Covington County Sch. Dist. v. Magee


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Docket Number: 2008-IA-01207-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2008-IA-01207-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-28-2010
Opinion Author: Carlson, P.J.
Holding: Reversed and rendered

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wrongful death - Tort Claims Act - Ministerial duty - Discretionary duty - Section 11-46-9(1)(b) & (d) - Section 37-9-69 - Section 37-9-14
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Dickinson, Randolph, Lamar and Pierce, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J., with separate written opinion.
Dissent Joined By : Graves, P.J.
Dissenting Author : Chandler, J. with separate written opinion.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-25-2008
Appealed from: Covington County Circuit Court
Judge: Robert G. Evans
Disposition: The Covington County School District filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Covington County Circuit Court granted in part and denied in part.
Case Number: 2008-45C

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Covington County School District




WILLIAM BUCKLEY STEWART, SR., ROBERT P. THOMPSON



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Lutricia Magee, Individually and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Lonnie C. Magee, Jr., Deceased, and All Others Who are Entitled to Recover Under the Wrongful Death and Survival Statute GERALD PATRICK COLLIER  

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    Topic: Wrongful death - Tort Claims Act - Ministerial duty - Discretionary duty - Section 11-46-9(1)(b) & (d) - Section 37-9-69 - Section 37-9-14

    Summary of the Facts: Lutricia Magee, individually and on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Lonnie Magee, Jr., deceased, and all others who are entitled to recover under the wrongful-death statute, filed suit against the Covington County School District, alleging negligence and res ipsa loquitur. The Covington County School District filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the circuit court granted in part and denied in part. The Supreme Court granted the District’s petition for interlocutory appeal.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: The District argues that its alleged acts or omissions were not ministerial, but discretionary in nature, thereby entitling the District to immunity pursuant to section 11-46-9(1)(d). Magee, however, argues that the District failed to perform its statutory duty to provide a safe environment for its students; therefore, section 11-46-9(1)(b) is triggered, and it is an issue of fact as to whether the District exercised ordinary care. A duty is discretionary if it requires the official to use her own judgment and discretion in the performance thereof. On the other hand, an act is ministerial if the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or under conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being dependent upon the officer’s judgment or discretion. If the District’s conduct is deemed ministerial, it is then protected from liability only if ordinary care is exercised in performing or failing to perform the statutory duty or regulation. In making its argument, Magee relies on section 37-9-69 as well as the Court’s mandate that school personnel are required to use ordinary care in administering public schools, and schools have the responsibility to use ordinary care to provide a safe school environment. Section 37-9-69 mandates that school personnel maintain appropriate control and discipline of students while the children are in their care. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case as revealed in the record, section 37-9-69 does not impose a statutory duty on the District. Magee also argues that section 37-9-14 gives rise to a statutory duty based on the facts of this case. This argument is without merit. Section 37-9-14 sets forth the responsibilities and powers of the superintendent, and in no way does this statute imply any duties pertaining to the oversight of athletic practices. Nothing in the record indicates that the District and/or the football coaches (or any District employee or staff member) violated any statute, ordinance, or regulation concerning conducting football practice, and the conduct at issue constitutes discretionary behavior. Thus, the exemption from liability found in section 11-46-9(1)(d) is applicable to today’s case.


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