Young v. Guild
| Docket Number: | 2004-CA-02532-SCT Linked Case(s): 2004-CA-02532-SCT ; 2004-CA-02532-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: |
Opinion Date: 10-30-2008 Opinion Author: Lamar, J. Holding: On Direct Appeal: Reversed and Remanded. On Cross-Appeal: Affirmed in Part and Reversed and Remanded in Part. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wrongful death - Jury instructions - Apportionment instruction - Admission of suicide notes - M.R.E. 901 - Hearsay - M.R.E. 803(4) - Irresistible impulse doctrine - Attorney-client privilege - M.R.E. 502(b) Judge(s) Concurring: Diaz, P.J., Easley, Graves and Dickinson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Waller, P.J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Randolph, J. with separate written opinion. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Smith, C.J., and Carlson, J. Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-24-2004 Appealed from: Yazoo County Circuit Court Judge: Jannie M. Lewis Case Number: 2001-CI58 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Candice Young, Personal Representative of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Cherie S. Hancock, Deceased |
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| Appellee: | Donald C. Guild, M.D. | |||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Wrongful death - Jury instructions - Apportionment instruction - Admission of suicide notes - M.R.E. 901 - Hearsay - M.R.E. 803(4) - Irresistible impulse doctrine - Attorney-client privilege - M.R.E. 502(b) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jim Herring, Cherie Hancock’s divorce attorney, referred his client to Donald Guild, M.D., a psychiatrist, for a mental evaluation and medical treatment. Herring wanted Dr. Guild’s expert opinion for a divorce proceeding that involved Hancock and her husband, George Hancock. Hancock’s mental state was at issue in the proceeding. Dr. Guild began to treat Hancock on an inpatient basis at St. Dominic Hospital in Jackson, Mississippi, on August 20, 1999. On September 15, 1999, Dr. Guild testified at Hancock’s divorce hearing. Dr. Guild discharged Hancock from the hospital on Friday, September 17, 1999. Hancock committed suicide on September 20, 1999, three days after her release from St. Dominic Hospital. Candice Young, individually and as personal representative of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Hancock, filed a complaint against Dr. Guild. During discovery, Dr. Guild’s counsel repeatedly attempted to depose Herring and eventually filed a motion to compel the deposition. The court denied the motion. Dr. Guild also filed a motion for summary judgment which the court denied. The jury returned a verdict for Dr. Guild. Young appeals, and Dr. Guild cross-appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jury instructions Young argues that the jury was not properly instructed as to the plaintiff’s theory of the case. The trial court failed to fulfill its ultimate duty to properly instruct the jury with any instruction that tied the facts and issues of the case to the law of negligence. The jury instructions as a whole are abstract. When read in toto, the instructions provided the jury with the appropriate standard of care but did not relate the standard of care to the facts and issues of the case. The trial court should have given Young the opportunity to place before the jury an instruction that informed the jury of all matters the plaintiff contended were at issue and necessary to prove her theory of the case. Young also argues that she was entitled to an apportionment instruction pursuant to section 85-5-7, since Dr. Guild put forth evidence that Thomas Hancock and other family members caused Hancock to commit suicide. Dr. Guild’s testimony indicated several times that Hancock's family exacerbated her mental condition. However, Young stated in a discovery response that no heir had exacerbated Hancock’s mental illness. Young provides no other theory as to how an heir could be held partially responsible for the suicide. Thus, Young’s denial is binding on her, and waives her right to an apportionment instruction. Issue 2: Admission of suicide notes Dr. Guild entered as an exhibit suicide notes the sheriff’s office found in Hancock’s bedroom and in her mother’s home. Young argues the admission of the suicide notes is reversible error. Authentication under M.R.E. 901 requires evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. A person's handwriting may be authenticated by a lay witness who is familiar with the handwriting. Such an authenticated document may be used by the trier of fact in comparison with a specimen for which authenticity is in question. Once a prima facie case is made, the evidence goes to the jury and it is the jury who will ultimately determine the authenticity of the evidence, not the court. The letters Hancock wrote to Young and her children while hospitalized were sufficiently authenticated by Young’s testimony. Issue 3: Privileged information Young argues that Dr. Guild’s counsel inappropriately commented to the jury that they would not hear from Hancock’s divorce attorney, Jim Herring, despite Young’s claim of the attorney/client privilege. The trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the comment about Herring. A trial court’s admonishment to the jury to disregard an improper question and answer is generally sufficient to cure any taint. Young also argues that a witness’s references to conversations between herself and Hancock were hearsay. However, she fails to provide any reference to that testimony. Young also argues that Dr. Guild, during his examination, repeatedly referenced conversations between himself and Hancock and that these statements do not meet the trustworthiness requirement of M.R.E. 803(4) because they were not written down in Dr. Guild’s medical records. However, Young has failed to provide any direction as to the specific testimony at issue. Issue 4: Irresistible impulse doctrine The Irresistible Impulse Doctrine is an exception to the rule that a plaintiff could not recover for a suicide. Under the Irresistible Impulse Doctrine, a plaintiff may recover when a tortfeasor has committed an intentional tort that causes an irresistible impulse in the decedent to commit suicide. The Irresistible Impulse Doctrine is inapplicable to a physician or other medical provider from whom treatment is sought for a mental condition, where the plaintiff claims that the negligent care led to the suicide. Such cases must proceed under the analysis required in other medical negligence cases. Applying these principles to today’s case, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment to Dr. Guild. Issue 5: Attorney-client privilege Under M.R.E. 502(b), a client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer’s representative. The privilege may be claimed by the personal representative of a deceased client. Dr. Guild argues the trial court should have allowed his counsel to depose Herring, since Herring was involved in implementing Dr. Guild’s discharge plan. In his offer of proof, Dr. Guild proposed that Herring should be allowed to testify about Hancock’s state of mind regarding how she was treated by her family and how she felt about being discharged to her mother’s home. On appeal, Dr. Guild also requested that Herring provide testimony of the interaction between Hancock and her family. Whether Herring gleaned Hancock’s state of mind from her behavior or actual statements, such actions and statements are protected by the attorney-client privilege if they were confidential and made in the context of Hancock’s legal representation. On remand, the trial court should inquire into the circumstances and substance of these actions, statements, and interactions, in order to determine if the attorney-client privilege is applicable. Conversations between Dr. Guild and Herring (regardless of Hancock’s presence) are protected under the attorney-client privilege, since Dr. Guild was acting as Herring’s representative pursuant to Rule 502(a)(4) when he treated Hancock. Although these conversations are privileged, Young waived the attorney-client privilege during the cross-examination of Dr. Guild (called by Young as an adverse witness) regarding the discharge plan. |
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