Mark S. Bounds Realty Partners, Inc. v. Lawrence


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-00493-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 05-11-2010
Opinion Author: Roberts, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Attorney's fees - M.R.C.P. 52(a) - M.R.C.P. 11(b) - Frivolous complaint - M.R.C.P. 57 - Subject matter jurisdiction
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Maxwell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 02-25-2009
Appealed from: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Judge: Janace Harvey Goree
Disposition: DISMISSED CASE FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION AND AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case Number: 2008-8-03-G

Note: Due to a military leave of absence, Hon. Virginia C. Carlton did not participate in this hand down.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Mark S. Bounds Realty Partners, Inc




GREGORY MOREAU JOHNSTON



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: Melanie Lawrence KATHLEEN SHORKEY COOK  

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    Topic: Contract - Attorney's fees - M.R.C.P. 52(a) - M.R.C.P. 11(b) - Frivolous complaint - M.R.C.P. 57 - Subject matter jurisdiction

    Summary of the Facts: After several years of employment with Mark S. Bounds Realty Partners, Inc., Melanie Lawrence decided to take another position in the real-estate industry and left Bound’s employment in October 2007. Soon after, a dispute arose between the parties; and in July 2008, Lawrence, through her attorney, mailed Bounds a letter explaining that unless they could reach an agreement regarding the monies Lawrence felt she was owed, she would file a complaint within the following week alleging, among other causes of action, breach of contract. In response to the letter, Bounds filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Madison County on the same day, Lawrence planned on filing her complaint in county court seeking a declaratory judgment and claiming, among other causes of action, breach of an employment contract. That same day Lawrence filed her complaint in the County Court of Madison County. Service of process in the county court matter was subsequently completed on Bounds soon after the complaint was filed. However, service of process on Lawrence in the chancery matter was not completed until approximately a month and a half after Bounds’s complaint was filed. Prior to successfully serving Lawrence in the chancery matter, Bounds filed a motion to dismiss in the county court in which it argued that it was first to file in the chancery court, and as such, jurisdiction attached to the chancery court. Bounds’s motion was never set for a hearing and was essentially abandoned. Soon after, Bounds effectuated service of process on Lawrence through a constable. Lawrence subsequently filed a motion to dismiss in the chancery court claiming that the chancery court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties’ claims. She also requested attorney’s fees resulting from Bounds’s chancery court action. The chancery court found that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction, and Bounds’s causes of action were subsequently transferred to the county court. Additionally, the chancellor awarded Lawrence attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,250. Bounds appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Bounds argues that the court erred by awarding Lawrence attorney’s fees, because there was no basis or authority for the award. As neither party requested findings of fact from the chancellor pursuant to M.R.C.P. 52(a) and this case is not one of significant complexity, the chancellor’s order will be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. M.R.C.P. 11(b) allows a court to award attorney’s fees if it finds that a party files a motion or pleading which is frivolous or is filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. In the context of attorney’s fees awarded pursuant to Rule 11(b), it will be assumed that the court made determinations of fact sufficient to support its ruling even when no finding in support of the award was explicitly made. A claim is frivolous when objectively speaking, the pleader or movant has no hope of success. The question before the chancery court in this case was whether, objectively speaking, a reasonable litigant in Bounds’s position have any hope of success of winning his case by filing his complaint in chancery court. Bounds’s stated purpose for filing his complaint in the chancery court was to avoid a jury trial. Such a tactic, i.e. attempting to gain priority jurisdiction, is not prohibited provided that the pleading is correctly filed, although the manner in which this particular race to the courthouse, albeit the wrong one, is suspect. Bounds’s complaint sought a declaratory judgment that no oral contract existed between the parties and also alleged the following: libel and slander alleging that Lawrence injured Bounds’s reputation and good will when she held herself out to be a “property manager,” even though she was not one; fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation also stemming from Lawrence allegedly holding herself out to be a property manager; breach of contract alleging that Lawrence breached her employment contract by engaging in a personal business using company resources and time; and unjust enrichment stemming from compensation received by Lawrence while she was allegedly engaged in personal business at the workplace. Bounds requested compensatory damages in the amount of $100,000. Seeking a declaratory judgment under M.R.C.P. 57 is a jurisdictionally neutral claim and is dependent on the underlying claim for a determination of which court properly has subject-matter jurisdiction. Unjust enrichment is an equity claim. However, in its complaint, Bounds ties its claim of unjust enrichment to its breach-of-contract claim. Circuit courts generally have exclusive jurisdiction over breach-of-contract claims that request damages, which are a legal remedy. Similarly, Bounds’s remaining claims, namely libel, slander, fraudulent concealment, and misrepresentation, request solely a legal remedy. Therefore, those causes of action raised by Bounds should have been raised in a court of law rather than one of equity. In its complaint, Bounds alleged that venue and subject-matter jurisdiction were proper in the chancery court because “the causes of action asserted by Plaintiff herein occurred and accrued in whole or in part in Madison County, Mississippi.” This statement does nothing in the way of establishing either venue or subject-matter jurisdiction in the Chancery Court of Madison County. Had Bounds believed that its complaint raised claims of equity and filed its complaint in chancery court with only the intent to avoid a jury trial, rather than harassment or some other form of judicial delay, such an agenda could have easily been argued in county court. Thus, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the chancellor’s implied findings that: Bounds’s complaint had no hope of success in chancery court; it unnecessarily expanded the proceedings of Lawrence’s dispute with Bounds; and/or it was interposed for delay or harassment.


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