Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Lumpkin


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00449-COA
Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-00449-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-15-2009
Opinion Author: Ishee, J.
Holding: DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED – 02/05/2008 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 02/20/2008 – GRANTED; AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Arbitration agreement - Healthcare surrogate - Consideration - Fraud - Unconscionability
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Barnes and Roberts, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton and Maxwell, JJ.
Procedural History: Motion for Rehearing
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY; Motion for Rehearing

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-09-2007
Appealed from: PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: Prentiss Harrell
Disposition: TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Case Number: 2006-0438

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: COVENANT HEALTH & REHABILITATION OF PICAYUNE, LP AND COVENANT DOVE, INC.




JOHN L. MAXEY, PAUL HOBART KIMBLE



 

Appellee: NELLIE LUMPKIN, BY AND THROUGH FRED LUMPKIN, NEXT FRIEND F.M. TURNER  

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Topic: Personal injury - Arbitration agreement - Healthcare surrogate - Consideration - Fraud - Unconscionability

Summary of the Facts: The motion for rehearing is granted, and this opinion is substituted for the original opinion. Nellie Lumpkin, through her husband and next friend Fred Lumpkin, filed suit against Covenant Health & Rehabilitation of Picayune, LP and Covenant Dove, Inc., seeking damages for personal injuries that allegedly occurred during her stay at its facility. Covenant Health subsequently moved to compel arbitration of the case based on the arbitration clause found in its standard admissions agreement. The circuit court refused to compel arbitration, finding the admissions agreement substantively unconscionable and void as a matter of law. Covenant Health appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Subsequent to the Court's initial decision, the Supreme Court decided Covenant Health & Rehabilitation of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds, 14 So. 3d 695 (Miss. 2009), in which it held that an arbitration agreement identical to that present in this case was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. Lumpkin does not dispute that her daughter was acting as her healthcare surrogate for the purposes of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act. A healthcare surrogate, acting under the provisions of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, is capable of binding his or her patient to arbitration. Lumpkin argues that the arbitration clause should fail for lack of consideration. In any contract, all that is needed to constitute a valid consideration to support an agreement or contract is that there must be either a benefit to the promissor or a detriment to the promisee. If either of these requirements exist, there is a sufficient consideration. Here, there is clearly sufficient consideration to support the arbitration agreement. Both parties undertook duties toward one another under the admissions agreement. Covenant Health promised to provide care and assistance to Lumpkin. Lumpkin promised to pay Covenant Health for its service. The mutuality of exchange found throughout the admissions agreement provides ample evidence that there was sufficient consideration to support the arbitration clause. Clearly under the language of the agreement, the arbitration clause was meant to apply to any dispute, regardless of its nature, that arose between the facility and Lumpkin, including her current claims of negligence and malpractice. Lumpkin argues that her daughter was fraudulently induced into signing the admissions agreement. However, the facts indicate that this is not what happened. The admissions agreement itself did not contain any false information; it simply contained terms that could have been altered had the daughter attempted to do so. Lumpkin correctly points out that the admissions agreement her daughter signed contains several clauses that have exactly the same language as clauses in other nursing home admissions agreements that the Supreme Court has explicitly held are unconscionable. This issue is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.


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