Day v. Day


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Docket Number: 2008-CA-01296-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 02-09-2010
Opinion Author: Myers, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contempt - Equitable distribution - Attorney's fees
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-07-2008
Appealed from: Lamar County Chancery Court
Judge: James H.C. Thomas, Jr.
Disposition: DAMAGES AWARDED TO WIFE, ATTORNEY’S FEES DENIED
Case Number: 2003-0153-GN-TH

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: JUANITA DAY




THOMAS T. BUCHANAN, JOHN D. SMALLWOOD



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: RICHARD SCOTT DAY, JR. PRO SE  

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    Topic: Contempt - Equitable distribution - Attorney's fees

    Summary of the Facts: Richard and Juanita Day were granted an irreconcilable differences divorce. The parties executed a written property settlement agreement pursuant to the divorce, which was approved by the chancery court. Following the divorce, both parties ultimately returned to Ohio. Approximately two years after the divorce was entered, Juanita filed a complaint for contempt, alleging that Richard had violated the terms of the property settlement agreement. Richard responded with his own complaint for contempt. Juanita appeals from the judgment.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Equitable distribution The chancellor acknowledged that the property settlement agreement stated that, if the marital home was not sold within twenty-four months, it would be appraised, and Richard would purchase Juanita’s remaining equity. The chancellor nonetheless concluded that because of “[Juanita’s] failure to cooperate in a timely appraisal of the home,” she could not benefit from an appraisal taken almost a year after the time provided for in the agreement. The chancellor therefore found the “sale clause” of the property settlement agreement remained operative, and pursuant to that clause he awarded Juanita approximately $6,000 from the remaining proceeds of the home. Juanita argues that the chancellor erred in not enforcing the agreement and awarding her equity based upon an appraisal which valued the home at $260,000. A court is obligated to enforce a contract executed by legally competent parties where the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous. However, performance of a contract is excused, or may not be taken advantage of, when it is prevented by the acts of the opposite party. Juanita’s argument – that the chancellor should have used the appraisal value she offered – is without merit; Juanita may not benefit from appreciation occurring during the eleven-month delay she was found to have caused. The parties owned a 2000-model Coachman RV prior to divorce. The property settlement agreement provided that the RV would be listed for sale, and that any proceeds from the sale remaining after the loan payoff would be split equally between the parties. The agreement did not provide which party would be responsible for arranging for the sale. The chancellor found that the RV was a liability rather than an asset. He also found that no evidence had been offered that the RV had ever been a net asset. Finally, the chancellor held that because Richard had assumed responsibility for the RV, he should be awarded it and exclusively assume all associated debts and obligations. Juanita argues that the chancellor erred in not awarding her some equity in the RV. She argues that she was unable to offer evidence of the RV’s value because it was in Richard’s possession for much of the time following the divorce. This argument is without merit because, first, there were other ways of proving the value of the vehicle and, second, because there is no evidence in the record that Juanita ever attempted to arrange for an appraisal or to take possession of the vehicle. Issue 2: Attorney’s fees Juanita argues that the chancellor erred in not awarding her attorney’s fees. Where one party is found in contempt of a previous judgment, attorney’s fees are generally proper. However, in this case, although the chancellor did find Richard in contempt with regard to some of the issues presented, he was not uncritical of Juanita’s conduct, finding that she had acted in bad faith with regard to other issues. The chancellor also repeatedly criticized how both parties had conducted themselves following the divorce and over several years of post-divorce litigation. The chancellor concluded that, on the balance, both parties should pay their own attorney’s fees. There was no abuse of discretion in that holding.


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