Huss v. Gayden


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Docket Number: 2007-FC-02165-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-25-2008
Opinion Author: RANDOLPH, J.
Holding: CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED

Additional Case Information: Topic: Certified question - M.R.A.P. 20 - Medical malpractice - Statute of limitations - M.R.C.P. 8(c) - Section 15-1-36
Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ.
Judge(s) Concurring Separately: EASLEY, J. (CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, P.J.)
Non Participating Judge(s): LAMAR, J.
Dissenting Author : GRAVES, J., with separate written opinion.
Dissent Joined By : DIAZ, P.J.
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - FEDERALLY CERTIFIED QUESTION

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: BARBARA HUSS AND RODNEY HUSS




JENNY M. VIRDEN, JOHN H. DANIEL, III, RALPH E. CHAPMAN



 

Appellee: JOHN OVERTON GAYDEN, M.D. AND MEMPHIS OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, INC. MARK P. CARAWAY, META S. COPELAND  

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Topic: Certified question - M.R.A.P. 20 - Medical malpractice - Statute of limitations - M.R.C.P. 8(c) - Section 15-1-36

Summary of the Facts: Under M.R.A.P. 20(a), the Court accepts the following certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: “[w]hen the alleged negligence is (1) administration of a drug by a physician, or (2) failure to disclose what a reasonable practitioner would have disclosed about the risks of a drug, and experts disagree as to whether the drug caused the plaintiff’s injuries, is the date that the alleged act, omission or neglect might, with reasonable diligence, have been first known or discovered by the plaintiff the date her condition or illness is diagnosed by non-defendant physicians or experts, or the date the pertinent facts are available in medical records, or is limitations tolled until one in a series of physicians or other experts the plaintiff consults first tells her that the drug caused her condition or illness?”

Summary of Opinion Analysis: When a plaintiff brings suit, M.R.C.P. 8(c) requires a defendant to affirmatively assert a statute-of-limitations defense, in order to receive its benefit. While the obvious benefit of this affirmative defense is sought procedurally, its effect (i.e., extinguishing the remedy) is a substantive right to which Mississippi law applies. The success vel non of this disputed affirmative defense requires a jury determination, but only if actually presented. Under Mississippi law, Gayden’s failure to establish factually the proof necessary to be accorded the protection created by this substantive right, precludes Gayden from prevailing upon it as a matter of law. This substantive issue should not be confused with the separate procedural issue of whether the defense is raised, preserved or should be barred, all of which are controlled by federal procedural law. Under either subsection (1) or (2) of section 15-1-36, a medical-malpractice action must be filed within two years from the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered. Under the discovery rule which tolls the statute of limitation, the central inquiry is the time that the patient discovers, or should have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that he probably has an actionable injury. In determining the applicability of the “discovery rule,” a review of Mississippi cases reveals the existence of dissimilar factual patterns which prevent application of a rote formula, despite adherence to the statutory language. In Mississippi, when a valid factual dispute exists, the issue is settled by the finder of fact, a jury. It is only when reasonable minds cannot differ that it becomes settled as a matter of law. Under M.R.A.P. 20, the Court will restrict its review of certified questions to the performance when properly requested of the function of declaring in general terms the controlling rules of state law and not the application of law to fact. Based on the record presented, the Court concludes that the medical-malpractice claims of Huss were not barred, as a matter of law, by the applicable statute of limitations outlined in section 15-1-36.


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