Utz v. Running & Rolling Trucking, Inc.
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-00977-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-15-2010 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wrongful death - Admission of evidence - M.R.E. 403 - Personal observations - M.R.E. 601 - M.R.E. 602 - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(c) - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 701 - M.R.E. 702 - Relevant evidence - M.R.E. 401 - Carrier rating - Absence of reflective tape - Taillight visibility - Photographs - Experts' theories of causation - Jury instructions - Special interrogatory verdict form - M.R.C.P. 49 Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson and Graves, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens and Pierce, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Waller, C.J., and Dickinson, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial; JNOV Nature of the Case: B. STEVENS HAZARD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-11-2008 Appealed from: Bolivar County Circuit Court Judge: Charles E. Webster Disposition: The trial court instructed the jury that R&R and Hunter were negligent by violating the FMCSRs, therefore, the jury had only to decide the liability issue of proximate cause. The jury returned a verdict in favor of R&R and Hunter. Carla filed post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or in the alternative, a new trial, or in the alternative, additur. The trial court denied Carla’s post-trial motions. Case Number: 2005-0008 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Carla Utz, Individually and on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries and the Estate of Preston Jimmy Utz, Deceased |
JAMES ASHLEY OGDEN, WENDY MICHELLE YUAN |
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| Appellee: | Running & Rolling Trucking, Inc. and Anthony Q. Hunter | JASON HOOD STRONG, B. STEVENS HAZARD | ||
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| Topic: | Wrongful death - Admission of evidence - M.R.E. 403 - Personal observations - M.R.E. 601 - M.R.E. 602 - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(c) - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 701 - M.R.E. 702 - Relevant evidence - M.R.E. 401 - Carrier rating - Absence of reflective tape - Taillight visibility - Photographs - Experts' theories of causation - Jury instructions - Special interrogatory verdict form - M.R.C.P. 49 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Preston Jimmie Utz was driving on Highway 61 in Bolivar County. Anthony Hunter, a truck driver for Running and Rolling Trucking, Inc., drove an eighteen-wheeler tractor-trailer truck on Highway 61. The Nissan Maxima occupied by Preston struck the rear of Hunter’s tractor-trailer and killed Preston. Following Preston’s death, his widow, Carla Utz, filed a wrongful-death action against R&R and Hunter. The main issue at trial was whether R&R’s failure to provide reflective tape, also known as conspicuity tape, as required by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, caused the accident. The trial court instructed the jury that R&R and Hunter were negligent by violating the FMCSRs, therefore, the jury had only to decide the liability issue of proximate cause. The jury returned a verdict in favor of R&R and Hunter. Carla appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Evidentiary issues Carla argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion in limine to exclude testimony from a witness concerning Preston’s alleged making, using, or selling methamphetamine (crystal meth) before the wreck. While the trial court acknowledged that the testimony was likely to be prejudicial, the test, pursuant to M.R.E. 403 is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court did not err by admitting the testimony. The witness testified about events that were within his personal observation and knowledge under M.R.E. 601 and 602. Also, his testimony was not hearsay under M.R.E. 801(c). He did not testify to any statements made by Preston but only testified about events that were within his personal knowledge. The testimony was relevant because it concerned the type of activity that Preston was involved in prior to the accident and what impact that activity may have had on his alertness at the time of the accident. The evidence was relevant, and the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect because it concerned the issue of proximate cause and potential fault. Carla also argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion in limine pertaining to evidence by R&R’s expert that Preston had methamphetamine in his blood at the time of the collision. The trial court did not err by admitting this expert testimony on whether Preston had methamphetamine in his blood. Carla did not object to the witness being qualified as an expert. Once a witness is qualified as an expert to render expert testimony, then it is within the province of the trier of fact to give weight and credibility to the testimony. Carla argues that the trial court erred pursuant to M.R.E. 401, 402, and 403 by allowing Preston’s mother and sister to testify about a white substance found in Preston’s pants pocket two months after his death. The trial court did not err in allowing testimony that the substance in Preston’s pants was crystal meth pursuant to M.R.E. 701. The testimony falls within the parameters of Rule 701, because the testimony was rationally based on the perceptions of the witness; it was helpful to the jury for a clear understanding of the testimony and the determination of a fact in issue, that being whether Preston had experienced