Hinds County Sch. Dist. Bd. of Tr. v. R.B., a Minor
| Docket Number: | 2006-CT-00326-SCT Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-00326-COA ; 2006-CA-00326-COA ; 2006-CT-00326-SCT ; 2006-CT-00326-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-11-2008 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: THE JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE CHANCERY COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HINDS COUNTY ARE REVERSED AND THE HINDS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES’ EXPULSION OF R.B. IS REINSTATED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Juvenile justice - M.R.A.P. 17(h) - Factual findings - Due process - Delegation of authority - Section 37-7-301(e) Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Randolph and Lamar, JJ.; Dickinson, J., Concurs in Part. Dissenting Author : Graves, J., with separate written opinion. Dissent Joined By : Diaz, P.J., and Easley, J.; Dickinson, J. Joins In Part. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - JUVENILE JUSTICE Writ of Certiorari: yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-30-2006 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: Patricia D. Wise Disposition: The trial court reversed and expunged the School Board's decision to expel R.B. from Byram Middle School and the Main Street Alternative School. Case Number: G2004-563-W/4 |
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| Note: | This opinion reverses a previous judgment from the Court of Appeals on 9/18/2007. See the COA opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO42783.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | HINDS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF
TRUSTEES |
T. MICHAEL CRONIN;
JAMES A. KEITH |
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| Appellee: | R.B., A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIEND, D.L.B. | LATRICE WESTBROOKS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Juvenile justice - M.R.A.P. 17(h) - Factual findings - Due process - Delegation of authority - Section 37-7-301(e) |
| Summary of the Facts: | The Hinds County School District Board of Trustees filed a petition for writ of certiorari after the Court of Appeals’ issuance of a plurality opinion affirming the judgment of the Hinds County Chancery Court to reverse and expunge the School Board’s decision to expel R.B. from Byram Middle School and the Main Street Alternative School. At the trial court level, the chancery court had ruled that the School Board’s removal of R.B. from Byram Middle School due to his possession of a prohibited device and the School Board’s subsequent decision to expel R.B. from the Alternative School for drug possession were arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence, resulting in substantial prejudice to R.B. The chancery court had ordered that the School Board’s disciplinary actions be expunged from R.B.’s record. The School Board appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | An appellate review of this administrative decision should not have gone beyond the record. However, because neither party objected to additional fact-finding by the chancellor, the Court must consider the additional evidence as part of the record pursuant to M.R.A.P. 17(h). The School Board argues that the Court of Appeals plurality improperly substituted its judgment for that of the School Board by making a factual finding regarding the nature of the object seized from R.B. The Court of Appeals plurality took issue with the scale of the photocopy and the fact that the superintendent and the school board viewed a photocopy of the instrument and not the actual instrument which had been seized. The Court of Appeals judges who comprised the plurality viewed the actual instrument and determined that the device was not a knife, but an unaltered nail file. From the record and the applicable law, it is obvious that the plurality, contrary to the factual findings of the School Board, substituted its own judgment for that of the School Board. The record reveals that there exists a reasonable basis to conclude that the object in question was a knife, as categorized by the principal and the school resource officer present at the time the instrument was confiscated. Therefore, the School Board’s disciplinary action in this matter was not arbitrary or capricious. The School Board also argues that R.B. received all process due under the law; and, alternatively, even if he were deprived of due process, R.B. suffered no substantial prejudice as a result. Due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story. R.B. argues that his due process rights were violated because he lacked notice of the School Board meeting and was not given an opportunity to speak on his own behalf at this meeting. However, R.B. was given an opportunity to speak on his own behalf to the Appeals Committee. Thus, R.B. was afforded the requisite notice and opportunity to speak on his own behalf at the Appeals Committee level of review. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the School Board’s policies and procedures allowed students more than one hearing. Therefore, R.B. is unable to meet the requisite showing of substantial prejudice. R.B. argues that due process routinely warrants cross-examination of witnesses, and, at a minimum, receipt of a witness list. Concerning the marijuana allegation, R.B. did receive a list of potential witnesses in his notice of the Appeals Committee hearing. The Appeals Committee’s review of hearsay statements was not improper. In the case of a drug offense, all school districts have a substantial interest in maintaining a safe, drug-free environment for their students. To do so, it is important for schools to have the discretion to protect the identity of students who report drug crimes occurring on their campuses. To hold otherwise would potentially endanger students by subjecting them to possible retaliation. In addition, this is not a case in which the school district denied R.B. the right to call his own witnesses to speak in his defense. As stated in the Appeals Committee notice letter, if R.B. had at any time deemed there were students with information relevant to his defense, he could have produced those students for the purpose of giving a statement to the Appeals Committee. From the record, R.B. unquestionably was afforded due process. Therefore, the decision of the School Board to expel R.B. for possession of marijuana was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The School Board argues that the Court of Appeals plurality opinion misinterpreted section 37-7-301(e) when the plurality opined that the School Board improperly delegated to its superintendent the decision as to whether the instrument in question was a weapon. A plain reading of the statute authorizes school boards to delegate disciplinary and placement decisions to other school administrators, so long as school boards make the final determination. The School Board merely delegated authority to the superintendent in making a determination as to whether the instrument in question constituted a weapon that violated school policy and state law, but the School Board itself made the ultimate determination regarding the expulsion. School boards are acting within their statutory authority to delegate such findings of fact in disciplinary matters. |
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