Walton v. Walton
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-00136-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-00136-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-27-2010 Opinion Author: Roberts, J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Validity of warranty deed - Motion to dismiss - Statute of limitations - Minor savings provision - Section 15-1-7 - Sanctions - M.R.C.P. 11(b) - Proof of attorney's fees Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J. Procedural History: Dismissal; Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-17-2008 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: William H. Singletary Disposition: DISMISSED SUIT TO SET ASIDE WARRANTY DEED AND AWARDED $1,000 IN RULE 11 SANCTIONS Case Number: G2008-130 S/2 |
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| Note: | Due to a military leave of absence, Hon. Virginia C. Carlton did not participate in this hand down. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Justin Walton |
JOHN PRESTON SCANLON, EDWIN LLOYD PITTMAN |
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| Appellee: | John Walton and Kenneth Walton | JOHN DENVER FIKE | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Validity of warranty deed - Motion to dismiss - Statute of limitations - Minor savings provision - Section 15-1-7 - Sanctions - M.R.C.P. 11(b) - Proof of attorney's fees |
| Summary of the Facts: | John Walton had obtained power of attorney for his mother, Jacqueline Hudson. Jacqueline had reserved a life estate interest in some property. Aside from the life-estate, John and his brother, Kenneth Walton, had been deeded the legal rights to the property. In 1997, John utilized his power of attorney for Jacqueline to execute a warranty deed, thereby conveying Jacqueline’s life-estate interest to himself. In September 2008, John’s nephew, Justin Walton, filed a complaint to set aside the warranty deed. Justin named John and his other uncle, Kenneth, as defendants. John filed a motion to dismiss Justin’s complaint. John requested attorney’s fees and sanctions pursuant to M.R.C.P. 11. The chancellor ultimately granted John’s motion to dismiss and his motion for Rule 11 sanctions. The chancellor awarded John and Kenneth a judgment of $1,000 against Justin. Justin appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion to dismiss Justin argues that the chancellor’s decision to grant John’s motion to dismiss was improper because the minor savings provision of section 15-1-7 tolled the statute of limitations; John and Kenneth’s fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations; and the chancellor failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. However, whether the statute of limitations was tolled is irrelevant if Justin’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Justin sought to set aside the 1997 warranty deed. The 1997 warranty deed stemmed from a 1989 warranty deed, in which Jacqueline and her husband conveyed six parcels of land to their two living sons, John and Kenneth. Edward and Jacqueline reserved a life-estate in those six parcels of land. Having acquired power of attorney for Jacqueline, John executed the 1997 warranty deed on Jacqueline’s behalf. The 1997 warranty deed addressed one of the six parcels of land that were transferred in the 1989 warranty deed. Setting aside the 1997 warranty deed would have no practical effect. Edward died in 1990, and Jacqueline died in May 2006. Pursuant to the 1989 warranty deed, when Jacqueline died, her life-estate lapsed. If the 1997 warranty deed was set aside, the 1989 warranty deed would still be in effect, and the 1989 warranty deed would still have transferred the six parcels of property to John and Kenneth. Thus, Justin’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Issue 2: Sanctions Although Justin named both John and Kenneth as defendants, the motion for M.R.C.P. 11 sanctions was only brought in John’s name. Pursuant to Rule 11(b), a trial judge may order a party to pay expenses or attorney’s fees if any party files a motion or pleading which, in the opinion of the court, is frivolous or is filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. A pleading is frivolous pursuant to Rule 11 if objectively speaking, the pleader has no hope of success. The pivotal point in time to assess a party’s or an attorney’s actions is the instant when the signature is placed upon the document. Here, the chancellor did not explicitly find that Justin’s complaint was frivolous or that it was filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. An actual award of attorney’s fees is dependent upon specific proof. The record does not contain any documentation regarding the time that John’s attorney spent responding to Justin’s complaint. Likewise, the record does not contain any evidence regarding the per hour rate that John’s attorney charged. What is more, John alone filed the motion for Rule 11 sanctions. There is no indication that Kenneth joined in John’s motion. Finally, the chancellor’s award is ambiguous in that it is unclear whether John and Kenneth each received a judgment of $1,000 or whether they were both to receive an equal portion of a single $1,000 judgment. Thus, this matter is remanded. to the chancellor for a factual finding of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by filing John’s motion to dismiss and his motion for Rule 11 sanctions. |
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