any effects of drug use at the time of the accident; and the testimony was not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of M.R.E. 702. Carla argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of R&R’s carrier rating. However, the carrier rating was not relevant under M.R.E. 401 to the litigation that arose from Preston’s death. Carla’s main contention was that the tractor-trailer did not have any reflective tape on the back panel. Further, the trial court gave an instruction that stated that R&R and Hunter had violated the FMCSRs and were negligent. Carla argues that the trial court erred by excluding Hunter’s driving record because his record of FMCSR violations showed a pattern and practice of violating the regulations. The trial court instructed the jury that R&R and Hunter had been negligent for violating FMCSRs. Therefore, the jury knew that R&R and Hunter had violated the regulations. As the fuel leak in question was unrelated in any manner to the accident and whether the absence of reflective tape caused the accident, the trial court properly excluded this evidence pursuant to Rules 401 and 403. Carla argues that the trial court erred by excluding two of her experts from testifying on the issue of the taillight visibility. She also argues that the trial court erred by allowing two of R&R’s lay witnesses to render opinions on taillight visibility. The trial court did not err by refusing all experts, both Carla’s and R&R’s, from testifying concerning dirt on the taillights or that the taillights were dirty. Pursuant to M.R.E. 702, opinions given by expert witnesses are designed to provide scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. This issue, dirt on the taillights, was not of a nature that required an expert opinion, as the jury had enough knowledge to discern whether the photographs depicted dirt on the taillights. As to Carla’s argument that the trial court erroneously had permitted lay witnesses for the defense to testify on the condition of the taillights, because the witnesses testified concerning their first-hand, personal knowledge and observations of the accident scene, the trial court did not err by permitting them to testify concerning their observations of the visibility of the truck taillights after the accident. Carla argues that the trial court erred by excluding her expert from testifying that the truck was “out of service” at the time of the collision due to a lack of reflective tape. The trial court did not err by excluding expert testimony on whether the truck was “out of service.” Based on the witness’s proffered testimony, he clearly stated that the truck was not out of service, although he would have placed it “out of service” had he inspected it. Carla argues that the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony on the issues of the visibility of the truck, where the truck had no reflective tape, and causation. The trial court did not err by limiting all experts’ opinions on the issue of whether the truck was visible to Preston on the night of the accident. The witnesses stated in one form or another that they were not present at the time of the accident and, therefore, could not state what Preston may have seen. None of the expert witnesses had the requisite knowledge to know what Preston may or may not have seen on the night of the accident. Any opinion on what Preston would have seen would be mere speculation. Since they could not testify concerning Preston’s visibility, they could not state whether the lack of reflective tape caused the accident. Therefore, the trial court did not err by excluding their proposed theories as to causation. Carla argues that the trial court erred by excluding a number of documents concerning reflective tape. The trial court excluded the other documents because they were prepared by private organizations, most were marketing devices, and they were hearsay. The documents, by Carla’s own explanation, would be hearsay, as they would be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that being what constitutes reflective tape, why it is used, its cost, and its effects in connection with accidents. Notwithstanding this, Carla was not prejudiced by the exclusion of these documents. Carla had witnesses give testimony concerning the purpose for reflective tape, the FMCSRs concerning reflective tape, whether the R&R truck had reflective tape, and how reflective tape, or lack thereof, could affect a person’s ability to see a truck. The jury also had actual photographs depicting the R&R truck, taken at the scene on the night of the accident. Carla argues that the trial court erred by excluding a number of photographs. The trial court did not err by refusing to admit the photographs of the exemplar trucks. Numerous witnesses testified to the lack of placement of the conspicuity tape on R&R’s truck on the night of the accident. The jury also saw at least six photographs depicting the rear of the actual truck driven by Hunter on the night of the accident. The trial court refused to admit twenty-six photographs of the tractor-trailer involved in the collision with Preston. Most of the twenty-six photographs that Carla now complains that the trial court erred by excluding were of the rear view of the trailer. These pictures, taken more than a year after the accident, showed the rear of the trailer with a bumper. The twenty-six photographs of the trailer, taken more than a year later, would not have been helpful to the jury as they did not depict the truck in the same condition as it was at the time of the collision. Carla argues that the trial court erred by finding as a matter of law that forty to forty-five miles per hour is