Crawford v. Morris Transp., Inc.
| Docket Number: | 2007-CA-00322-SCT Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-00322-SCT ; NO. 2011-CA-00120-SCT CONSOLIDATED WITH 2007-CA-00322-SCT & 2006-CA-00185-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-04-2008 Opinion Author: Waller, P.J. Holding: As to Case No. 2006-CA-00185-SCT: Affirmed. As to Case No. 2007-CA-00322-SCT: Reversed and Remanded. Appellant taxed with costs of appeal in No. 2006-CA-00185-SCT. Appellees taxed with costs of appeal in Case No. 2007-CA-00322-SCT. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Statute of limitations - Savings statute - Section 15-1-69 - Priority jurisdiction Judge(s) Concurring: Diaz, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson, Randolph and Lamar, J.J. Non Participating Judge(s): Smith, C.J. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-04-2006 Appealed from: Coahoma County Circuit Court Judge: Al Smith Disposition: The circuit court dismissed both complaints by Crawford. Case Number: 14-CI-03-0017 |
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| Consolidated: Consolidated with 2006-CA-00185-SCT; Michael Crawford v. Morris Transportation, Inc., Alex Jordan, Individually and as Agent Driver of Morris Transportation, Inc., and Custom Sign Company a/k/a Custom Sign Company of Batesville, Inc. f/k/a Custom Sign Company of Grenada, Inc.; Coahoma Circuit Court; LC Case #: 14-CI-03-0017; Ruling Date: 01/04/2006; Ruling Judge: Albert Smith, III | ||
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | MICHAEL CRAWFORD |
DEREK D. HOPSON, SR. |
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| Appellee: | MORRIS TRANSPORTATION, INC. AND CUSTOM SIGN COMPANY a/k/a CUSTOM SIGN COMPANY OF BATESVILLE, INC. f/k/a CUSTOM SIGN COMPANY OF GRENADA, INC. | CHARLES S. HEWINS, R. BRITTAIN VIRDEN, GERALD H. JACKS, KATHY R. CLARK | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Statute of limitations - Savings statute - Section 15-1-69 - Priority jurisdiction |
| Summary of the Facts: | Michael Crawford filed a petition to perpetuate testimony in the Circuit Court of Coahoma County. The matter was removed to federal court, and Crawford sought dismissal, alternatively remand, on the basis that removal was premature because no complaint had been filed. Before the federal court dismissed the matter, Crawford filed a complaint in 2003 in the circuit court. Following dismissal, and after the statute of limitations had expired, Crawford attempted further prosecution of his pre-dismissal complaint. Additionally, Crawford filed a separate complaint post-dismissal in 2005, raising the same claims against the same parties. The circuit court eventually dismissed both complaints. Crawford appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Crawford argues that he filed the 2003 complaint with the permission of the federal court. 28 U.S.C. §1446(d) provides that after filing a notice of removal, the defendant or defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded. Any action taken in state court following a written notice of removal, but before remand, is of no force or effect. Accordingly, the 2003 complaint was a nullity because the matter was never remanded. With regard to the 2005 complaint, Crawford argues that the 2003 complaint created a second cause of action which abated the federal court complaint he had filed one month earlier. Under section 15-1-69, the 2005 complaint was properly brought within one year of the federal or “priority court’s” dismissal. For priority jurisdiction to apply, the second action should be between the same parties, seeking on the one hand, and opposing on the other, the same remedy, and should relate to the same questions. As a general rule, the principle of priority jurisdiction does not apply where like suits are pending in both state and federal courts. The principle of priority jurisdiction inapplicable to this case. Crawford’s federal court complaint and his 2003 complaint were not separate causes of action. Crawford argues that the savings statute, section 15-1-69, allowed him to re-file suit within one year after the federal court’s dismissal. The requirements for application of the savings statute include: his federal court complaint was “duly commenced” within the three-year statute of limitations; he exercised good faith in filing his complaint in federal court; the suit was dismissed as a matter of form without an adjudication on the merits; and he filed the 2005 complaint within one year after dismissal of the federal suit. Even though the federal court ultimately dismissed the matter, Crawford’s federal court complaint was nevertheless “duly commenced” as defined under section 15-1-69. Crawford also exercised good faith in filing the federal-court complaint. He involuntarily found himself in federal court and sought some way to get a complaint on the record. Additionally, Crawford filed the 2005 complaint within one year of the federal court’s dismissal of the “original suit.” The record supports that dismissal was based upon a “matter of form” not affecting the merits—namely, a lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a complaint. Crawford inadvertently found himself in a procedural quagmire and made a good-faith effort to preserve his claim. Application of the savings statute to Crawford’s 2005 complaint is appropriate and consistent with the purposes of the statute. Crawford filed his 2005 complaint on July 14, 2005, within one year of the federal court’s dismissal. As a result, the circuit court erred in dismissing the 2005 complaint. |
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