King v. Bunton


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Docket Number: 2008-CA-01800-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2008-CA-01800-SCT
Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-25-2010
Opinion Author: Dickinson, J.
Holding: Affirmed
Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Dismissal of insurer - Equitable estoppel - Setting aside default judgment - M.R.C.P. 55(c) - Good cause
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Graves, P.J., without separate written opinion.
Procedural History: Default Judgment; Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 09-30-2008
Appealed from: WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: Isadore Patrick
Disposition: The trial court set aside an entry of default and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against two defendants.
Case Number: 05,0271-CI
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Darrell King and Mary King




 RAJU AUNDRE’ BRANSON



  
  • Appellant #1 Brief
    		•
    Appellee: Charles E. Bunton, III, Mississippi Housing Authorities Risk Management, Inc., and the Housing Authority of the City of Vicksburg STEVEN LLOYD LACEY, DAVID A. BARFIELD  
    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Dismissal of insurer - Equitable estoppel - Setting aside default judgment - M.R.C.P. 55(c) - Good cause
    Summary of the Facts: Darryl and Mary King were involved in a motor vehicle collision with Charles Bunton. Although the vehicle driven by Bunton was owned by his employer, the Housing Authority of the City of Vicksburg, the accident report erroneously listed it as owned by HACV’s insurer, the Mississippi Housing Authorities Risk Management, Inc. The Kings’ counsel sent a demand letter to MHARM, but addressed it to “Mississippi Housing Authority.” A response to the demand letter came from MHARM’s third-party claims administrator, Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., who referenced its client as “Mississippi Housing Authorities.” The Kings addressed and mailed Mississippi Tort Claims Act notice-of-claim letters to HACV, MHARM, the City of Vicksburg, and other entities. Seven days later, the Kings filed suit against MHARM HACV, and Bunton. Although HACV is an independent entity, separate and distinct from the City of Vicksburg, the complaint erroneously described HACV as an entity of the City of Vicksburg, and erroneously listed Vicksburg’s mayor as HACV’s agent for service of process. Bunton was served with a copy of the summons and complaint. He filed a motion to dismiss, claiming immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, and failure to provide proper notice. After obtaining an extension of time, the Kings served MHARM. Entries of default were entered against Bunton and MHARM for failing to answer or respond to the complaint within thirty days. The trial court later set aside the entries of default against Bunton and MHARM, allowed the Kings to amend their complaint to include HACV as a party, and dismissed the City of Vicksburg. The order also dismissed MHARM, stating that it was never a proper party to the lawsuit. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, naming Bunton, HCAV, and MHARM as defendants. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. MHARM argued that it should be dismissed because it was merely HACV’s insurer, and it neither owned the vehicle nor had it ever employed Bunton. Bunton and HACV argued that they should be dismissed because the Kings had failed to comply with the ninety-day pre-suit notice requirement of the MTCA. The trial judge again dismissed MHARM. However, he held that HACV or Bunton would not be dismissed because the Kings’ amended complaint was filed more than ninety days after the MTCA notice, causing it to relate back to the filing of the original complaint. HACV and Bunton filed a petition for interlocutory appeal which the Court granted. The Court held that the Kings did not provide the required notice, and the trial court erred when it failed to grant Bunton’s motion to dismiss. The trial court then dismissed HACV and Bunton. The Kings appeal.
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Dismissal of insurer The Kings argue that it is error for the trial court to dismiss HACV’s insurer, MHARM, because the accident report listed MHARM as the owner of the vehicle. They also argue that, because Bunton could not be found, they were unable to obtain discovery from him. However, the Kings point to no document or source of information they sought in discovery which they assert would contradict the documents and affidavits produced by defendants. MHARM and HACV produced the purchase agreement and certificate of title application, both showing that HACV was the owner of the subject vehicle. Additionally, the Kings were provided with affidavits by HACV and MHARM stating that Bunton was an employee of HACV and was not, and had never been, employed by MHARM. Issue 2: Equitable estoppel The Kings argue that Bunton and HACV should be equitably estopped from asserting MTCA defenses, including the failure to provide proper pre-suit notice. This issue was decided on interlocutory appeal when the Court ordered that Bunton and HACV should be dismissed from the lawsuit because the Kings failed to strictly comply with the notice provisions of the MTCA. Issue 3: Default The Kings argue that the trial court erred by setting aside the entries of default against MHARM and Bunton. M.R.C.P. 55(c) draws a clear distinction between setting aside an entry of default and setting aside a judgment of default. There is a more liberal standard for setting aside a default than the standard for setting aside a default judgment. Good cause shown requires the moving party to provide an explanation for the default or give reasons why vacation of the default entry would serve the interests of justice. The trial court determined that MHARM was never a proper defendant in this lawsuit. Similarly, under the MTCA, Bunton could not be held personally liable pursuant to section 11-46-7(2). In light of these reasons, the court did not abuse its discretion.


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