Williams v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-00338-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-09-2010 Opinion Author: Myers, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Voluntariness of pleas - Factual basis - Sentence - Right to appeal - Ineffective assistance of counsel Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Irving, J. Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-30-2009 Appealed from: DeSoto County Circuit Court Judge: Andrew C. Baker Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DENIED Case Number: CV2008-0169BD |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | JASON EDWARD WILLIAMS |
JAMES D. FRANKS, JR. |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Voluntariness of pleas - Factual basis - Sentence - Right to appeal - Ineffective assistance of counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jason Williams pled guilty to culpable-negligence manslaughter and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to twenty years for each offense, with four years suspended. He filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was denied. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Voluntariness of pleas To determine whether the plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given, the trial court must advise the defendant of his rights, the nature of the charge against him, as well as the consequences of the plea. Williams argues that the trial court failed to ensure that he was informed of and understood each of the elements of the two crimes to which he had pleaded guilty. The State concedes that the trial judge did not explain the elements of the two charges at the plea hearing; nor did the judge ask defense counsel whether they had advised Williams of the elements. Additionally, the two plea petitions signed by Williams did not set forth the elements of the crimes. Rather, each petition referred only to the indictment that specifies the elements for each respective crime, and each contains a statement sworn to by Williams acknowledging that he was advised by his lawyers of the elements. However, the State contends that the prosecutor gave a detailed recitation of the facts the State intended to prove if Williams had elected to proceed to trial, which expressly laid out all of the essential elements of the crimes charged. The State points out that Williams stated on the record that he recalled and understood that the facts recited by the State were the bases for his charges. The State submits that this affirmatively demonstrates that Williams was made aware of the necessary elements. There is no constitutional infirmity with the elements of the crime to which a defendant wishes to plead guilty having being explained to the defendant by the prosecutor rather than the judge at a plea hearing. When determining whether a record accurately reflects that a defendant received real notice of the true nature of the charge as required by due process, a prosecutor’s on-the-record statement properly identifying the elements of the crime should carry no less weight than an assurance to the court by either the defendant or defense counsel that counsel did so at some previous point off the record. Here, the on-the-record statement by prosecutor, essentially reiterating the charging language in the indictment, evinces an accurate showing that Williams was informed of the essential elements of the two crimes charged. With one exception, the prosecutor sufficiently identified the essential elements of both crimes. Of particular significance, is the fact that the essential conduct elements were described to Williams. The prosecutor failed to describe the killing as “unlawful” in his statement of the case. Concern that this critical element was not mentioned at the plea hearing is abated by the fact it was twice set forth in the indictment, once for each count. Also, Williams attested in his plea petition that he and his attorneys had discussed all possible defenses that he may have had to the charges. Thus, the record contains sufficient evidence that Williams pleaded guilty to the crimes, culpable-negligence manslaughter and aggravated assault, with knowledge and understanding of the respective elements of each crime. Issue 2: Factual basis Williams argues that the trial court failed to make a determination that factual bases existed for his guilty pleas. In operating his vehicle in the dark of night without the use of headlights in the manner described by the State substantially establishes that Williams unlawfully acted with reckless behavior under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. His conduct caused the death of one person and severe injury to another person. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence that Williams committed the crimes charged, culpable-negligence manslaughter and aggravated assault. Issue 3: Sentence Williams argues that although the trial court advised him that he was giving up the right to a jury trial by pleading guilty, neither the court nor his counsel informed him that the jury would not sentence him if he were convicted in a jury trial. The law requires that before accepting a criminal defendant’s guilty plea the trial court must fully inform the defendant of the likely consequences that may directly result from the defendant’s decision. The law does not require the trial court to ferret out and dispel an inconsequential misapprehension, such as the one here. In addition, Williams was specifically informed of the statutory maximum and minimum punishment that each crime carries. Issue 4: Right to appeal Williams argues that although the trial court advised him that he was not entitled to appeal a plea of guilty, he was not advised by either the court or his counsel that he would be allowed to appeal a jury conviction. The record, however, discloses otherwise. In both plea petitions, Williams swore that he understood he could plead not guilty and proceed to a trial by jury, and that he had the right to any appeal therefrom. Issue 5: Ineffective assistance of counsel Williams argues that his defense counsel was deficient in failing to raise the aforementioned points with him prior to his decision to plead guilty. Since there is no merit to Williams’s claim that his guilty pleas were not valid, there is no merit to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. |
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