellor ultimately reached a final decision on that basis. In a custody-modification proceeding, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a material change in circumstances has occurred; this change adversely affects the welfare of the child; and a change of custody is in the best interest of the child. Evidence was presented that while in Curry’s care, C.H. has suffered from an episode of lice infestation, a urinary-tract infection, at least one yeast infection, allergies, a lack of bathing and toilet training, and a broken arm. The record adequately supports the chancellor’s evidentiary findings with regard to the negative-hygiene issues experienced by C.H., her academic struggles, and the incident that endangered C.H. brought about by Curry’s reckless decision to drive with impaired vision. Thus, the chancellor did not manifestly err in concluding that a material change of circumstances had occurred which adversely affected the safety and welfare of C.H. Issue 2: Physical disability Curry argues that the chancellor placed undue weight upon her physical disability. A parent’s physical or mental disability does not in itself determine the outcome of a child-custody dispute; rather, it is the best interest and the welfare of the child that controls the chancellor’s decision. There is no merit to Curry’s contention that the chancellor grounded his decision solely on the fact that she suffers a severe vision limitation and McDaniel does not. Evidence was presented that put at issue Curry’s decision-making ability with regard to her disability, which gave the chancellor cause for concern with regard to the welfare of C.H. Issue 3: Albright analysis The chancellor made detailed findings in this case with regard to the Albright factors. Although Curry maintains that the chancellor should have never reached an Albright analysis, she argues that the chancellor also failed to give due weight to a number of the Albright factors in deciding the best interest of C.H. There is no clear error in the chancellor’s decision. The chancellor thoroughly considered the Albright factors in determining the best interest of C.H., applying the substantial and credible evidence presented before him.


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