Jones v. Fluor Daniel Servs. Corp.
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-00456-SCT Linked Case(s): 2008-CA-00456-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-18-2010 Opinion Author: Pierce, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Statute of limitations - Section 15-1-35 - Waiver - Amended answer - M.R.C.P. 6 - M.R.C.P. 15 - Discovery Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph and Chandler, JJ. Dissenting Author : Dickinson, J., with separate written opinion. Dissent Joined By : Lamar and Kitchens, JJ. Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J., Dissents With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Graves, P.J..; Dickinson, J. Joins In Part. Procedural History: Summary Judgment; Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE; Dismissal |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-04-2008 Appealed from: Jasper County Circuit Court Judge: Robert G. Evans Disposition: The Jasper County Circuit Court granted Fluor Daniel Services Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress with prejudice as barred by the statute of limitations. Case Number: 13-0036 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Gene Jones, Ashley Craft, Ralph Scott, Hardy Gordon, James Williams and Reggie Williams |
THOMAS QUITMAN BRAME, JR. |
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| Appellee: | Fluor Daniel Services Corporation | GARY E. FRIEDMAN, STEVE J. ALLEN, SAUNDRA BROWN STRONG | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Statute of limitations - Section 15-1-35 - Waiver - Amended answer - M.R.C.P. 6 - M.R.C.P. 15 - Discovery |
| Summary of the Facts: | The six plaintiffs in this case are all African-American males and former employees of Fluor Daniel Services Corporation. While employed with Fluor Daniel, they worked under the direct supervision of Rudy Amaro, a Mexican man. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges Amaro committed a number of racially-motivated offenses while acting in the scope, course, and authority of his employment. The plaintiffs filed a joint action against Fluor Daniel, claiming Fluor Daniel is vicariously liable for Amaro’s actions. Amaro also was named a defendant, but was never served with process and is believed to have returned to Mexico. This case was previously appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to the claim of “tortious infliction of emotional distress” and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings on that issue alone. On remand, Fluor Daniel again moved for summary judgment – this time alleging the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiffs’ intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. The trial court granted Fluor Daniel’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim as time-barred. The plaintiffs appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Statute of limitations The plaintiffs argue that the court erred in allowing Fluor Daniel to maintain the defense of statute of limitations asserted in the original answer, because Fluor Daniel has waived its right to rely on the statute of limitations as a defense in this matter. A defendant’s failure to timely and reasonably raise and pursue the enforcement of any affirmative defense or other affirmative matter or right which would serve to terminate or stay the litigation, coupled with active participation in the litigation process, will ordinarily serve as a waiver. Unreasonable failure to timely assert any right which could terminate the litigation could lead to a waiver of such right if coupled with participation in the litigation process. In the present matter, there is uncertainty as to when the plaintiffs’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was raised. The plaintiffs’ original complaint states that the defendant’s actions constitute “a negligent infliction of emotional distress.” The complaint does not mention intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant stated in its answer that “[t]he plaintiffs’ claims, to the extent any are stated, may be barred by statutes of limitations.” It cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling the defendant had not waived the statute of limitations defense – particularly in light of plaintiffs’ failure to state their claim clearly. The plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in applying a one-year statute of limitations to an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, and that a three-year statute of limitations applies to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court’s rulings on the statute of limitations for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim have been inconsistent. Where a statute enumerates and specifies the subject of things upon which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned or under a general clause, those not of like kind or classification as those enumerated. The fact that wrongful conduct is alleged to be intentional does not determine which statute controls. Where the conduct alleged may be fairly categorized as one of the enumerated torts, the one-year statute applies. Otherwise, it does not. Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a tort against the person, as are the vast majority of those specifically enumerated in section 15-1-35. Therefore, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is fairly embodied in the causes of action included in section 15-1-35, and it too carries a one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Issue 2: Amended answer When this case was remanded to the trial court, Fluor Daniel filed an amended answer. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to file its amended answer approximately four years late. While the trial court has discretion to allow an amendment and should do so freely under the proper circumstances, an amendment should not be granted when it would prejudice the other party. The plaintiffs are incorrect in their assertion that Fluor Daniel must show excusable neglect under M.R.C.P. 6. The correct rule governing amendments to pleadings is M.R.C.P. 15. Here, the plaintiffs added four more plaintiffs, with all their jurisdictional statements and prayers for relief, and also altered the service-of-process allegation for Fluor Daniel. These are the only differences between the first amended complaint and the second amended complaint. A default judgment never was sought in this matter for the failure of Fluor Daniel to respond to the second amended complaint. Also, the plaintiffs can show no prejudice because Fluor Daniel pleaded the statute of limitations in its original answer. Thus, there was no error. Issue 3: Discovery The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in allowing the defendants to propound initial discovery (interrogatories and requests for production) more than four years after the litigation had commenced. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a protective order with the trial court, which was denied as moot. The order pointed out that the motion had been filed prior to the grant of summary judgment, and that accordingly “no trial would be necessary.” There was no error. |
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