McBride v. State


<- Return to Search Results


Docket Number: 2008-KA-01347-COA
Linked Case(s): 2008-KA-01347-COA ; 2008-CT-01347-SCT ; 2008-CT-01347-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 05-04-2010
Opinion Author: Barnes, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Sexual battery - Right to speedy trial - Sufficiency of evidence
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving and Maxwell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J.
Dissenting Author : Roberts, J., with separate written opinion
Dissent Joined By : Griffis and Ishee, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 02-20-2008
Appealed from: Coahoma County Circuit Court
Judge: Charles E. Webster
Disposition: CONVICTED OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
District Attorney: Laurence Y. Mellen
Case Number: 2006-0021

Note: Due to a military leave of absence, Hon. Virginia C. Carlton did not participate in this hand down.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Jerry McBride




W. DANIEL HINCHCLIFF



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LISA L. BLOUNT  

    Synopsis provided by:

    If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
    hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office.

    Topic: Sexual battery - Right to speedy trial - Sufficiency of evidence

    Summary of the Facts: Jerry McBride was convicted of sexual battery of his minor daughter and sentenced to twenty-five years. He appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Right to speedy trial McBride argues that he was denied his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial, as he was incarcerated approximately nineteen months before being brought to trial. For constitutional speedy-trial claims, the starting point for the calculation of the time begins with the defendant’s formal indictment or information or arrest. McBride’s constitutional right to a speedy trial attached when he was indicted on May 30, 2006. McBride’s trial was held approximately seventeen months from the date of his indictment; thus, the delay is presumptively prejudicial. Reasons given by the State for the delay were the timing of McBride’s arrest during the court term, the timing of the mini-terms, administrative oversight or mere negligence, docket overcrowding, and the availability of a key witness for the State. Given these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was no evidence that the State deliberately delayed McBride’s trial. McBride filed two pro se motions to dismiss his charges due, in part, to a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The record does not reflect that McBride ever filed a motion demanding a speedy trial. McBride filed these motions after the order of December 21, 2007, which set trial for one month later on January 22, 2008. Accordingly, with these motions, McBride was not trying to have his case heard but, rather, have it dismissed. There is no evidence that McBride’s defense was impaired by the delay in trial. While the delay was regrettable, the trial court was correct in finding McBride’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. McBride did not raise his statutory right to a speedy trial specifically. When he raised his constitutional right to a speedy trial, it was well past the 270-day requirement of the statute. Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence McBride argues that the State did not prove the element of the victim’s age within the time frame of the indictment and subsequent jury instructions. McBride is factually correct that the victim was actually twelve years old in January 2002, the time of the sexual battery. Regardless, there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury that the victim was under the age of fourteen during the first incident, which is the requirement of the statute. She admitted that her age of eleven or twelve was an approximation, which is completely reasonable under the circumstances. Further, there was no testimony presented at trial that she was over the age of fourteen at the time of the first incident. The time frame in the indictment and jury instructions of the sexual battery was an approximation, which is proper. As long as sufficient evidence at trial proved the victim was under the age of fourteen during the first incident, the time frame of the incident is not relevant because it is not an element of the crime. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that the victim was sexually battered well before her fourteenth birthday and within the parameters of the indictment’s stated dates of “on or about or between” January 2002 and December 2005.


    Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court