Harris v. Harris


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00873-SCT
Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 08-14-2008
Opinion Author: SMITH, C.J.
Holding: Affirmed
Additional Case Information: Topic: Contempt - Property settlement agreement - Payment of property taxes - Sanctions - M.R.A.P. 38 - M.R.C.P. 11
Judge(s) Concurring: WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ., EASLEY, CARLSON, GRAVES, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): LAMAR, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-10-2007
Appealed from: DeSoto County Chancery Court
Judge: Mitchell M. Lundy, Jr.
Disposition: This appeal arises from an order of the DeSoto County Chancery Court on a petition for contempt filed by Kimbroughly (Elam) Harris (“Kimbroughly”) and counter petition for sanctions filed by James Malcolm Harris, Jr. (“James”). The petition for contempt was originally filed in response to James’s alleged failure to pay property taxes on certain property distributed in the parties’ recent divorce. The chancellor held that the property taxes were marital debt and that James was responsible for the taxes for the time period of January 1, 2006, through December 20, 2006. The court also held that the counter petition was not well taken and denied it.
Case Number: 06-02-0280
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: JAMES MALCOLM HARRIS, JR.




 MALENDA HARRIS MEACHAM, L. ANNE JACKSON HODUM



  
  • Appellant #1 Brief
    		•
    Appellee: KIMBROUGHLY (ELAM) HARRIS M. W. ZUMMACH, JOSEPH M. SPARKMAN  
    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Contempt - Property settlement agreement - Payment of property taxes - Sanctions - M.R.A.P. 38 - M.R.C.P. 11
    Summary of the Facts: Kimbroughly Harris filed a petition for contempt against James Harris, Jr. in response to James’s alleged failure to pay property taxes on certain property distributed in the parties’ recent divorce. James filed a counter petition for sanctions. The chancellor held that the property taxes were marital debt and that James was responsible for the taxes for the time period of January 1, 2006, through December 20, 2006. The court also held that the counter petition was not well taken and denied it. James appeals.
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Property settlement agreement James argues that the chancellor did not interpret or enforce the property settlement agreement as a contract and that nothing in the plain language of the property settlement, as incorporated into the final divorce decree, could be viewed as agreeing to assume a prorated share of any debt. The first step of the analysis is to look at the plain language of the contract. The underlying issue here is whether James or Kimbroughly is responsible for the 2006 property taxes on the marital home pursuant to the property settlement agreement as incorporated in the divorce decree. The property settlement agreement does not directly address the issue of the 2006 property taxes on the marital home. The second step of the analysis is to apply the discretionary canons of contract construction. One such rule of construction is that specific language controls over general inconsistent language in a contract. Construing one provision to control over another does not address the ambiguity of the term “debt.” The final step of the analysis allows the chancellor to incorporate extrinsic or parol evidence in the event the contract still is not clear. In this case the chancellor looked to the temporary order. The chancellor determined that the taxes on the marital home were marital debt and as such James would be responsible for them up until the date the divorce was made final. Based on the facts, there is substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s resolution of the contract’s ambiguity. Issue 2: Sanctions Kimbroughly argues that James should be sanctioned under M.R.A.P. 38 for filing a frivolous appeal. Rule 38 frivolousness has the same definition as M.R.C.P. 11. The question is whether a reasonable person would have any hope for success. The arguments presented on appeal are not frivolous, and therefore sanctions are inappropriate.


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