Evans v. State
| Docket Number: | 2007-CT-00443-SCT Linked Case(s): 2007-KM-00443-COA ; 2007-KM-00443-COA ; 2007-CT-00443-SCT |
|
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-21-2010 Opinion Author: Pierce, J. Holding: Court of Appeals affirmed; Circuit court reversed and remanded for a new trial. |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: DUI First Offense - Section 63-11-30(1) - Common-law DUI - Per se DUI - Admission of expert testimony Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph, Lamar and Chandler, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - MISDEMEANOR Writ of Certiorari: yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-20-2007 Appealed from: MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Thomas J. Gardner Disposition: The Justice Court of Monroe County convicted Mary Reed Evans of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. Evans appealed to the Circuit Court of Monroe County. After a trial de novo without a jury, the circuit court came to the same result. Evans appealed, and the Court of Appeals, in a six-to-three decision, reversed the conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. The Court of Appeals found that the circuit court had erred in its application of Porter v. State, 749 So. 2d 250 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), and also found that Dr. A. K. Rosenhan was qualified to give his expert opinion. District Attorney: John Richard Young Case Number: Cr07-042 |
|
| Note: | The matter is now before this Court on writ of certiorari, and we find error in part of the Court of Appeals’ analysis. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Monroe County Circuit Court and remand this matter for a new trial, although for different reasons than those of the Court of Appeals, which also reversed and remanded. See the original COA opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO51259.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Mary Reed Evans |
JOSEPH JOSHUA STEVENS, JR. |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | DUI First Offense - Section 63-11-30(1) - Common-law DUI - Per se DUI - Admission of expert testimony |
| Summary of the Facts: | Mary Evans was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense in justice court. Evans appealed to the circuit court. After a trial de novo without a jury, the circuit court came to the same result. Evans appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The State argued at trial that Porter v. State, 749 So. 2d 250 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), bars any attempt to introduce evidence that precludes a finding that Evans was guilty under section 63-11-30(1)(c), which is the DUI-per-se portion of the statute governing blood-alcohol levels. Evans argues that the holding in Porter bars only the admission of evidence in an attempt to prove that alcohol consumption did not impair the driver. Evans claims that she is attempting to introduce evidence that her BAC was below the legal limit at the time she was driving, and she is not attempting to prove that her alcohol consumption failed to impair her driving. The circuit court judge accepted the interpretation of Porter offered by the State whereby the defense is prohibited from introducing evidence from either expert or lay witnesses regarding alcohol consumption because this is a “DUI-per-se case,” and an admissible Intoxilyzer test result showed Evans’s BAC to be over the legal limit. The Court of Appeals held that Porter was inapplicable to this case because Evans was attempting to introduce evidence to prove her blood-alcohol content was below the legal limit, rather than attempting to prove she was not intoxicated. Porter is distinguishable and not controlling in the instant case. Section 63-11-30(1)(a) is referred to as “common-law DUI,” and it is distinguishable from section 63-11-30(1)(c), which is referred to as “per-se DUI.” “Common-law DUI” is often used to prosecute defendants when BAC test results are unavailable, or the defendant’s BAC tests are under the legal limit, but there is sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s ability to operate a vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol. This evidence of impairment may include slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, or erratic driving. However, in Evans’s case, there is no “impairment” evidence, only her BAC level. Thus, Evans was not prosecuted under the common-law DUI statute, but for a per-se violation under section 63-11-30(1)(c). Porter stands for the proposition that in a DUI-per-se case, the defendant cannot offer evidence regarding whether or not he was under the influence which would impair his ability to drive a vehicle. Evans was not offering expert testimony on retrograde extrapolation to prove she was not impaired when she was pulled over. Instead, she offered it to prove that she did not have a BAC of .08% or more when she was pulled over; thus, she did not violate section 63-11-30(1)(c). The Court of Appeals found Evans’ expert witness to be qualified. However, the trial judge never made a determination of the qualifications of witness as an expert witness. He also made no finding on the reliability of the testimony. Since the trial judge is vested with gatekeeping responsibility, it is his duty to determine whether or not a witness is qualified and whether the testimony is reliable, consistent with the standard set out in the Rules of Evidence. The decision by the Court of Appeals on the qualifications of the witness as an expert was inappropriate. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
