Scott v. State
| Docket Number: | 2005-CT-00915-SCT Linked Case(s): 2005-KA-00915-COA ; 2005-KA-00915-COA ; 2005-CT-00915-SCT ; 2005-CT-00915-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: |
Opinion Date: 12-04-2008 Opinion Author: Smith, C.J. Holding: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED. CONVICTION OF CAPITAL MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT, WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Capital murder - Recusal of judge - Suppression of confession - Speedy trial - Closing argument - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.A.P. 22(b) Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Dissenting Author : Diaz, P.J., without separate written opinion. Concurs in Result Only: Graves and Dickinson, JJ. without separate written opinion Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY Writ of Certiorari: yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-31-2005 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Tomie Green Disposition: Conviction of capital murder and sentence of life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. District Attorney: Eleanor Faye Peterson Case Number: 02-1-149-00 TTG |
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| Note: | This opinion reversed the COA's previous decision on 3/18/2008. See the COA opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO46939.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | WILLIAM G. SCOTT a/k/a WILLIAM SCOTT |
J. CHRISTOPHER KLOTZ;
JOSHUA AARON TURNER |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. GLENN WATTS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Capital murder - Recusal of judge - Suppression of confession - Speedy trial - Closing argument - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.A.P. 22(b) |
| Summary of the Facts: | William Scott was convicted of capital murder which occurred during an armed robbery. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Scott appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict and remanded the case for a new trial and a new evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Recusal of judge At the heart of this appeal is an ex parte conference (which was sealed under the court’s order) in which Scott’s counsel revealed a serious conflict brought about by his client’s confession to the murder, insistence on taking the stand to offer perjured testimony, and insistence on attempting to find alibi witnesses who would likewise commit perjury. Scott’s counsel, without initially revealing the content of the conflict, explained to the judge in an ex parte hearing that he found himself in an ethical dilemma that could cost him his license to practice law. The trial judge inquired further in order to make her ruling. At that time, Scott’s counsel revealed to the trial judge that Scott had confessed to him that he had committed the crime and was intent on falsely testifying. The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge abused her discretion by failing to recuse herself after the ex parte hearing with Scott’s counsel. The question is whether a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality. Scott and the Court of Appeals misplace their focus on what Scott’s counsel told the judge in the ex parte hearing. The confession that Scott’s counsel revealed to the trial judge, after every other remedy had been exhausted, was entirely consistent with the corroborating evidence. Not a single case cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling involved a jury trial. As such, the facts herein are inapposite to those upon which the Court of Appeals seeks to rest its holding. The trial judge applied the proper legal standard to admit the written confession and allowed the jury to weigh the evidence before it. The judge did not need to recuse herself and made no determination as to the truth or falsity of the confession, merely that it met the standard required for admission. Scott places great emphasis on the alleged violation of the attorney-client privilege. However, our law states that an attempt to utilize an attorney’s service in furtherance of a crime, such as perjury, forfeits the protection of this rule. The judge, while properly acting as gatekeeper, was the trier of fact as to admissibility of the evidence; however, the trial judge was not the ultimate trier of fact. The jury rendered the verdict based on substantial evidence, including Scott’s testimony. The presumption of impartiality remains with nothing to rebut it. Issue 2: Suppression of confession A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress will be reversed only if the incorrect legal principle was applied; if there was no substantial evidence to support a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights; and if the denial was a result of manifest error. In this case, a signed Miranda waiver and a signed and initialed confession were admitted into evidence. In addition, the officers who Mirandized Scott and took his confession were available to (and ultimately did) testify. The State’s burden of proving that a confession is voluntary is met by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. The record shows that the officers were available to testify, which left the decision of whether the confession was voluntary to the trial judge’s discretion. The trial judge allowed the written confession into evidence, which was within her discretion and substantiated by sufficient evidence in the record. Thus, the Court of Appeals is reversed on this issue and the trial judge’s ruling that the confession met the legal standard required of it for admission is reinstated. Issue 3: Speedy trial Scott filed three motions for continuance to delay his trial, which is directly contrary to his assertion that he requested, and was denied, a speedy trial. In addition, Scott sought to dismiss his counsel on several occasions and filed several motions pro se. In determining whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial as guaranteed under the United States Constitution, the court must consider the length of delay, reason for delay, defendant’s assertion of his rights, and whether the defendant has been prejudiced. Although the length of the delay in this case does exceed 270 days, the delay is largely attributable to Scott and somewhat attributable to a crowded docket. Additionally, there is no evidence that Scott was in any way prejudiced by any delay. Given this evidence, the Court of Appeals’ judgment granting a new evidentiary hearing on this issue is vacated. Issue 4: Closing argument The comments made by the prosecutor that Scott was a shyster and a con artist are substantiated by Scott’s own testimony. Scott testified that he had been convicted of theft and conspiracy to embezzle; Scott admitted he had used a stolen ATM card, had altered a social security card to change the numbers, and had a stolen license plate on his car to avoid being arrested. This issue is without merit. Issue 5: Ineffective assistance of counsel The Court of Appeals held that this issue would be better brought by motion for post-conviction relief. Under M.R.A.P. 22(b), issues which may be raised in post-conviction proceedings may also be raised on direct appeal if such issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record. Because this issue has been brought by Scott on grounds that could have been decided by the trial court, the Court has the power to determine whether Scott received ineffective assistance of counsel. Scott claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on false arrest, failure to interview alibi witnesses, failure to view alleged evidence, and failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument. The record indicates that Scott was arrested in Marietta, Georgia, under an outstanding warrant for his arrest, which warrant was never disputed. Scott’s counsel delineated the effort made to locate the purported alibi witnesses provided by Scott, witnesses who never could be located. In addition, Scott’s roommate did not corroborate Scott’s contention that he was asleep at home. Whether or not Scott’s counsel viewed a videotape of an individual purchasing cigarettes from a convenience store after the murder and armed robbery is a question of strategy left to Scott’s counsel. Scott’s claim regarding his counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s comments that Scott was a con man and a shyster fall squarely within the purview of trial strategy. |
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