Transocean Enter., Inc. v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.


<- Return to Search Results


Docket Number: 2008-CA-01823-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2008-CA-01823-SCT ; 2008-CA-01823-SCT ; 2008-CA-01823-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-11-2010
Opinion Author: Carlson, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contractual indemnity - Choice of law - Invitee - Application of section 31-5-41
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Dickinson, Lamar and Pierce, JJ.
Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Graves, P.J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Kitchens, J.; Randolph and Chandler, JJ., Join In Part. Randolph, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Chandler, J.; Dickinson and Pierce, JJ., Join In Part.
Procedural History: Motion for Rehearing
Nature of the Case: Motion for Rehearing; CIVIL - OTHER

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-10-2008
Appealed from: Jackson County Circuit Court
Judge: Robert P. Krebs
Disposition: The Circuit Court of Jackson County entered judgment granting Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., indemnity.
Case Number: CI-2000-00,337(1)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: TRANSOCEAN ENTERPRISE, INC.




JOHN A. SCIALDONE, TODD G. CRAWFORD, RYAN A. HAHN



 

Appellee: INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC. RICHARD P. SALLOUM, J. THOMAS HAMRICK, JR.  

Synopsis provided by:

If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office.

Topic: Contractual indemnity - Choice of law - Invitee - Application of section 31-5-41

Summary of the Facts: The motion for rehearing is granted, and these opinions are substituted for the original opinions. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., and Transocean Enterprise, Inc., were named defendants in a personal-injury action which was settled. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., alleged a claim for contractual indemnity pursuant to a Shipyard Agreement between itself and Transocean Enterprise, Inc. The circuit court entered judgment granting Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., indemnity, and as a result, Transocean Enterprise, Inc., appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Transocean argues that the indemnity provision of the Shipyard Agreement is not triggered because Ernie Cardwell was an independent contractor of Transocean, as opposed to a subcontractor or an invitee. Further, Transocean argues that, even assuming the indemnity provision is triggered, Ingalls’ claim is barred by section 31-5-41. Before the trial court, Ingalls argued that Mississippi law should apply over general maritime law, and the trial court agreed. It has long been held that neither ship construction nor supplying materials for that purpose is a maritime business. Also, the Shipyard Agreement contained a choice-of-law provision which stated that it would be governed by Mississippi law. Under admiralty law, where the parties have included a choice of law clause, the state’s law will govern unless the state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction or the state’s law conflicts with the fundamental purposes of maritime law. As such, the trial court correctly determined that maritime law does not apply and that Mississippi law governs this dispute. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Cardwell was an invitee under Mississippi law. An invitee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage. Cardwell was aboard the Discoverer Enterprise at Ingalls’ shipyard due to the invitation of Transocean via Coastline for the mutual advantage of all parties herein. With the classification of Cardwell as an invitee, the language of the Shipyard Agreement is clear, and Transocean seemingly has a duty to indemnify Ingalls. This duty, however, arguably could be voided by section 31-5-41 to the extent that the indemnity provision in the Shipyard Agreement provides for indemnification of Ingalls for Ingalls’ own negligence. The trial court justifiably did not address the implications of section 31-5-41. This statute could reasonably be interpreted as invalidating indemnity or “hold-harmless” clauses in construction contracts to indemnify another person from that person’s own negligence. Transocean and Ingalls, however, stipulated that the issue of tort allocation of liability was not before the trial court. In addition, neither party has argued fault, and there is insufficient information in the record for the Court to determine to what extent, if any, Ingalls was negligent and seeks to be indemnified for its own negligence.


Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court