MS Comp Choice, SIF v. Clark, Scott & Streetman


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00117-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-00117-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 05-08-2008
Opinion Author: Diaz, P.J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Legal malpractice - Service of original complaint - M.R.C.P. 15(a) - Statute of limitations - Relation back - M.R.C.P. 15(c) - Real party in interest - M.R.C.P. 8
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Graves, Dickinson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - LEGAL MALPRACTICE

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-28-2006
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: W. Swan Yerger
Disposition: The trial court ruled that the amendments did not relate back to the date of the original complaint based on its determination that the claims asserted in the amended complaint were those of the insurance company, not the third-party administrator; consequently, it held that the claims asserted in the amended complaint were barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Case Number: 251-05-898 CIV

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: MS COMP CHOICE, SIF




JOEL W. HOWELL, III



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: CLARK, SCOTT & STREETMAN DAVID W. MOCKBEE, DAVID BRICE DENISON  

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    Topic: Legal malpractice - Service of original complaint - M.R.C.P. 15(a) - Statute of limitations - Relation back - M.R.C.P. 15(c) - Real party in interest - M.R.C.P. 8

    Summary of the Facts: After sustaining injuries in a logging accident, Elie Grinstead filed a petition to controvert with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission against his employer, Monticello Forest Products Corp., and its insurance carrier, Mississippi Comp Choice, SIF. Safety Risk Services, Inc., Comp Choice’s third-party administrator, retained the law firm of Clark, Scott & Streetman, P.A. to defend Grinstead’s suit. The administrative law judge found that Grinstead was entitled to benefits. The Clark firm appealed the ALJ’s decision to the full Commission which affirmed the decision. The Clark firm appealed to circuit court which affirmed the decision of the Commission. According to Comp Choice and Safety Risk, the Clark firm was directed to appeal the decision of the circuit court, but failed to do so. Subsequently, Grinstead filed suit against Comp Choice and his employer for bad faith denial of his workers’ compensation claim. The Clark firm faxed a standard release form to Comp Choice for its review in connection with the Grinstead workers’ compensation case. Comp Choice and Safety Risk also claim that the Clark firm failed to timely notify them about the amount of benefits owed to Grinstead. Comp Choice and Safety Risk eventually discharged the Clark firm as counsel and subsequently filed suit against the Clark firm. The complaint asserted claims of legal malpractice, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Safety Risk never served the complaint upon the Clark firm. Instead, Comp Choice filed an amended complaint substituting itself as the party plaintiff in the place of Safety Risk. The amended complaint asserted the same claims against the Clark firm as the original complaint. Comp Choice served the amended complaint on the Clark firm. The Clark firm filed a motion to dismiss arguing, among other things, that the amended complaint was a new and original complaint asserting claims that were barred by the three year statute of limitations. The court granted the Clark firm’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Comp Choice’s complaint with prejudice. Comp Choice appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Service of original complaint The Clark firm argues that the amended complaint cannot relate back to the date of the original complaint under M.R.C.P. 15(c) because the original complaint was never served. M.R.A.P. 15(a) does not require that a pleading be served before it may be amended; rather, it allows a plaintiff to amend his complaint at any time before a responsive pleading is served. The two federal courts that have confronted this issue have held that a plaintiff is allowed to amend the original complaint before it has been served. The only state appellate court to have considered the question likewise held that a plaintiff is allowed to amend the complaint without having first served it on the defendant. Therefore, Rule 15(a) allows a plaintiff to amend his complaint without having first served the complaint on the defendant, and the trial court erred in ruling that Comp Choice’s amended complaint was invalid. Issue 2: Statute of limitations The Clark firm argues that, under M.R.C.P. 15(c), the amended complaint filed by Comp Choice cannot relate back to the date the original complaint was filed because it asserts a new cause of action for a new party and that the latest date the statute of limitations could have begun to run on Comp Choice’s cause of action for legal malpractice was November 11, 2002, when it sent correspondence to Comp Choice regarding the final payment and release of Grinstead’s claim. The Clark firm asserts that the statute of limitations expired on November 11, 2005, and thus the claims Comp Choice asserted in the amended complaint filed on January 9, 2006, were time-barred. Comp Choice argues that the amended complaint did not assert new claims, but merely substituted Comp Choice as the party plaintiff after it became the real party in interest by virtue of Safety Risk’s assignment. Based on federal case law on this issue, an amendment substituting a plaintiff relates back to the date of the original complaint under M.R.C.P. 15(c) if the new plaintiff is the real party in interest. Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether Comp Choice adequately alleged in the amended complaint that it was the assignee of Safety Risk’s claims against the Clark firm and thus the real party in interest. Under M.R.C.P. 8, it is only necessary that the pleadings provide sufficient notice to the defendant of the claims and grounds upon which relief which is sought. Although the amended complaint does not expressly state that Safety Risk assigned the claims it asserted against the Clark firm in the original complaint to Comp Choice, it does state that Comp Choice is an assignee of Safety Risk. This statement can only be interpreted to mean that Safety Risk assigned its claims against the Clark firm to Comp Choice. Accordingly, Comp Choice provided sufficient notice in the amended complaint to the Clark firm that it was asserting the claims of Safety Risk as an assignee of those claims and not asserting new claims. Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether the claims asserted in the amended complaint by Comp Choice were separate claims barred by the statute of limitations.


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