In re Estate of Langston v. Williams
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-01090-COA Linked Case(s): 2008-CA-01090-COA ; 2008-CT-01090-SCT ; 2008-CT-01090-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-30-2010 Opinion Author: Griffis, J. Holding: Reversed and rendered. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wills & estates - Inter vivos transfers - Confidential relationship - Undue influence Judge(s) Concurring: Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J. Dissenting Author : Irving, J., with separate written opinion. Dissent Joined By : King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-16-2008 Appealed from: SUNFLOWER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: Janace Harvey Goree Disposition: FOUND CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE AND SET ASIDE INTER VIVOS TRANSFERS Case Number: 2005-0225 |
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| Note: | Due to a military leave of absence, Hon. Virginia C. Carlton did not participate in this hand down. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
PATRICIA MCDANIEL LANGSTON,
DECEASED: MANSFIELD LANGSTON |
LINDSEY C. MEADOR |
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| Appellee: | ETHEL WILLIAMS | ALSEE MCDANIEL | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Wills & estates - Inter vivos transfers - Confidential relationship - Undue influence |
| Summary of the Facts: | From August 23, 1997, until March 11, 2002, Patricia Langston and her husband, Mansfield Langston, owned their marital home on Kentwood Lane, in Indianola, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. On March 11, 2002, Patricia quitclaimed the marital home to Mansfield because Patricia had purchased a home on French Road, also in Indianola. On March 15, 2002, Patricia executed a will naming Mansfield as executor. The will divided Patricia’s entire estate equally among her three adult children and one of her sisters. A clause in the will expressly stated that: “MANSFIELD LANGSTON, my husband, has his own estate in his name, therefore no provision for him is made in this will.” At the time this will was executed, Patricia owned the French Road home solely in her name. On May 9, 2002, three deeds were prepared by the Langstons’ attorney. The first deed was executed by Patricia and created a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in the French Road home, which then became the couple’s marital home. The second deed conveyed the home on Kentwood Lane to Patricia’s mother, Ethel Williams. Mansfield testified that the home was sold to Williams at a discounted price. In the third deed, Williams sold and conveyed her home in Indianola. On June 11, 2002, Patricia executed a second will that was identical to her first will except it named Patricia’s mother as executor instead of Mansfield. On September 4, 2003, Mansfield and Patricia executed a $200,000 certificate of deposit as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. After Patricia died in 2005, Patricia’s estate was opened by her mother. The estate sought to set aside the joint tenancies in the marital home and the certificate of deposit in order to bring those assets into the estate for distribution to the will beneficiaries – Patricia’s adult children and Patricia’s sister. The chancellor found that a confidential relationship existed between Mansfield and Patricia, and that Mansfield did not meet his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the creation of the joint tenancies was not the result of undue influence. Both joint tenancies were set aside and brought into Patricia’s estate. Mansfield appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Mansfield argues that the chancellor erred as a matter of law in finding that Mansfield and Patricia were in a confidential relationship for the purpose of raising the presumption of undue influence, because the factors used by the chancellor to find a confidential relationship are factors that would be found in any trusting, healthy relationship between a husband and wife. The factors to be considered in determining whether a confidential relationship exists between the parties are whether one person has to be taken care of by others, whether one person maintains a close relationship with another, whether one person is provided transportation and has their medical care provided for by another, whether one person maintains joint accounts with another, whether one is physically or mentally weak, whether one is of advanced age or poor health, and whether there exists a power of attorney between the one and another. The chancellor found that Patricia’s chronic health problems made her physically and mentally weak, and although she was not of an advanced age, she did have poor health. Both Mansfield and Patricia granted each other power of attorney. There is substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s conclusion that a confidential relationship existed between Mansfield and Patricia. A party claiming that an inter vivos transfer is void because of undue influence must show by clear and convincing evidence that a confidential relationship existed between the grantor and grantee/beneficiary. When such a relationship exists, the presumption of undue influence arises automatically. Once the presumption is established, the burden shifts to the grantee to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. In order to overcome the presumption, the grantee must show that: he or she exhibited good faith in the fiduciary relationship with the grantor; the grantor had full knowledge and deliberation when he executed the deed; and the grantor exhibited independent consent and action. Here, the transfers at issue were inter vivos transfers. Therefore, once the chancellor found a confidential relationship, the presumption of undue influence automatically arose. No actual showing of undue influence on the part of Mansfield was required. Because it is clear that a husband and wife naturally influence each other as part of their marital relationship, there must be something more to show that such influence was undue. To presume undue influence here, solely based on the existence of a confidential relationship, would discourage certain benefits that are quite common and encouraged among spouses – assistance with health problems, transportation to doctors’ visits, joint accounts, reciprocal powers of attorney, and the most obvious factor – a close relationship. Accordingly, the legal standard used by the chancellor in this case was improper due to the long-term marriage of Patricia and Mansfield. There is no question that Patricia executed the deed and the certificate of deposit. Both the attorney who prepared the deed and the banker who prepared the certificate of deposit testified that Patricia was competent, knowledgeable, and did not exhibit any mental weakness. A close relationship is to be expected as part of Patricia and Mansfield’s long-term marriage. The two were married for eleven years, and the transfers at issue were not executed until eight years into the marriage. There was no evidence that Mansfield prevented Patricia from freely signing the deed or the certificate of deposit. While Patricia suffered from physical problems, the evidence established that she was a strong-willed person and mentally capable of making her own decisions. Factors which occurred here, such as using the same attorney or bank, lack of consideration, and confidence in each other, are to be expected as part of a relationship between a husband and wife of eleven years. The chancellor’s application of the automatic presumption of undue influence based solely on the existence of a confidential relationship was improper based on the specific facts of this case. Thus, the judgment of the chancellor holding such joint tenancies null and void is reversed and rendered. |
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