Williams v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-KA-02129-SCT Linked Case(s): 2008-KA-02129-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-01-2010 Opinion Author: Kitchens, J. Holding: COUNT I: AFFIRMED; COUNT II: REVERSED AND RENDERED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sexual battery - Sufficiency of evidence - Severance - URCCC 9.03 - Exclusion of evidence - Hearsay - M.R.E. 803(25) - Juror misconduct - Jury instruction Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Dickinson and Lamar, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Graves, P.J., with separate written opinion Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Randolph, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-08-2008 Appealed from: LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Jim S. Pounds Disposition: Count I: Conviction of sexual battery and sentence of thirty (30) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Count II: Reversed and Rendered. Lee County taxed with costs of appeal. District Attorney: John Richard Young Case Number: CR06-415 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | NICKEY WILLIAMS |
OFFICE OF INDIGENT APPEALS: GEORGE T. HOLMES, LESLIE S. LEE |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Sexual battery - Sufficiency of evidence - Severance - URCCC 9.03 - Exclusion of evidence - Hearsay - M.R.E. 803(25) - Juror misconduct - Jury instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | Nickey Williams was convicted of two counts of sexual battery. He was sentenced to thirty years’ incarceration on the first count and twenty years’ incarceration on the second count with ten years suspended. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Williams argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Williams had sexually abused his younger daughter. The only evidence that this daughter had been sexually abused was testimony from the doctor who examined her. Only opinions formed by medical experts upon the basis of credible evidence in the case and which can be stated with reasonable medical certainty have probative value. Although an expert need not use the exact phrase, “reasonable degree of medical certainty,” this does not diminish the requirements for admissibility. The physician in this case couched his opinion in terms of suspicion of probability, which, standing alone, absent additional corroborating evidence, is insufficient in a criminal case. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the sexual battery of this daughter beyond a reasonable doubt. Issue 2: Severance Williams argues that the trial judge erred in overruling his motion to sever the two counts of the indictment. The judge denied the motion as untimely since it was made on the day of trial. Although URCCC 9.03 permits a trial judge to sever offenses during trial, it is not reversible error for a trial judge to deny an untimely motion to sever, except under circumstances where the reasons supporting severance become apparent late in the process. Nothing in the record suggests new developments or revelations during the two-year period between the date of arraignment and the morning of trial that would have given the defendant additional cause for severance. Thus, it was not error for the trial judge to deny Williams’s motion to sever the two offenses for trial. Issue 3: Exclusion of evidence Williams argues that the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding his relationship with his daughters. The judge excluded the testimony as irrelevant because none of the witnesses could establish that they had observed the defendant with his daughters at any time close to the alleged abuse. Thus, there was no error. Issue 4: Hearsay Williams argues that the trial court erred in allowing two witnesses to testify about the statements one of his daughters had made to them about her abuse. He also argues that the doctor should not have been allowed to testify about the contents of the forensic interview. Under M.R.E. 803(25), the trial judge made an on-the-record determination that the daughter had no motive to lie, the witnesses testified that she was truthful, more than one person had heard the statements, the statements were spontaneous and were made shortly after the incident, she had made the statements with certainty, there was no evidence that suggestive techniques were used, and, although the daughter was very young, it would be difficult for her to fabricate such a story. Thus, the judge did not abuse its discretion in allowing the witnesses to testify about the statements. With regard to the forensic interview, the doctor never testified about the specific statements and simply acknowledged that a forensic interview had been performed. Thus, this argument is without merit. Issue 5: Juror misconduct Williams argues that the jury was tainted because a juror did not respond in voir dire examination to questions about his knowing one of the State’s witnesses. A juror’s failure to respond to a question in voir dire does not warrant a new trial unless the trial court determines that the question propounded to the juror was relevant to the voir dire examination, unambiguous, and such that the juror had substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited. Given that the witness in this case was simply an acquaintance and that the juror did not recognize her name, the juror did not have substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited. Issue 6: Jury instruction Williams argues that the court’s refusal to grant him a jury instruction on child testimony entitles him to a new trial. The trial court’s granting of such an instruction is not mandatory, and its refusal to do so is not grounds for reversal. |
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