J.C.N.F. v. Stone County Dep't of Human Serv.
| Docket Number: | 2007-CA-01252-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-11-2008 Opinion Author: Graves, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Termination of parental rights - Section 93-15-103(3)(h) - Appointment of counsel Judge(s) Concurring: Waller and Diaz, P.JJ., Carlson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Smith, C.J. Dissenting Author : Dickinson, J., with separate written opinion. Dissent Joined By : Easley, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CUSTODY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-05-2007 Appealed from: STONE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: Sanford R. Steckler Disposition: The Chancery Court terminated the parental rights of J.C.N.F. Case Number: 2006-0210-3 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | J.C.N.F |
JAMES L. FARRIOR, III |
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| Appellee: | STONE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES | KATHERINE JANE CALDWELL |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Termination of parental rights - Section 93-15-103(3)(h) - Appointment of counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | J.L.N., then a fourteen-year-old male, and E.D.F., then a ten-year-old female, were placed in the custody of the Stone County Department of Human Services when their mother, J.C.N.F., was an hour late in picking them up from school. The DHS supervisor assigned to the case testified at the termination hearing that when the mother arrived at the school, she appeared to be unable to take the children home. A DHS social worker assigned to the case and the DHS supervisor both testified that the mother was then arrested by police. The supervisor stated that she was arrested for driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license. The social worker stated that she was arrested for driving with a suspended license and possession of a controlled substance. Both children were adjudicated neglected by the youth court. The youth court also entered a Disposition Order stating, in part, that the mother would not be permitted to visit her children until she entered into a service agreement with DHS and made a good faith effort to comply with its terms. The mother signed the Service Agreement in October 2005. In May 2006, the youth court suggested that DHS initiate proceedings to terminate the mother’s parental rights. Accordingly, DHS filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. At the conclusion of a hearing, the chancellor terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Termination of parental rights The mother argues that the chancellor erred in terminating her parental rights because termination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In order to sever the rights of a natural person, a petitioner must first show by clear and convincing evidence that the objecting parent has either abandoned or deserted the child or is mentally or morally or otherwise unfit to rear or train the child. If a petitioner can make such a showing, then the best interest of the child is to be considered. Section 93-15-103(3)(h) consists of three components. First, it requires that the child have been adjudicated abused or neglected. Second, it requires that the child have been placed pursuant to section 43-15-13, which governs the placement of children in foster care and relative care by DHS by order of the youth court. Third, it requires that a court of competent jurisdiction have determined that reunification is not in the best interest of the child. At the termination hearing, DHS presented the following evidence relevant to section 93-15-103(3)(h). The children were adjudicated neglected by the Stone County Youth Court on April 13, 2005. The Stone County Youth Court ordered that the children be placed in DHS custody on March 3, 2005. And the children have since been placed with relatives and in foster care arrangements. Thus, the first two requirements are satisfied. Although the record does not include an order, judgment, or decision from the youth court stating whether or not reunification would be in the best interest of the children, there was testimony from the DHS social worker and supervisor regarding the hearing in which the youth court recommended that parental rights be terminated. Implicit in a recommendation that parental rights be terminated is the belief that reunification is not in the best interest of the child. Hence, there is substantial evidence that the third requirement of section 93-15-103(3)(h) is met. Thus, the chancellor did not err in finding that parental rights should be terminated on the basis of section 93-15-103(3)(h). The testimony revealed that the children would benefit from the termination of parental rights and a permanent living arrangement. The testimony shows that the mother was unemployed, that she voluntarily took care of other people’s children at their homes, and that, at the time of the hearing, she had taken a month off from babysitting. The testimony indicated that she has had serious struggles with her mental health (she suffers from bipolar affective disorder and depression) and prescription drugs. Furthermore, of the thirteen tasks she was assigned pursuant to the Service Agreement, the testimony revealed that she was unable to complete eight of the tasks, including submitting to and obtaining negative results from random drug testing, counseling, submitting to a psychological examination, and keeping DHS aware of her whereabouts and contact information. The record shows that the children lived in a difficult home environment when they were in the care of their mother. The testimony reveals that they moved from school to school and were not properly supervised at home. The mother raises an argument concerning the validity of the judgment signed by the chancellor because it was prepared by DHS. Whatever error the chancellor may have committed by signing the judgment as drafted by DHS is harmless because there is substantial, credible evidence supporting the termination of parental rights pursuant to section 93-15-103(3)(h). Issue 2: Appointment of counsel The mother argues that due process required that counsel be appointed to represent her at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Constitution and due process do not require the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding and that the right to counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In this case, an attorney would have been able to present the mother’s testimony in a more persuasive manner or object to inadmissible evidence, but one of the bases on which the chancellor terminated parental rights would remain unaffected by the presence of counsel. In other words, the Court cannot say that the presence of an attorney would have precluded the chancellor from finding that parental rights should be terminated based on section 93-15-103(3)(h). An attorney could not have changed the factual history of the case. Moreover, the mother had four or five months in which to find a legal services organization to represent her or to raise funds to hire an attorney. Therefore, she was not unconstitutionally deprived of counsel or of due process. |
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