not an unreasonably slow speed, and two-and-one-half miles is insufficient to create an immediate hazard. However, there was no evidence that Hunter drove the R&R truck at a speed or in a manner that constituted a hazard to the flow of traffic. The trial court did not err by finding that there was insufficient evidence that two and one-half miles was insufficient to create an immediate hazard. The evidence showed that Hunter entered the highway and traveled a distance of two and one-half miles prior to the collision. There was no evidence that Hunter pulled in front of Preston on the highway. Issue 2: Jury instructions Carla argues that the trial court erred by denying her jury instruction on proximate cause. A party cannot complain about a refused instruction where the instruction, as given, adequately instructs the jury. When the jury instructions were read as a whole, they fairly informed the jury of the law and created no injustice to Carla. Carla argues that the trial court erred by denying jury instructions relating to R&R’s and Hunter’s alleged violation of numerous FMCSRs. However, a violation of a statute, in and of itself, does not dictate that either the violation was the proximate or contributing cause of an injury suffered by a party, or recovery for damages is imminent. Granted, the FMCSRs are regulations, not statutes, nevertheless, the logic holds true for the instructions at issue in this case. Carla argues that the trial court erred by denying a jury instruction concerning negligence of a driver operating a vehicle at a speed and manner which would constitute a hazard to the flow of traffic or to other vehicles traveling in the same roadway. No evidence was presented to show a hazard to the flow of traffic. This is true because Hunter drove no more than forty-five miles per hour, traveled in the right-hand lane of two southbound lanes, and the accident occurred two and one-half miles from Hunter’s point of entry onto Highway 61. Thus, the evidence was insufficient to support the instruction. Carla argues that the trial court erred by refusing two jury instructions which established some of her theories of liability. Both instructions concerned yielding the right-of-way. The accident occurred two and one-half miles after Hunter had entered the highway from the R&R lot and had been traveling in the right hand lane. Based on the evidence provided, the trial court did not err by refusing these instructions. Carla argues that the trial court erred by refusing a jury instruction which concerned section 63-3-701. Carla argued that R&R and Hunter were violating the FMCSRs, thus the tractor-trailer could not be operated or moved safely. The trial court did not err by refusing the instruction, as there was no evidence to show that the tractor-trailer could not be operated or moved safely at the time it left R&R’s lot. Carla argues that the trial court erred by refusing jury instructions which concerned “an unusual condition or emergency.” The trial court did not err. After hearing all the evidence, including that the trailer had no reflective tape, the jury found in favor of R&R and Hunter, indicating that the lack of reflective tape and the violations of the FMCSRs were not the proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of the collision. No other facts inferred an unusual condition or emergency. Carla argues that an instruction given was erroneous, because it placed an absolute duty on Preston to avoid the collision. Notwithstanding the use of the term “absolute,” giving the instruction is not reversible error. But for the use of “absolute,” the statement of law was accurate. The instruction did not place, as Carla claimed, an absolute duty on Preston to avoid the collision. The instruction provided that the jury should find Preston negligent only if the trailer would have been visible to a reasonably prudent driver in Preston’s position and the accident could have been avoided through the exercise of reasonable care. Carla argues that one of the instructions was peremptory, a misstatement of law, a misstatement of the facts, cumulative, compound, and placed an absolute duty on the plaintiff. The fact that the jury instruction may be compound does not invalidate the instruction. Further, the instruction was not cumulative, as each of R&R’s instructions covered different legal principles. Carla argues that one instruction imposed a strict-liability standard and a peremptory standard. This instruction referred to a motorist’s duty to drive a vehicle within the speed limit. The conditional language in the instruction does not compel the jury to find negligence on the part of Preston. The plain language also did not place the burden on Preston to avoid the accident regardless of whether R&R and Hunter were at fault, as argued by Carla. The language required that a percentage of fault be assessed only if Preston’s negligence was a “proximate contributing cause” and did not require the jury to relieve R&R and Hunter of an assessment of fault unless the rate of speed was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Carla argues that the trial court erred by admitting an instruction concerning a motorist’s ability to travel or reduce his speed to stop his vehicle within his range of vision. There was no error. There was no indication of any gouge or skid marks on the road, indicating little if any maneuvering by Preston to avoid the collision. Carla argues that the trial court erred by giving a jury instruction which was a special interrogatory verdict form. The special interrogatory is within the trial court’s discretion pursuant to M.R.C.P. 49. |
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