Gregg v. Gregg


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Docket Number: 2008-CA-02025-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-23-2010
Opinion Author: Lee, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Equitable distribution
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Myers, P.J., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Maxwell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-29-2008
Appealed from: WEBSTER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Judge: Dorothy W. Colom
Disposition: GRANTED IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES DIVORCE AND DIVIDED MARITAL PROPERTY AND DEBTS
Case Number: 2007-57-C

Note: Due to a military leave of absence, Hon. Virginia C. Carlton did not participate in this hand down.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Joseph D. Gregg




PAUL M. MOORE, JR., TINA MARIE DUGARD SCOTT



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: Patricia M. Gregg J. TYSON GRAHAM  

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    Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Equitable distribution

    Summary of the Facts: Joseph Gregg and Patricia Gregg consented to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences. The issues of equitable distribution and alimony were submitted to the chancellor. Joe appeals the court’s distribution.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Joe argues that the chancellor erred in awarding Pat a one-third interest in the appreciated value of the home he owned prior to the marriage without deducting a corresponding amount of debt. Joe’s home was valued at approximately $50,000 when the couple married. After adding on to the home and making other improvements, the appraised value of the home at the time of the divorce was $110,000. In March 2001, the couple took out a home-equity loan on the home for $88,764. The loan was used to purchase the two lots in Starkville, an investment note, and one-third of the thirty-acre parcel of land in Webster County. In 2004, when Pat sold her business in Starkville, the proceeds were used to pay off the home-equity loan. The couple paid approximately $77,000 toward the home-equity loan from the proceeds of Pat’s business. Pat also used money from her inheritance to make renovations to the home, which contributed to its increase in value. Joe argues that the income from Pat’s businesses was commingled because Pat deposited it into the couple’s joint account and therefore, the sum Pat paid on the home loan was from marital funds, which rendered any equity on the home subject to the remaining debt. The chancellor was not manifestly wrong in awarding Pat a one-third interest in the appreciated value of the home. The couple lived in the home for fourteen years. The home was clearly marital property. Pat contributed significantly to the increase in value of the home. As to Joe’s argument that the chancellor’s ruling ignored the debt owed on the home, the chancellor made clear that the goal of the division of property was to eliminate the need for alimony. At the time of the divorce, Joe’s retirement funds were worth approximately $86,000. He concedes that the $13,000 he withdrew during the marriage was correctly identified as marital property. However, he argues that the remaining amount was separate property because it was a passive increase in funds. Marital property is any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage. The retirement income which was acquired and accumulated during the marriage is marital property. Further, Pat testified that her retirement account was spent on expenses while the couple traveled the country in a RV. Therefore, Pat had no retirement savings. Joe argues that the chancellor erred in awarding Pat the two Starkville lots and a one-half interest in the thirty acres in Webster County purchased during the marriage. The two Starkville lots and one-third of the land in Webster County were paid for with a portion of the $88,764 home-equity loan. The second one-third of the price of the land in Webster County was paid with proceeds from Joe’s IRA, and the final payment was made from the joint checking account. Therefore, Pat paid one-third; Joe paid one-third; and the couple jointly paid one-third of the purchase price of the thirty-acre parcel of land. The chancellor correctly reasoned that since each party contributed to one-half of the total purchase price, the land should be divided equally. Joe also argues that the chancellor failed to consider his contributions to the marriage. The chancellor found that Pat’s testimony was credible and noted that she produced documentary evidence to support her contentions. Based on the documentary evidence provided by Pat, the chancellor found that the source of the majority of the funds used to purchase marital assets came from her inheritance and profits from the sale of her businesses. The chancellor found Joe’s testimony regarding the value of the assets and the source of funds to acquire the assets was not credible. The chancellor’s division of the property was not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. The chancellor thoroughly considered each of the Ferguson factors in reaching her decision, and the division was made in a way as to avoid the need for alimony.


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