Caves v. Yarbrough
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-01857-SCT Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-01857-SCT ; 2006-CA-01857-SCT ; 2006-CA-01857-SCT |
|
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-25-2008 Opinion Author: DICKINSON, J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded; The appellant's motion for rehearing is granted. The previous opinions are withdrawn and these opinions are substituted therefor. |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Medical malpractice - Tort Claims Act - Statute of limitations - Section 11-46-11 - Wrongful death - Section 11-7-13 - Discovery rule Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: EASLEY, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: DIAZ, P.J. with separate written opinion. Procedural History: Motion for Rehearing Nature of the Case: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-13-2006 Appealed from: Franklin County Circuit Court Judge: Forrest Johnson Disposition: This is a medical-negligence lawsuit filed pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"), which requires that suits be filed within one year "next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based." The question presented is whether the plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. Case Number: 02-CV-026 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | IRENE CAVES, STATUTORY REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES
OF JIMMY CAVES |
JOEL W. HOWELL, III |
|
|
| Appellee: | BENJAMIN YARBROUGH, M.D., AND FRANKLIN COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL | JAMES SCOTT ROGERS, WADE G. MANOR, LANE B. REED | ||
| Amicus #2: | ||||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Medical malpractice - Tort Claims Act - Statute of limitations - Section 11-46-11 - Wrongful death - Section 11-7-13 - Discovery rule |
| Summary of the Facts: | The motion for rehearing is granted, and these opinions are substituted for the original opinions. Jimmy Caves died on April 17, 2000. On April 21, 2000, Irene Caves, Caves’ wife, requested and obtained the medical records pertaining to her husband’s death. According to her testimony, when she attempted to obtain a copy of the autopsy report from the pathologist’s office, Mrs. Caves was told there would be a delay due to the death of the doctor who had performed the autopsy. She continued to request the report on a weekly basis until September 2000, when she moved out of state and turned the pursuit of the autopsy report over to her son, Kevin, who continued to request the report. Although the autopsy report was completed on September 28, 2000, Mrs. Caves asserts that she did not receive it until March of 2001. Prior to receiving the autopsy report, Mrs. Caves contacted an attorney, because she suspected wrongdoing on the part of Franklin County Memorial Hospital and Dr. Benjamin Yarbrough. Based on the information available at the time, the attorney declined to take Mrs. Caves’s case. She then contacted another attorney, who took her case and retained Dr. Gary Pfortmiller, a full-time emergency-room physician, to review the case. After reviewing the medical records and the autopsy report, Dr. Pfortmiller provided an affidavit dated April 11, 2001, which stated that Mr. Caves’s death was “caused by or contributed to by care far below the minimal standard.” On February 13, 2002, Mrs. Caves provided the Hospital notice of a claim under the Tort Claims Act. On April 12, 2002, Mrs. Caves followed up the notice with a lawsuit against the Hospital and Dr. Yarbrough. The Hospital and Dr. Yarbrough filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Mrs. Caves’s claims were time-barred because she failed to bring them within the one-year statute of limitations. Mrs. Caves responded by arguing that she had provided notice and had filed her claim within one year of her discovery of her claim. The trial court granted summary judgment, and Mrs. Caves appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Statute of limitations Section 11-46-11 of the Tort Claims Act describes the beginning of the limitation period as the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based. The three terms, “tortious, wrongful, and otherwise actionable” are troublesome because they are not synonymous. Although subsection (4) of the statute has no direct application in today’s case, it is helpful in understanding the intent of the statute. Subsection four’s employment of the “cause of action accrued” language is more consistent with an interpretation of subsection three, which holds that the limitation period begins on the earliest date all of the elements of a tort are present. Therefore, in applying the statutory language of the Act, the statute of limitations for claims thereunder begins to run when all the elements of a tort, or cause of action, are present. Giving the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable doubt, all of the elements of all claims were present, at least by April 17, 2000, when Mr. Caves died. Since notice was not provided until February 13, 2002, the suit was time-barred, unless application of a discovery rule delayed the beginning of the running of the limitations period until at least February 13, 2001. With regard to the wrongful-death statute, section 11-7-13 encompasses all claims – including survival claims which could have been brought by the decedent, wrongful-death claims, estate claims, and other claims – resulting from a tort which proximately caused a death. And where death is not an immediate result of the tort, the limitation periods for the various kinds of claims may not begin to run at the same time. In the present case, the wrongful-death claims of the wrongful-death beneficiaries matured – and the statute of limitations on those claims began to run – on April 17, 2000; not because that is the day Mr. Caves died, but rather because that is the first day (“if death had not ensued”) Mr. Caves could have brought a claim. If there are other claims against Dr. Yarbrough and the Hospital (such as estate claims and claims for loss of consortium) which may be subject to a different statute of limitations, those claims are not before the Court. Issue 2: Discovery rule The Tort Claims Act does not include a discovery rule which tolls or delays the beginning of the running of the statute of limitations until the claimant discovers the injury or the claim. On rehearing, both Mrs. Caves and amici argue that, even though the Act has no discovery provision, previous decisions have held otherwise and the doctrine of stare decisis requires the Court to follow those prior decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis requires the Court to apply an incorrect previous interpretation of a statute unless it is pernicious, impractical, or mischievous in effect, and resulting in detriment to the public. However, the Court has offered no guidelines for finding or identifying these prerequisites (pernicious, impractical, mischievous, etc.). Thus, the need for a clear, consistent rule is apparent. Therefore, in cases where the Court concludes a statute was incorrectly interpreted in a previous case, the Court will nevertheless continue to apply the previous interpretation, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, upon finding the Legislature amended or reenacted the statute without correcting the prior interpretation. Such action on the part of the Legislature amounts to incorporation of the previous interpretation into the reenacted or amended statute. The Tort Claims Act’s discovery rule was judicially created in Barnes v. Singing River Hosp., 733 So. 2d 199, 205 (Miss. 1999). By reenacting section 11-46-11(3) without addressing or countermanding the Court’s decision in Barnes, the Legislature acquiesced and tacitly approved and incorporated into the statute a discovery rule as announced in Barnes. Thus, the limitations period for claims under the Tort Claims Act does not begin to run until all the elements of a tort exist, and the claimant knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of both the injury and the act or omission which caused it. The finder of fact (in this case, the trial judge) must decide when those requirements are satisfied. While the trial court found that, because there were no “latent injuries or actions,” the discovery rule had no application, the operative question is whether statutory notice was provided within a year next following the earliest date Mr. Caves (or his personal representative), by exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the injury and the acts or omission which caused them. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
