Jackson v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-CT-00074-SCT Linked Case(s): 2008-CP-00074-COA ; 2008-CP-00074-COA ; 2008-CT-00074-SCT ; 2008-CT-00074-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-01-2010 Opinion Author: Waller, C.J. Holding: Reversed and remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Jurisdiction - Section 99-39-7 - Section 99-39-25 - Time bar - Successive writ - Defective indictment - Waiver - Section 99-39-21(1) - Right to due process Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson and Graves, P.JJ., Dickinson, Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Procedural History: PCR; Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF; Dismissal Writ of Certiorari: yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-04-2007 Appealed from: WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Isadore Patrick Disposition: The trial court dismissed Robert H. Jackson’s most recent motion for post-conviction relief. Case Number: 07,02231CI |
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| Note: | This judgment reverses and remands a previous decision by the Court of Appeals. See the original COA opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO53767.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Robert H. Jackson |
PRO SE, WILLIAM B. BARDWELL, DAVID McCARTY |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JOHN R. HENRY, JR. |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Jurisdiction - Section 99-39-7 - Section 99-39-25 - Time bar - Successive writ - Defective indictment - Waiver - Section 99-39-21(1) - Right to due process |
| Summary of the Facts: | Robert Jackson pled guilty to capital murder and was sentenced as a habitual offender to life in prison without parole. Jackson filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence on April 21, 1986. The trial court dismissed Jackson’s 1986 PCR motion without a hearing. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the three-year limitation period of the UPCCRA operates prospectively. Therefore, the lower court was clearly in error for applying the time bar to Jackson. The case was remanded. Upon remand, the trial court issued an order on January 27, 1989, either dismissing or denying Jackson’s PCR motion. Jackson appealed that order, and the Supreme Court affirmed it without opinion on October 24, 1990. Jackson filed another PCR motion in the trial court in 1993. The trial court either dismissed or denied this motion as well. Jackson appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed, once again without opinion. In 1999, Jackson filed an application for leave to proceed in the trial court with a new PCR motion based on newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court denied Jackson’s application. On January 17, 2002, Jackson again sought leave to pursue post-conviction relief in the trial court because of an intervening decision. The Supreme Court denied Jackson’s application. On March 1, 2004, Jackson filed a document entitled “Petition for Extraordinary Circumstances Review,” which was treated as another application for permission to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court. The Court again denied the application. Jackson filed another PCR motion in the circuit court on November 14, 2007, which the circuit court dismissed. Jackson’s appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Pursuant to section 99-39-7, the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s 1999, 2002, and 2004 applications for leave to proceed in the trial court, because Jackson’s conviction and sentence were never directly appealed. Hence, the only way in which the Court properly could have considered Jackson’s PCR filings would have been if Jackson had first presented his PCR motion to the trial court, that court had denied relief, and Jackson had appealed that decision to the Supreme Court pursuant to section 99-39-25. The fatal flaw in Jackson’s 1999, 2002, and 2004 applications was not that they were successive writs, but that they were filed in the wrong court. Thus, the Supreme Court improperly exercised jurisdiction and denied Jackson’s applications instead of dismissing the applications without prejudice for being filed in the wrong court and directing Jackson to file his PCR motions in the trial court. Thus, the Warren County Circuit Court continues to have exclusive initial jurisdiction over Jackson’s PCR proceedings. The Supreme Court’s denials of Jackson’s 1999, 2002, and 2004 applications are vacated. Jackson argues that his indictment is substantively defective, because it does not state the underlying offense to the burglary, and alternatively, because it omits the phrase “without the authority of law,” an essential element of the offense of capital murder. Since the indictment provides the basis of the notice to the defendant of the crime for which he is to be tried, the failure to be informed of the nature of the crime underlying the burglary is tantamount to the failure to allow a defendant to prepare a defense. The fact that the killing occurred “without the authority of law” is a statutory element of simple murder, capital murder, and manslaughter. And a defendant cannot be convicted based on an indictment that fails to include all the essential elements of the crime. A substantive defect in an indictment cannot be waived by entry of a guilty plea and may be raised in a motion for post-conviction relief. Hence, Jackson did not waive the substantive deficiency of his indictment by pleading guilty. Jackson pleaded guilty, but he failed to object to his indictment or otherwise assert any problems with it at either his plea hearing or his sentencing hearing. Thus, based on section 99-39-21(1), Jackson’s problems with his indictment should be barred. Jackson’s arguments regarding the substantive deficiencies in his indictment – insofar as they implicate his fundamental constitutional rights to due process – are excepted from the procedural bars of the UPCCRA, which would otherwise prohibit their consideration. The indictment predicates Jackson’s capital-murder charge on his alleged “commission of the crime of Burglary,” but it does not state the underlying offense that Jackson allegedly intended to commit that comprised the burglary. The indictment gave no notice to Jackson on how to prepare his defense. Jackson’s indictment was substantively defective, because it did not state the underlying offense that comprised the burglary. Jackson could not have been properly convicted of capital murder based upon it. The 1979 indictment that purportedly charged Jackson with capital murder did not state that Jackson’s alleged killing of the victim was done “without the authority of law” or “unlawfully.” Thus, the indictment did not sufficiently charge Jackson with simple murder or manslaughter. Since the indictment does not charge Jackson with another crime, it fails to charge him with any crime at all. Therefore, Jackson could not have been convicted of any crime based upon his 1979 indictment. Jackson’s conviction must be reversed. |
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