Field v. State


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Docket Number: 2008-KA-00793-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 02-23-2010
Opinion Author: Barnes, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Possession of cocaine - Disproportionate sentence - Section 41-29-139(c)(1)(B) - Jury instruction - Other crimes' evidence - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 402 - Reasonableness of search
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-16-2008
Appealed from: NEWTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: Vernon Cotten
Disposition: CONVICTED OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE AND SENTENCED TO EIGHT YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
District Attorney: Mark Sheldon Duncan
Case Number: 07-CR-0055-NW

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: DEBRA S. FIELD




EDMUND J. PHILLIPS, JR., P. SHAWN HARRIS



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: STATE OF MISSISSIPPI OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JOHN R. HENRY, JR.  

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    Topic: Possession of cocaine - Disproportionate sentence - Section 41-29-139(c)(1)(B) - Jury instruction - Other crimes' evidence - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 402 - Reasonableness of search

    Summary of the Facts: Debra Field was convicted of felony possession of cocaine and sentenced to eight years. She appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Disproportionate sentence Field argues that her sentence of eight years was disproportionate to the crime, considering both her age and status as a first-time offender. The consistent rule in Mississippi is that a sentence that does not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute will not be disturbed on appeal. The maximum sentence permitted under section 41-29-139(c)(1)(B) for possession of cocaine is eight years. The circuit court sentenced Field to eight years, which clearly is within the statutory authority. Further, although Field claims that she was a first-time offender, it was noted at Field’s sentencing hearing that she had been previously charged three times for driving under the influence and that she was addicted to marijuana and alcohol. Issue 2: Jury instruction Field argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction the defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf and his testimony should not be disregarded simply because he is the defendant. However, defendants are not entitled to an instruction which informs the jury that the defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf. Issue 3: Other crimes’ evidence Field was found guilty of possession of marijuana in an earlier trial. She argues that M.R.E. 404(b) act to shield the defendant from any discussion about the marijuana. Proof of another crime is admissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so interrelated as to constitute a single transaction or occurrence or a closely related series of transactions or occurrences. Here, the circuit court found that reference to the fact that marijuana was found in the truck was necessary to provide the jury with a complete story of the crime. The deputy’s discovery of the marijuana justified his search of Field’s cigarette case. Even if the marijuana showed evidence of a separate crime, its introduction at trial was necessary to provide context for the deputy’s ultimate discovery of the cocaine. Further, Field’s admission that the marijuana was hers demonstrated that it was more likely that the cocaine was also Field’s as she had control of the container in which both drugs were discovered. Field also argues that because the circuit court admitted evidence of marijuana possession, it “opened the door” to further evidence regarding Field’s previous trial. Under M.R.E. 402, evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. It was for the second jury to determine the credibility of all the evidence and testimony offered. Evidence that an earlier jury was unable to reach a decision on the cocaine charge is simply not relevant as it does not make it more or less likely that Field knowingly possessed the drugs in question. Issue 4: Reasonableness of search Field argues that because the police checkpoint did not comport with the written policy directives of the Newton County Sheriff’s Department, any search emanating from the checkpoint was invalid. The Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Here, the deputy testified that the legitimate purpose of the checkpoint was to check for valid driver’s licenses. The checkpoint was set up during daylight hours in a straightaway, and the plan was to stop every vehicle, without exception, that they encountered at the checkpoint. Additionally, the checkpoint was authorized by the Newton County Chief Deputy Sheriff, a department supervisor. A checkpoint set up for the specific purpose of checking driver’s licenses, valid tags, and insurance serves a legitimate public safety purpose; therefore, it does not violate a defendant’s right of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.


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