Rayner v. Pennington
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-01924-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-07-2010 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Reckless disregard - Section 11-46-9(1)(c) - Emergency vehicle - Section 63-3-809(1) - Section 63-3-315 Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Dickinson, Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens and Pierce, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, P.J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-14-2008 Appealed from: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: William E. Chapman, III Disposition: The Circuit Court of Rankin County granted summary judgment to Rankin County. Case Number: 2007-73C |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | MILDRED ELAINE THOMPSON RAYNER,
INDIVIDUALLY AND MICHELLE LYNN
RAYNER BYNUM, AS NATURAL MOTHER AND
NEXT FRIEND OF BILLY JOE DAVID BYNUM, A
MINOR |
GARY LEE WILLIAMS, J. EDWARD RAINER |
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| Appellee: | SHERIFF RONNIE PENNINGTON, FOR THE COUNTY OF RANKIN, MISSISSIPPI, MICHAEL B. McCARTY, AND JOHN DOES 1-6 | MICHAEL JEFFREY WOLF, C. ALLEN McDANIEL, III | ||
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Reckless disregard - Section 11-46-9(1)(c) - Emergency vehicle - Section 63-3-809(1) - Section 63-3-315 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Mildred Rayner and Michelle Rayner Bynum, as natural mother and next friend of Billy Joe David Bynum, a minor, filed suit against Rankin County Sheriff Ronnie Pennington, Deputy Michael B. McCarty, and John Does 1-6, for injuries stemming from a vehicular accident. The court granted summary judgment to Rankin County. Rayner appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Rayner argues that genuine issues of material fact were present that Deputy McCarty acted in reckless disregard of the safety and wellbeing of her and her passenger, because he entered the intersection from an improper lane, against the red light, and with an obstructed view of the eastbound lane of Highway 18. Reckless disregard under section 11-46-9(1)(c) embraces willful and wanton conduct which requires knowingly or intentionally doing a thing or wrongful act. Police officers are not liable for negligence, which is a failure to exercise due care. Here, testimony from Deputy McCarty and two eyewitnesses stated that Deputy McCarty had his lights and sirens on. In fact, one of the witnesses was traveling from the same direction as Rayner, and she heard the sirens and yielded to Deputy McCarty’s patrol car. Rayner testified that she heard no sirens and did not see any blue lights; however, Rayner testified that she had not detected the presence of the patrol car at all before the collision. Because she never detected the patrol car, Rayner could not have known whether or not it had lights and sirens on. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rayner, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Deputy McCarty’s lights and sirens were on, as every witness who observed his patrol car perceived the lights and sirens. Further, it was undisputed that, although Deputy McCarty’s view was obstructed due to the vehicle stopped in the center turn lane, he appreciated the danger from oncoming traffic and proceeded cautiously by keeping a lookout and slowly creeping into the intersection. In light of section 63-3-809(1), which requires other drivers to yield to an emergency vehicle, Deputy McCarty’s precautionary measures of looking both ways and cautiously creeping into the intersection evinces that Deputy McCarty appreciated the risk involved in crossing the intersection. Therefore, Deputy McCarty’s conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard. Rayner also argues that, although Deputy McCarty was driving an authorized emergency vehicle, he lacked authorization to cross the intersection under section 63-3-315 because he was responding to a “disturbance,” not an “emergency call.” There is no caselaw construing the term “emergency call” as used in section 63-3-315. Nor is there any evidence disclosing what the disturbance might have been in this case. Rayner bears the burden to prove that Deputy McCarty acted in reckless disregard. Rayner has not submitted any proof that the situation to which Deputy McCarty was responding was of such an insignificant nature that he acted in reckless disregard by crossing the intersection against the red light. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rayner, nothing about Deputy McCarty’s conduct demonstrated a conscious indifference to consequences equating to almost a willingness that harm should result. |
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